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THE
WORKS
OF

THOMAS SHARP, D. D.
Late ARCHDEACON of *Northumberland*, and
PREBENDARY of *Durham*.

VOLUME II.

CONTAINING,
TRACTS
ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

LONDON:

Printed for ROBERT HORSFIELD, at the *Crown*
in *Ludgate-Street*. 1763.



TRACTS

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

Formerly Printed separately.

Now Collected into One VOLUME.

A Vindication of Bp. *Taylor*.
Reply to the Protestant Flail.
Preface to the fifth and sixth
Volumes of Archbishop
Sharp's Sermons.
Preface to the Seventh Vo-
lume of the same.

Questions for examining
Children and young Per-
sons in the Catechism.
Letters on Moral Virtue and
Moral Obligation.
Speech at *Farewell-Hall*.
Discourses on Preaching.

By *THOMAS SHARP*, D. D.

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1811



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ERRATA.

Vindication of B. Taylor.

P. 28. line penult. for *most* read *more*.

Reply to the Protestant Flail.

P. 51. l. 11. for *incerting*, read *inserting*. P. 112. l. 7. for 1 Pet. iii. 1. read 1 Pet. iii. 21. P. 159. l. the last, in the Margin, for Eccl. iv. 3. read Eccles. iv. 12. P. 478. l. 3. for *judicious*, read *judicious*.

A VINDICATION of Bishop
Taylor, From the injurious Misrepresentation of him by the Author of
 the LETTER to the Clergy of the
 Church of *England* in the County
 of *Northumberland*. With a few
 Remarks upon some other PASSAGES
 in that Letter. First printed in
 1733.

THE Letter-writer might have passed unmolested, for any Thing he hath said himself either by Way of *Challenge* or *Advice* to the Clergy of *Northumberland*, (for They will *accept* neither from *such Hands*, but equally despise *both*) had he not by a false and most unjust Representation of Bishop *Taylor* grossly abused his Readers. For after he hath spit his own *little* Venom, being conscious of his own natural Impotence, he hath tacked to his Letter, by Way of Postscript, three or four Passages from Bishop *Taylor*, much to his own Purpose, but greatly to the

VOL. II. B Prejudice

Prejudice of that learned Man's Character, by an unufal Piece of Fraud in the Manner of Quotation.

As the Bishop's Polemical Works, out of which these Passages are taken, are in the Hands of few People, but his Name and Character univerfally known, this Cheat may poffibly be attended with ill Confequence; while *his Authority* is vouched, and *his Testimony* produced for *Doctrines which he never held*; and there be very few even of the Clergy of *Northumberland* Themfelves, who have the Opportunity of Examining how these Passages lie in the Place from whence they are taken, and thereby detecting the Iniquity and false Dealing of this their new Correspondent. The Defign therefore of this Paper is to fet these Quotations in a true Light, as well for the *Vindication* of the good Bishop, and feafonable Reprehenfion of the fraudulent Letter-writer; as to prevent the Effects of his thus impofing on his Readers, either by furprifing the more wary and intelligent, or deceiving the Weak and unlearned among them: To all whom thofe Quotations muft needs appear shocking, as they ftand difguifed and unexplained in his Poftfcript.

Bifhop

Bishop Taylor, in his noble *Collection of Polemical Discourses* (the third Edition published in Folio, Lond. 1674) hath one intitled, *A Discourse concerning the Liberty of Prophefying*. The eighteenth Section of which is intitled, *A particular Consideration of the Opinions of the Anabaptists*, pag. 1040.

And here he treats very largely and fully of their Capital Opinion against the Baptism of Infants. He begins with these Words. *Although it be a Doctrine justly condemned by the most Sorts of Christians upon great Grounds of Reason, yet possibly their Defence may be so great, as to take off much, and rebate the Edge of their Adversaries Assault. It will be neither unpleasant nor unprofitable to draw a short Scheme of Plea for each Party, the Result of which possibly may be, that though they be deceived, yet they have so great Excuse on their Side, that their Errour is not impudent or vincible. The Baptism of Infants rests principally and usually upon this Discourse, &c.* Then he produces the several Arguments usually alledged for Infant Baptism, which take up the next nine Paragraphs or Sections.

At the twelfth Section, p. 1042. He begins to represent what the Anabaptists have to say in Opposition to those Arguments before laid down, and in Justification of their own Tenent. *To all this, says he, the Anabaptist gives a soft and gentle Answer, &c.* And so he goes on to the thirty-fourth Section, p. 1051, personating the Anabaptist, and saying a great deal more for their Doctrine, and urging it a great deal better than ever they could do for themselves. Having acted his Part very dextrously, he concludes, *Thus far the Anabaptists may argue;—They have been encouraged in their Errour more by the accidental Advantages we have given them by our weak Arguings, than by any Excellency of their Wit, and (much less) any Advantage of their Cause.—But because all Men will not understand my Purpose* (he speaks of such People as our Letter-writer, who for want of Learning, no more understand the Use of the Figure *Prosopopæia*, than they do the Use of the Rite *Pædobaptism*) *or think my Meaning innocent unless I answer the Arguments which I have made or gathered.—I have chosen therefore to add some Animadversions upon the Anabaptists Plea.* And then he proceeds in
 eighteen

eighteen Pages, solidly confuting the Plea which he had been drawing a Scheme of, and demolishing that Castle which he had been building for them in the Air; and in which our wise Letter-writer thinks yet to take Sanctuary. See from Page 1051, to Page 1069. The Plea refuted.

Now the Reader, who hath not these Works of Bishop *Taylor*, and is not acquainted with them, is desired to take Notice that all the Passages cited as the Bishop's in the Postscript above-mentioned, are taken out of this Anabaptists Plea, as it stands ingeniously supported by his Wit, and agreeably adorned by his Style. They are his own Words and Expressions; so far is true. Nay, the Arguments themselves are so far his own, as he hath by the Help of a fine Imagination and a superior Fancy, drest them up in greater Strength and Beauty than the Anabaptists themselves could ever do, *yet, they are not*, as they are represented in the Postscript, *his Sentiments*: Nor could the Letter-writer imagine that they were; though he hath shewed but little Judgment or Skill in the Choice of them, for he hath only picked out such Passages as

suitest best with his own low Taste, and hath left the more ingenious and subtile Arguments behind.

Quotations in the Postscript from Bishop Taylor, personating the Anabaptist,

Why cannot God (says Bishop Taylor) as well do his Mercies to Infants now immediately, as he did before the Institution either of Circumcision or Baptism? *Num. 17. p. 1044.*

However there is no Danger that Infants should

Quotations out of the same Discourse of Bishop Taylor's where he refutes his own Arguments for the Anabaptists.

To the last Clause viz. *Why cannot God as well do his Mercies to Infants, &c.* I answer, that I know no Man that says he cannot; but yet this was not sufficient to hinder Babes from Circumcision, and why then shall it hinder them from Baptism? *Ad Num. 17. p. 1058.*

This Precept was in all Ages expounded to signify

should perish for Want
of this external Mini-
stry, much less for
prevaricating Christ's
Precept of *Nisi quis*
renatus fuerit, &c. Ib.
N. 18.

signify the ordinary
Necessity of Baptism
to all Persons; and
nisi quis can mean In-
fants as well as Men
of Age: And because
it commands a new
Birth and a Regene-
ration, and implies
that a natural Birth
cannot intitle us to
Heaven; but the se-
cond Birth must; In-
fants who have as much
need and as much
Right to Heaven as
Men of Years, and
yet cannot have it by
natural or first Birth,
must have it by the
Second and Spiritual.

p. 1059.

For first the Water
and Spirit in this Place
signify the same Thing,
and by Water is meant
the

I reply, that *there-*
fore they do not signi-
fy the same Thing, be-
cause by Water is
B 4 meant.

the Effect of the Spirit, cleansing and purifying the Soul, as appears in its parallel Place of Christ baptizing with the Spirit and with Fire.

meant the Effect of the Spirit, unless the Effect and the Cause be the same thing; so that here is a Contradiction in the Parts of the Allegation. — I shall not need to consider their parallel Instance. — This Place was verified in the Letter, and first Signification of it, and so did relate to the miraculous Descent of the Holy Ghost in the Likeness of Tongues of Fire. But this concerns not all, for all were not so baptized, &c. *Ad Num. 18.*

The rest of this Quotation answered

Quotations in the next Paragraph out of *Num. 31. p. 1049.*

Ad Num. 18. p. 1059.

Answered at Page 1066.

Quotation

Quotation out of Page 1050.	Answered at Page 1067.
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Quotation out of <i>Num.</i> 32, which is the last.	Answered in Pages 1067 and 1068.
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Thus far Bishop
Taylor. See Postscript.

I have now confide-
red all that the Ana-
baptists can with Pro-
bability object against
our Arguments, and
have discovered the
Weakness of their
Exceptions. *Ad Num.*
25.

To confront every Sentence that he hath
quoted out of the Bishop's Discourse with its
respective Answer out of the same, in Words
at length, as is done in the three first Senten-
ces, would take up much room to little Pur-
pose. This short Specimen, with the Refe-
rences to those Places in Bishop *Taylor's* Book,
where any Person, who has a Mind to satisfy
himself further, will find the several Answers,
may be sufficient to justify that learned Divine,
and to demonstrate the shameful Want of In-
genuity

genuity and Honesty in the Letter-writer, who could condescend to such a mean Art as this, to give some Appearance of Authority to his own weak Reasonings; and draw his Reader by a Cheat into a Persuasion, into which he could not draw him by his Arguments.

And this may suffice for an Answer to his Postscript.

As to his Letter itself, which he hath wrote to rebuke the Clergy of *Northumberland* for *unchristianing*, as he calls it, the Quakers, he should be given to understand, that the *Northumberland* Clergy, whatever they may *think* of those of his Sect, yet do not use to call them by any unchristian Names, (unless *Quaker* itself be such) or otherwise reproach or injure them; but are willing they should enjoy the Toleration that the Laws have given them, and may reasonably expect from them, in such Circumstances, at least Peace and good Words. But since nothing will satisfy him, but a public Acknowledgement of their *Right* to be called *Christians*, which he proclaims in his Title Page, and asserts throughout his Letter, supports it from Scripture, and from the Doctrine of the Church of *England* in her Articles,

cles, and inveighs against the Clergy as the People most forward to rob them of it; since this is the Case, it will be worth while to see how he makes this Claim out for *his Friends*. And truly they will have no Reason to thank him; for it follows from his own Arguments that they are *no Christians*; which is more perhaps than the Clergy of *Northumberland*, if he will but let them alone, would care to cast in their Teeth.

His first Position is, *That Quakers do believe the Baptism of Christ as fully and sincerely as any Christian ever did. And he Challenges them* (viz. the Clergy,) *to prove the Contrary*, p. 3. And if they were to challenge him to prove that the Quakers *do sincerely believe it*, he would find it impossible to give them Satisfaction: So that such *absurd Challenges* are better let alone. They do not, by their own Confession, believe *that* to be *the Baptism of Christ* which all other Christians hold for *such*. And how *sincerely* they do believe what they call *His Baptism*, will not be known, or credited on their bare Word. Every Body will judge of *their sincerity* as he is disposed.

But

But there may be a Fallacy in the Assertion: For they do not allow any to be properly *Christians* but themselves (as this Writer himself insinuates a little further, and is the Consequence of his Doctrine, whatever he may have said in the Beginning of his Letter to the Contrary.) So that what he says here, may in this Sense be true enough, for any Thing we know, *viz.* that, whatever they mean by the Baptism of Christ, *it is as fully and sincerely believed by one as by another of them.* And he may safely *Challenge* all the World to prove the Contrary.

His next step is, that *sprinkling Infants, and signing them with the Cross, are in his Opinion mere Ceremonies, &c.* p. 4. Here too we have only his Word for it: And were he to add his *solemn Affirmation*, it would not advance *his bare Opinion and Judgment* into an Argument. And besides, what hath Infant Baptism to do with the Point he has undertaken to make out, *viz.* *That Quakers are Christians?* He has spent four Pages in condemning the Practice of Baptizing Infants: But how doth this help towards proving either the *Baptism, or Christianity of Quakers?* Why doth he take up the Weapons
of

of the *Anabaptists*, (or *Baptists*, as they call themselves) and fight in their Cause, seeming thereby to allow of Dipping, or the Baptism of Adults (See *Fran. Bugg's Quakerism Withering*, p. 46. *Lond.* 1694); when at the same Time he really disallows of *that* too, and opposes the external Rite, which they use to make themselves Christians, as vehemently as he opposes the Baptism of Infants? He brings no Conclusion for his own Right to Christianity either way; but only a Proof of his own Insincerity.

He would pretend indeed, as a Colour for this Proceeding, that the Clergy *do Unchristian the Quakers for denying Baptism to Infants*. This he repeats over and over, and in Answer to it tells them, that *if they cannot prove that Infant Baptism is the Baptism of Christ, then the Foundation of their Charge against the Quakers is false*. But this is a mere Pretence; for if this was all the Charge against them, they would only be reckoned and called *Anabaptists*, or *Antipædobaptists*. But the Charge upon which they are reported *no Christians*, is of a more grievous Nature, *viz. The renouncing Water-Baptism in general, and denying it to all without Distinction*.

So

So that this Suggestion of his is not only false, but improbable, and can do him no Service.

The same may be said of his next Plea, p. 5. *That Infant Baptism is, according to the Doctrine of the Church of England, an Article of Faith.—And that the Quakers are unchristian'd for not believing this Article.—Because (as he says) it is neither contained in Scripture, nor can be proved thereby; as every Article of Faith, according to the Judgment of our Church, ought to be.*

He hath read our Articles (as he hath done Bishop Taylor) without understanding the Subject or Design of them; otherwise he would have learned the Difference between *assenting* to a *Doctrine*, and *obeying* a Precept, between *Belief* and *Profession*, *Faith* and *Baptism*; which are as clearly distinguished *in them*, as they are *in Mark xvi. 16.* *He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved.* Whereby it appears that Baptism is necessary to Salvation, though it be not *a necessary Article of Faith.* What is said in the Articles of Infant Baptism, is no more than this, that *it is in any Wise to be retained in the Church, as most agreeable with the Institution*

Institution of Christ. He is to blame to quarrel with this, for it is not the Ground and Bottom upon which the Condemnation of Quakers stands.

Let him rather try how he will refute that other Position which very nearly concerns him and them. ART. 27. *Baptism is a sign of Profession, and Mark of Difference, whereby Christians are discerned from others that be not Christians.*—*Christiani à non Christianis*, as the Latin is, viz. They who have put on Christ in Water-Baptism, from Jews, Turks, Infidels, Quakers, &c.

What he says, p. 6. is founded on the like Mistake. *Would you think the Quakers did you Justice, if they should pronounce you no Christians, because you deny the Doctrine of Transubstantiation?* He takes this to be a parallel Case; as if any Man's being a Christian depended on his admitting or denying that particular Doctrine. He should have put it thus to have made it parallel, *Would you think, &c. if they should pronounce you no Papists, because you deny Transubstantiation?* And then both the Answer, and the Application would be plain and easy. For as no Man who denies that Doctrine is a true Papist,

Papist, so no Man who denies Baptism is a true Christian.

At length he produces his last and grand Argument against Infant Baptism. *He calls upon the most wise and learned of them, (viz. Northumberland Clergy) to prove Infant Baptism from Scripture, that is (says he, that they may not mistake his meaning) to prove from Scripture, that sprinkling Infants on their Foreheads with a little Water, is the Baptism of Christ instituted by Him, and practised by his Apostles.*

Poor Gentlemen, how will they deal with this Man, or satisfy his Demands ! They will prove to him, that *all without Exception who are capable of being admitted into Covenant with God through Christ are to be baptized, Mat. xxviii. 19. Mark xvi. 16. John iii. 5. Eph. iv. 5, &c.* They will prove *little Children to be as capable of this under the Gospel, as they were under the Law to be Members of the Covenant in Christ to come ; and that they are, at that Age, intitled to the Kingdom of God, and highly acceptable to our Saviour, Mark x. 14, 15, 16.* That they are *not to be kept from him, not to be despised, but may serve*

as a Pattern even to Adults, *Matth. xviii. 3, 4, 5, 6, 10.* And they will prove, that if Children be *thus capable of Admission into the Gospel Covenant*, they cannot be *excluded* from the *outward Seal* of it. For allowing *their Capacity*, we have no Controversy even with the *Anabaptists*, concerning this Conclusion.

Nay they will give him more direct Scripture Proof of Infant Baptism, from *1 Cor. vii. 14. Now are your Children holy.* Which cannot be fairly and consistently understood otherwise than of those Children having been baptized, as many of the old Fathers interpreted it, and hath been more particularly shewn by learned Men of late; Dr *Hammond* on the Place; Dr *Wall*, *Infant Baptism, Chap. 11. Sect. 11.* and others.

But though they will prove *all this*, as hath been done an hundred Times, and backed with the perpetual Practice of the Church, from the Times of the Apostles, to the present Age, (as Dr *Wall* hath particularly shewn in *his History of Infant Baptism*) yet it will not come up to what this Letter-Writer calls for. For there is not a Word in the Bible of *sprinkling Infants*, or of *their Foreheads*, or of a

little Water to be used for the Purpose, which are the Things he must be satisfied in. They can prove *the Thing*, that is, *the Right of Children to Baptism*; that they not only *may*, but *ought* to be baptized; and that *pouring Water on their Faces*, is as literally and truly *washing them*, as if they were dipped; and that *a little Water* may suffice for *little Children*. But here is the Misfortune, they cannot shew to this Man in all the Scripture, the Words *Infant Baptism* any more than *Infant circumcision*. But they will tell him, in lieu of it, that if his Way of Arguing be right, it will prove more than he thinks of, and hold as strongly against the *Quakers Baptism*, as *Infant Baptism*.

For the *Baptism of Christ*, or *Christ's Baptism*, (which are his constant Terms for expressing the *only true Baptism*, wherewith Quakers are baptized,) are Expressions not to be met with in the whole Bible. And they will, in his own Words, *Desire him to shew them where they are, that they may read them; for they have read both the Old and New Testament through* (much ofner, and to more purpose, than ever he hath done) *and yet they cannot find any such Phrase* as he talks of. They read often of the
Baptism

Baptism of John, and of the Baptism of Repentance: But though the Word *Baptism* occurs above twenty Times in the New Testament, yet they could never meet with it so used, viz. *Baptism of Christ*. Therefore according to his own Argument, *He that is not baptized with the Baptism of Christ, is not a true Christian, although in Words he may profess Christ*, p. 4. But the *Baptism of Christ* not being to be read in Scripture, any more than *Infant Baptism*, the Quakers cannot have it in their own Way of Reasoning; and consequently are *not Christians, though they may in Words profess Christ*.

This is really the first fair Deduction or Conclusion that comes out of his boasted Arguments to prove the Quakers to be Christians.

To omit therefore all the impertinent Inferences he draws from his pretended Confutation of Infant Baptism, let us proceed to his next Argument levelled against Baptism *with Water*.

He says, p. 7. *That the Baptism of Christ cannot be proved from Scripture to be a Water-Baptism*. The Reason which he gives is, that

in the Institution of Baptism, *Matth. xxviii. 19. There is no Mention of Water.* No more there is of *Christ*. And therefore if *Water-Baptism* cannot for this Reason be proved from thence, no more can the *Baptism of Christ*.

But it is as certain that *Water-Baptism* was here instituted, as that *Christ* did institute it. And it is certain that the Apostles understood it so, as appears both by their Practice and Writings. *Acts x. 47, and viii. 36, 38. Eph. v. 26. Heb. x. 22.* In all which Places *Water* is expressly mentioned.

But all the Misinterpretations of this Text in *Matthew*, by the Quakers, are owing, as hath been observed often, to their Ignorance of the learned Languages, and inability to judge rightly of the Translations. Here, for Instance, *Baptize* is a Greek Word, which becoming a technical Term in other Languages to express this Sacrament, is only *made English* by usage. Otherwise our Translators might have rendered it here, as they have done in other Places, *Go, and wash Men in the Name of the Father, &c.* And then there would be no Room for this Cavil, or for the Nonsense that follows about understanding the Form, not of *the Name*,
but

but *Power of the Father*, &c. But though our Letter-Writer hath got here, what is properly and truly a Quaker's Argument, yet he doth not care to trust himself with the Management of it, but calls in the Assistance of a *Friend*; and brings in a Quotation from one of *the Brotherhood*. The slender Substance of which having been confuted again and again, shall only be answered here by a Reference to *Mr Leslie's Divine Institution of Water-Baptism*, Sect. 1 and 2. And *Wall's Defence of his History of Infant Baptism*. Cap. 3 and 4. And we will proceed to his last, and only Argument properly so called, to prove the Quakers Christians.

It is this, p. 10. *John, said Christ to his Disciples, truly baptized with Water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many Days hence. Here Christ plainly distinguishes John's Water-Baptism from the Baptism of the Holy Ghost. John had baptized with Water, but Christ tells his Followers that they should be baptized with the Holy Ghost. Now Mark (says he) that the Followers of Christ are to be baptized with the Holy Ghost. And now he thinks he has done the Business compleatly; only, as*

he adds, it *will concern* every Body to have *this Witness* in themselves, (as to be sure the Quakers *all* have it) and then *he believes that such Ceremonies as Infant sprinkling would die away*. And none but *Friends* would be true Christians.

But now the most ignorant Person who reads this Argument, may plainly see that the whole Force of it lies in his dropping the Words, *not many Days hence*, which would have spoiled all, because they restrain what Christ said to his Disciples only, and in his substituting Followers instead of Disciples. For if, where he bid us *Mark*, we do but mark this silly Fraud of his, we shall find the Conclusion we are to attend to, is no more than this, that *the Disciples of Christ were to be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many Days after*.

And what is this to the other Followers of Christ, or Quakers in particular. They have not *this Baptism of the Holy Ghost*, for that was promised only to these Disciples, and they do not pretend *to any other*; therefore they have not the *Baptism of Christ* in any Sense: And then, according to his own Rule, as was observed

served before, *He that is not baptized with the Baptism of Christ* (which the Quakers are not) *is not a true Christian, although in Words he may profess Christ* (as the Quakers do.) So that in short this poor Man, because he was told the Clergy had said, that the Quakers were *no Christians*, has wrote them a Letter really to prove the Thing which they were reported to have said.

But notwithstanding they have said Nothing but what he himself hath verified in Publick, yet he must have his Fling at them, for being in other Respects *false Teachers*, p. 12. and receiving, which is most abominable, *both Tithes and Titles from Man*.

THE Apostles (saith he, p. 11.) *preached Christ freely without Money or Tithes; not for filthy Lucre's Sake, as some now do. They were Men of great Simplicity and Self-denial, some of them poor Fishermen to their Trades. They were not Lovers of flattering Titles, such as my Lord, Doctor of Divinity, Master of Arts, &c. which those now a-Days, who would be accounted the Ministers of Christ, receive from Man*.

Whether the Clergy of the Church of England, or the Quakers (who look upon

themselves to be the only true Successors of the Apostles) do preach, all Circumstances considered, most like the Apostles, is fully examined in a Book intitled, *Christianity no Enthusiasm* (in Answer to *Thomas Elwood*) Chap. 3. where the Author proves the Quakers to be very unlike the Apostles in several Instances. Also in *Francis Bugg his Christian Ministry of the Church of England, distinguished from the Antichristian Ministry of the Quakers, being a Reply to their Letter to the Clergy of Norfolk and Suffolk*, London 1699, p. 15—18. where he runs a Comparison between the Doctrines of the one and of the other; to which the Reader is referred, if he wants Satisfaction. All that shall be remarked here is, That the only Pretence the Quakers can have of preaching like the Apostles, must be from two Circumstances, where there is an accidental Similitude, in that they preach the Gospel *without Money or Tithes*, and *without* having had any proper Education to fit them for so Great a Work.

But it must be remember'd, that this Semblance (such as it is) between them, who in all other Respects are as unlike as possible, is no
Manner

of Credit to the Quakers, and at the same Time no Kind of Disparagement of the Apostles; whose Wants were abundantly supplied by the Churches, and whose Deficiency in Learning (or other Qualifications necessary to recommend them to the World) incident to their former Way of Life, was amply made up by supernatural Gifts and Powers, whereby they, *who were but Fishermen by Trade*, were enabled to dictate both to the learned Scribe and Philosopher. But how doth it follow from hence, that *Weavers, Pedlars, and Woolcombers*, who pretending a Call from the Spirit, set up for Apostolical Preachers, are Successors of the Apostles, or like them in their Characters? To preach Christ *truly*, though *with Money and Tithes*, is much nearer the Apostolick Pattern, than to preach him *falsly and ignorantly without them*. And what would become of us, if it were not for those *Lords, Doctors of Divinity, and Masters of Arts*, who preserve sound Learning in the World, and guard Men from the Doctrines of *Enthusiasts* (*who would be accounted the Ministers of Christ*) and support good Sense, and the true Interpretation of

of the Scriptures, against Nonsense, and the Chimeras of Ignorance?

How *flattering* soever *these Titles* may seem to poor Handicraftsmen, who know not why or wherefore they are bestowed, yet they are very consistent with the *Simplicity* and *Self-denial* of the Gospel, and are Titles usually born with less Pride and Ostentation, than the Quakers seem guilty of in their affected Singularities.

In fine, to dismiss the Letter-writer with a little friendly Advice, let him consider, that Times are not now as they were in the Apostles Days, nor is there any Person now living to be compared with them. The best Method we can take to be like them, is to observe punctually their Directions; one of which, of great Consequence to the Publick, is, *That as God hath distributed to every Man, as he hath called every Man, so let him walk and abide therein—not intruding into Things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up in his fleshly Mind—but studying to be quiet, and to do his own Business. For God is not the Author of Confusion, but of Peace.*

Let

Let the Quakers then keep to their *Shop-boards*, and to their *Looms*, &c. and mind their several Occupations, and not aspire to Things above their Reach, and beyond their Sphere, *desiring to be Teachers of the Law, and yet neither understanding what they say, nor whereof they affirm.* Let them be just in their Dealings, peaceable in their Lives, and, as much as they please, *silent in their Meetings*; for Silence in Matters of Religion is always safest, and best becoming those who know the least of it. However, let them be *silent* at least out of their Assemblies, and not publish their Folly to the World. Above all, let them not lay Claim to the Privileges of *Masters of Arts*, and *Doctors of Divinity*, when they disclaim and abhor *those Titles*; nor pretend a Right to be *Teachers in Theology*, when they have no Characters of Education upon them, to denote their Capacity of being so. The Credit of *those Styles* is as much beyond their Attainments, as it is above their Scorn: And they cannot wish to be farther from the Honour of them, than they are in Reality from deserving them.

And as to the *Pedlar*, who took upon him to deliver this Letter to some of the Clergy of

Let

of *Northumberland*, let him know, that if he burdens his Pack with Arguments and distinctions, or any Kind of *Book-learning*, he will soon make it too heavy for his Shoulders ; he is not fit for this Business, neither hath he *License* to vend such Wares.

THE Act of Toleration will not authorize him to carry about *Challenges in controverted Points of Religion*. Let him therefore for the future meddle no further *with the Clergy of this County*, than only to carry them *Holland* for their Shirts, and *Cambrick* for their Bands ; and be content with such Business as he was bred to. And let him be more just and fair in his Pedling-Trade, than his Friend the Letter-writer is in *his Quotations* ; for if he doth not come more honestly by his Goods, than the other hath done by his Passages out of *Bishop Taylor*, and should presume to impose upon his Customers *with stolen Remnants*, as the other hath upon his Readers, if he be not quite so easily detected, yet he may be sure, when ever he is found out, to be most severely corrected. †

A R E P L Y to a Pamphlet, entitled,
The P R O T E S T A N T F L A I L ; or, *A*
 Defence (grounded upon Scripture)
of a Letter to the C l e r g y of Nor-
 thumberland. In further Vindica-
 tion of Bishop *Taylor* ; and in Justi-
 fication of certain R E M A R K S *upon*
the said L E T T E R, formerly Publish-
 ed. First printed in 1735.

T H E

P R E F A C E.

TH E Author of *The Protestant Flail*
 sets forth in his *Preface*, that “ A P. 3.
 “ certain Person in the *North of England*, be-
 “ ing convinced in his Judgment, that sprink-
 “ ling Infants with Water, was not the Bap-
 “ tism of *Christ*, &c. writ and published a
 “ short Letter, *addressing himself* to the Clergy
 “ of the Church of *England* in the County
 “ of *Northumberland*,” &c. And *all that he*
requested

requested (as this Author acquaints us in his first Chapter, p. 3.) was, that they would *assign the Scripture Reasons for the Practice of Infant-Baptism*; as if his Letter had been, properly, *an Address, or a Request*, to the Clergy, to be better informed, if he was mistaken in his Judgment, in so material a Point.

And had this been really the Case, the Letter-writer would have been treated with great Tenderness, and perhaps might have found full Satisfaction too from his Enquiry. But his Conduct and Temper were of another Kind. Instead of *addressing* the Clergy like a serious Man, he openly *challenged them* (p. 3.) *and called upon the most Learned and Wise among them* (p. 6.) *to prove* what he demanded of them; for, he says, *he doth not love to pin his Faith upon their Sleeves* (p. 6.) He charged them, absurdly enough, *with unchristianing the Quakers for denying Baptism to Infants* (p. 4.) *and for that Cause only* (p. 5.) *With being unjust and uncharitable in doing so* (p. 3.) *highly unjust in it* (p. 7.) He represented them as *false Ministers* (p. 12.) *who preach Christ for filthy Lucre's Sake, Lovers of flattering Titles, who*
would

would be accounted the Ministers of Christ (p. 11.)

He treated the Administration of Baptism according to the Usage of the Catholick Church, with great Scorn and Petulance throughout his Letter; and concluded, *that they who know the Baptism of Christ by Experience, will not suffer themselves to be impos'd upon by the Ignorance or Tricks of designing Men, who make a Gain of Godliness* (p. 12.) To this he added a *Postscript*, wherein he introduced a very learned Man, and a great Ornament of the Church, speaking partly like an *Anabaptist*, and partly like a *Quaker*.

P 13, 14,
and 15.

The Piece thus dressed out and finished, he caused to be privately printed, and then he went about distributing it in *Northumberland* among the People.

And this the Author of the *Flail* thinks ought to have been looked upon by the Clergy as an *Address*, or a *Request to them*. And perhaps he takes it to be a decent and modest one too. But they must have been more ignorant and undiscerning than the Letter-writer represents them, if they could have been of this Author's Opinion.

However,

However, what gave the greatest Offence to as many as were sensible of the Abuse, was the injurious Treatment of Bishop *Taylor* in the *Postscript*, which occasioned the Publication of a little Piece, entitled, *A Vindication of Bishop Taylor, &c.* to which were added a few Strictures upon the *Letter* itself, as a short, but seasonable Reprehension of the Writer of it, for falling foul on the Clergy of a whole County, without any Provocation that appeared, and who were as undeserving such Usage (at least in the *Vindicator's* Opinion) as any Body of Pastors in this or any other Kingdom. This Reply (if a few slight Remarks may be called so) though it had nothing either of that *Learning* or *Wisdom* which the *Letter-writer* called for (for that had been treating him too much out of his own Way) yet it had Significancy enough to do his Business and to shew that his Zeal as much outstript his Knowledge, as it spoiled his Manners; and that although he wrote with as great Assurance and Sufficiency, yet he was so far from understanding what he was writing about, that his own Way of Arguing terminated in those very Conclusions which he had been charging the Clergy

Clergy with as their own, and censuring as *false and uncharitable*.

This happened to have so good an Effect upon the Letter-writer, that nothing more hath been since heard either of his writing or dispersing Books; and his Indiscretion as well as his Letter were in a fair Way of being forgotten, had not a third Person come at length with a long *Flail*, threatening to *chastise the Vindicator* for his poor *Penny Pamphlet*, and to defend and patronize the *Letter-writer*. Indeed he fairly tells us the Reason why he interests himself in this Matter. It seems he himself was deeply concerned in the most material Point which related to Bishop *Taylor*, and upon which the *Vindicator* had been most severe. For he says, in Page the fifth of his Preface, that “*the*
“ *Author of the Letter, conscious of his own In-*
“ *nocence, and far from designing any thing that*
“ *was unfair by the Quotation, not having the*
“ *Bishop's Book by him, let a Friend of his,*
“ *from whose Writings he had taken it, see in*
“ *what manner he was attacked, who thereupon*
“ *promised to clear him of the unjust Aspersions*
“ *which that Writer had cast upon him.*”

Since then our Author owns that these Quotations were taken from *his own Writings*, it is but just to clear the Letter-writer (who relied upon his Credit and Fidelity) of so much of the Charge as he appears to have incurr'd by taking what he did upon Trust. Only let this be remember'd, that till this Discovery was made, the *Letter-writer*, like all those *who report Scandal*, was justly chargeable with the Injury done to the Bishop's Memory, till he gave up his Author, or his Author, as in this Case, voluntarily took the Accusation upon himself. And from this Time the *Letter-writer* might have been acquitted of any fraudulent Designs in his *Postscript*, had not this Advocate for him mismanaged his Cause, and in pleading it, confessed his Client guilty; as will be seen, when we come to examine his pretended Defence in the first Chapter. So that from the inconsistent Accounts which are given, there and here, it becomes hard to discover which of them was the Principal, or chief Agent, and which an Accessory, or the Instrument in this Affair. But they share the whole Accusation between them, and must make the best of it. And how well our Author clears either

ther himself or the other in this Cause, will be seen hereafter.

In the mean time, as to what he says a little further, in his Preface, of the *Vindicator's* having "*treated the Letter-writer in an ungentleman-like manner, and with great Scorn and Contempt, bidding him, For the future, to meddle no farther with the Clergy of that County, than to carry them Holland for their Shirts, and Cambrick for their Bands, and be content with such Business as he was bred to;*" had he but likewise added (as he should have done merely for Illustration sake) that the *Letter-writer* was a *Country Pedlar*, the Advice, which was given him as considered expressly *under that Capacity*, might not have seem'd so unseasonable, or the Language so unbecoming. It cannot, surely, be an unhandsome Treatment of any Man, to advise him to mind his own Trade and Calling, and to take heed lest he expose and hurt himself by meddling with such Things as are out of his Road. *A Pedlar*, considered in his own proper Business, is as far from deserving Contempt, and as far from meeting with it among Men of Sense and Manners, as any other Person.

Vind.
P. 23.

And yet, *a Pedlar in Controversy*, or *a Pedlar in Print*, may happen to make a very indifferent Figure; and, considered *as a Writer*, be as low as 'tis possible for a Man to sink in the Esteem of all sensible Judges. Nor is there any Way of helping this, if such Persons (whether Pedlars or no) as know not the right Side of an Argument from the wrong Side, will needs set up for Disputants and Controvertists. They will not be treated like *Gentlemen* and *Scholars*, as our Author seems to expect his Friend should have been treated; but they will be used, as all such Writers are, with that Disesteem which they unnecessarily bring upon themselves. The kindest Service that can be done them, when they will not receive Instruction, is to give them such friendly Correction, as may be likely to preserve them from all such Attempts for the future as will only draw upon them *Scorn* and *Contempt*. For, as was said above, it is impossible any Writer should escape these, who will boldly venture to *speak* upon Subjects upon which he hath not yet learned to *think*.

The Reason given at the Conclusion of the
P. 7. Pref. Preface, why this Defence of our Author's is
entitled

entitled the *Protestant Flail* (for it is usual with the *Quakers* to call their Books by such Names as require an Interpretation) is pretty remarkable.

“ Knowing, says he, how successfully they
 “ (viz. some of our first Reformers and Protest-
 “ tants) being destitute of *Academical Learning*,
 “ defended their Tenets with the BIBLE; we also,
 “ trusting only to that Weapon in this Defence,
 “ have therefore call’d it the PROTESTANT
 “ FLAIL.”

But he should have told us what Reformers he means, for we know of none that merited, or were dignified by that Name, but such as were Men of sound Learning, who had been trained up in *Schools and Academies*; to whose acquired Accomplishments, as well as Honesty and natural Parts, we owe, under God, the *Protestant* Name and Profession. The *Restoration* of good *Literature* was one of the principal Means of bringing on the *Reformation* of the *Church*, as Ignorance, the Mother of Error, had been one of the principal Means of carrying Superstition and Tyranny to that Height in the *Church of Rome*. So that, in all human Probability, with out the Help of *Academical Learning*,

ing, which the *Quakers* so much disparage, there had been no *Reformation* at all, or at least no better than appeared in these Kingdoms in the last Century. For then, it is true, there arose a Sett of *Reformers*, and among them the *Quakers* (if our Author means them by this Observation) who were wholly destitute both of *Academical* and other Kinds of Learning. And what Use they made of their *Bibles* without it, we leave to be determined by all who are conversant in their Books.

However, he conceives from hence, that the Bible, in illiterate Hands, is not unfitly compared to, or represented by a *Flail*. Why he pitches upon this Instrument in particular, or this *Weapon* (as he is pleased to call it) he doth not inform us. But this we know, that *the Flail* is an *Instrument* which doth of all others require some Art and Skill to wield and manage it right, and that it threatens the Chastisement of the Person who handles it awkwardly and without Experience.

Whether, therefore, this be a happy, or an unlucky Conceit of our Author's, let others judge. His Fancy, by an unusual Step, has
mistaken

mistaken its Way into a pretty just Similitude, but it unfortunately recoils upon himself, and defeats his intended Application. So that his very Comparison is a kind of *Flail*, which being unskilfully managed, gives him an unexpected Blow. A bad Omen at the very entrance upon his Work; which so well answers *its Title*, with respect to this unlucky Property of a *Flail*, that it had been more discreet in him never to have taken it in hand.

But it will be much harder to find a Reason (for he gives us none) for the other Part of *the Title* of his Book, which is——“*or, A Defence of a Letter to the Clergy of Northumberland: In Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, A Vindication of Bishop Taylor, &c.*” when, in Reality, he hath not defended any Part of the said Letter, save one single Passage, in which the *Pedlar* had produced a Quotation from a *Friend* (and most probably from this *very Friend* who had furnished him with the Materials for a *Postscript* :) Neither hath he so much as examined *the Vindicator's* Remarks upon any other Part of *the Letter*, excepting the said Passage, where he himself is supposed to be principally concerned: Which Part likewise *the Vindica-*

tor had only glanced upon, as being a Citation for which the *Letter-writer* seemed not altogether responsible. So that our Author, instead of defending the Letter (as his Running-Title would make one believe) doth only attempt to defend a particular Citation in it; in which neither the *Letter-writer*, nor the *Vindicator*, are much concerned. And he entirely drops the poor *Pedlar*, whom he leaves to answer for all the rest himself,



A

R E P L Y

TO THE

Protestant Flail.

CHAP. I.

REPLY to Chap. I. of the Flail.

SECT. I.

IN the *Vindication of Bishop Taylor from the injurious Misrepresentation of him by the Author of a Letter, &c.* it was shewn, to make the *Title* good, that all the Passages brought together in the *Postscript* to the said *Letter*, were taken out of the *Bishop's Anabaptist Plea*, *Vind.* p. 6. which is Part of his *Discourse upon the Liberty of Prophecy*; — that in writing that *Plea*, he professedly *personated an Anabaptist*; — that p. 7. at the End of the said *Plea*, he had refuted all those Arguments which he himself had ad-*ibid.* vanced

vanced in that Cause;—that these several
Vind. p. 8. Passages were quoted, or by the manner of
 Quotation were represented in the said *Postscript*,
 not only as *his Words* (for it is allowed they
 were so) but as his *real Sentiments* upon the
 Subject treated of;—that the leaving these
 Passages naked and defenceless, without any
 Explanation or Gloss to ascertain the true Drift
 and Meaning of them, nay, without the least
 Intimation given how he came to use such
 kind of Arguments, or deliver such kind of
 Doctrine, was putting a downright *Cheat* upon
 the Reader; and such as could not be discove-
 red, and perhaps would not be suspected by
 those who were wholly unacquainted with the
Bishop's Polemical Works, as most of those
 Persons might be supposed to be, among whom
 this *Letter* was distributed.—That therefore
 this Manner of Quoting was greatly prejudicial
 to that learned Man's Character; was a Piece of
 unusual Fraud practised upon the candid Rea-
 der; and shewed, in the Letter-writer, a shame-
 ful Want of Honesty and Ingenuity.

This was the Charge; at which our Author
 is much disgusted. But the Question is, whe-
 ther the *Vindicator* did not make it good, by

setting the *References* out of the *Bishop's Liber-* p. 9, 10,
ty of Prophecy in such a Light, that it evident-
 ly appears from thence, that the Passages in
 the *Postscript*, though they are the Bishop's
 own Words, yet they were not his Sentiments
 upon Infant-Baptism, but the Sentiments of
 that *Seet* which he all along opposed.

In answer to this, the Author of the *Flail*
 says, the *Vindicator's* Charge contains one *Affer-* Flail, p. 4.
tion that is not true, and another which the *Vin-*
dicator would be hard set to prove, were he put
 to it.

The false Assertion is, His saying that the p. 4, 5.
Passages are taken out of Bishop Taylor's *Pole-*
mical Works; whereas neither the Letter-writer,
 nor his Friend from whose Writings the *Passa-*
ges were taken, ever saw or heard of those Works
 to their Knowledge, till the *Vindicator* told them
 of Bishop Taylor's noble Collection of *Polemical*
Discourses published in Folio, Lond. 1674.

If indeed the *Vindicator* had affirmed, that
 the Passages were taken out of that Edition
 which he himself made use of, he might have
 said a Thing untrue, according to the Account
 now given. But he asserted no more than
 that they were taken out of the *Bishop's Polemical Vind.* p. 5.
Works.

Works. One of which is this very Book that they themselves own the Passages to have been taken from. And it was as much Polemical in the first Publication of it, as in the later Editions: equally so, whether printed in Quarto, or in Folio. But our learned Author seems to take for granted, it never commenced *Polemical* till it was published in the large Collection of his Controversial Works in 1674. And thus he hath ventured to charge *the Vindicator* with a Falshood for want of a little of that *Academical* Learning which he despises, as useless: for had he but known what *Polemical* meant, he could not have committed so gross a Mistake.

He might with as much Justice have charged *the Untruth* on Account of another Circumstance which *the Vindicator* was ignorant of, but which is now discovered, viz. that *these Passages were not taken* by the Letter-writer out of any Edition of Bishop Taylor, but from

Flail, p. 4. *the Writings of a Friend*; that Friend who *Pref* to the *Flail*, p. 5. *promised*, and now undertakes to clear him from all Aspersions cast upon him on that Account.

Flail, p. 5. The other Assertion, which he thinks *the Vindicator* would be hard set to prove, were

be put to it, is, that Bishop Taylor's Authority Vind. p. 6. is vouched, and his Testimony produced, for Doctrines which he never held.

But surely the Bishop's Answer, given in his own Person and proper Character to those Arguments which he had before offered under the Personage or fictitious Character of an *Anabaptist*, may be justly deemed to contain his standing and avowed Sentiments; unless we will suppose him always to have a Mask on, and to write under such perpetual Disguise, that we cannot know when he speaks his own Mind, and when he only *acts a Part*.

But how will the *Vindicator* prove that Bishop Flail, p. 5. Taylor did not hold and approve in his Judgment, of those Arguments which he has advanced in his Plea against Infant-Baptism, when he first published them to the World.

This is just like the Letter-writer's Challenge to the Clergy of Northumberland, to prove that the Quakers do not believe the Baptism of Christ *Lett. p. 3. as fully and sincerely as any Christian ever did.*

Such absurd Challenges and Questions deserve no Answer. Yet our Author shall have all the Satisfaction that can possibly be given him, viz. as strong a Proof for the Thing
he

he requires, as the Thing itself is capable of. And it is thus: Bishop *Taylor* drew up his Scheme of Plea for the Infant-Baptists as impartially and fully as he did that for the Anabaptists. He could not hold and approve in his Judgment the Arguments on both Sides which are contradictory to each other. The Question then is, which of them he appeared to approve, *when he first published them to the World*. To this we answer, first, that he gave sufficient Intimations in the Work itself, that he was far from thinking with the Anabaptists; for he says, *The Anabaptists have been encouraged in their Error more by the accidental Advantages given them by the Weakness of those Arguments that have been brought against them, than by any Truth of their Cause, or Excellency of their Wit*. Dr *Hammond*, who wrote an Answer to the Anabaptists Plea before Bishop *Taylor* replied to his own Objections, quotes this very Sentence, and consents to the Truth of the Observation; and it was very plain he judged from thence, and so might any intelligent Reader, that Bishop *Taylor* did not hold and approve in his Judgment those Arguments which he had advanced against the Doctrines

and Practice of his own Church. 2. Though the Bishop had given no such Intimation of his own Sentiments, but had left the Arguments on both Sides to their own Weight, without the least Suggestion that he preferred the one Sort in his private Opinion to the other; yet if we will suppose him to have approved of either, we must suppose that he approved of those which made for the Doctrine he at all Times professed, and for the Practice he at all Times espoused and defended, as far as can be learned from all his other Writings^a. Not to mention his own Declaration, when he published his Answer to his own Arguments in 1657. *that he therefore chose to do so, because all Men would not understand his Purpose, or think his Meaning innocent, unless he answered the Arguments which he had made or gathered.* If therefore he knew his own Mind, if he was conscious of his own Meaning and Design in first publishing his *Anabaptists Plea*, he was *not* of that Opinion, that our Author insinuates

he

^a *The Consideration of the Church in baptizing the Children of Believers. — Two Discourses, one concerning Baptism, the other concerning Infant-Baptism In Bishop Taylor's Life of Christ, Fol. p. 151.*

he held, and puts us upon proving that he did not hold.

P. 5.

He asks further, "How will the Vindicator reconcile his (Dr Taylor's) publishing what Dr Hammond says is the most diligent Collection, and the most exact Scheme of Arguments against Infant-Baptism that he had ever met with, and let them lie" (he means, with letting them lie) "fix or seven Years unanswered?"

Supposing we cannot find what were his Reasons or Motives for this, will it follow that he was all that Time in the *Anabaptists* Persuasion concerning Infant-Baptism? Or that when he wrote his Answer at last to his own Arguments, he had either changed his Mind or concealed it, and spake contrary to it? Neither of these Things can be concluded from his Delay in vindicating himself so early as our Author thinks he ought to have done, or what Use is it, in the present Dispute, to enquire what might be his Reasons for not doing it sooner? We may be sure he had his Reasons, and no doubt they were good ones but whether they were or no, yet his Vindication of himself, when it did come forth

was so full and so satisfactory, that it made Amends for his Delay in publishing it; and ought in Reason to put a Stop to all Censures of him on that Head, as well as to all Sugestions of his ever having been in contrary Sentiments.

Our Author "*thinks that the Excuse that Dr P^r Wall has made for him^b is greatly derogatory of his Character, and contrary to the very Design of his writing and publishing that Treatise.*" Let him therefore hear another Account given by other Writers^c; viz. That the Nature and Design of *Dr Taylor's Discourse on the Liberty of Prophecyng*, being to shew that some Diversity of Opinions might be tolerated in the Church, he was led to exemplify, in a great many Particulars, how easily, and

VOL. II. E by

^b *Hist. of Infant-Baptism, Part II.*

^c *Editus est ab eo Liber qui inscriptus erat De Libertate Prophe- tandi. In eo id præcipue agebat ut ostenderet ferendam esse in Eccle- siâ quandam opinionum diversitatem. Quod ut omnibus persuaderet, explicabat pluribus quam difficilis esset Veritatis indagandæ Ratio, quamque facile Homines in varios Errores laberentur; multasque præterea argumentorum species adducebat, quibus aiebat illos et decipi posse et solere. Hic itaque sæpe disputat, non quæ ipse sentiat, sed quo optime modo aliorum errores excusari queant. Resp. Rob. Grovii ad lib. qui inscrib. Celeusma. Lond. 1680. Quar. p. 80.*

by what Sort of Arguments, Men were apt to be unwarily seduced into Error ; and that in doing this, he did not so much declare what he himself thought of those Arguments, as he did endeavour to shew in how plausible a Light they might be set, that he might thereby plead some kind of Excuse for those who were betrayed by their seeming Probability into erroneous Opinions and Doctrines. But in doing this, he was not unmindful of the Rule he had taken from *G. Nazienzen*^d, *Never to write for Peace sake to the Detriment of sound Doctrine*, “ but still he had prepared^e his *Σοφὸν Φάρμακον* ; “ or, An Antidote to prevent any dangerous “ Effects of his Discourse. For the judicious “ Reader may perceive such a Reserve (though “ it lie in *Ambuscade*, and is compacted in a “ narrow Compass) as may easily rout those “ Troops which began too soon to cry Victory, “ and thought of nothing else but dividing “ the Spoil.”

Now

^d *Non studemus paci in detrimentum veræ doctrinæ.* Bishop Taylor's Epist. Dedicat. before the *Liberty of Proph.*

^e See *Ant. a Wood's Athenæ Oxon.* under Taylor ; and *The Long's Preface to Mr Hale's Treatise of Schism.*

Now if this Account be the true one (and our Author, to use his own Words, *would be hard set to prove it not so, were he put to it*) there is no Difficulty in the Things which he puts *the Vindicator* upon reconciling.

And when all is done, the Bishop set forth an Answer to his own Objections, before the Time that our Author supposes. For though indeed it was no less than ten Years from his first publishing his *Liberty of Prophecy* to his inserting and annexing his Answers to his *Anabaptists Plea*, which he did in 1657; yet he had published the Substance of those Answers as early as 1652, in his Treatise, called *The Consideration of the Church in Baptizing the Children of Believers*^t, Quarto; and again, in 1653, in his *Discourse concerning Infant-Baptism*, in the Life of Christ, Fol. p. 184.

There is one Thing more which our Author has to object to the *Vindicator* in the beginning of his second Chapter, p. 18. which may be most properly replied to here. And that is, that in the *Vindication*, though “*he placed the*” “*Answers which he found in the Bishop’s Pole-*

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mical

^t See *Ant. a Wood Athen. Oxon.*

“ *mical Works over-against some of the Passa-*
 “ *ges quoted in the Postscript in a Column or*
 “ *two, yet he hath omitted placing an Answer to*
 “ *a Passage which, to a Quaker, is the most*
 “ *material of all, because it contains a strong*
 “ *Argument against Infant-Baptism, and also*
 “ *an excellent Plea for the Holy Spirit's Bap-*
 “ *tism.*”

Neither the Passage nor the Answer to it were set down in the *Vindication*, for Brevity's Sake; but the very Section and Page where the Answer was to be found, were expressly
Vind. p. 10. referr'd to, in these Words, *The rest of this Quotation answered, Ad Num. 18. p. 1059.* And had our Author taken the small Pains of consulting the *Bishop's Polemical Works* of 1674, referr'd to, he would there have found what he pretends to want, and would have prevented his falling into so groundless a Cavil. But because he thinks the Passage is so *material* in the Eyes of *the Quakers*, and that it contains so excellent a Plea for the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, which is a Point he lays so great a Stress upon, and urges so frequently in his two following Chapters; therefore he shall have the Answer from Bishop Taylor placed (as
 the

the former were in the *Vindication*) over-against the Objection.

The Quotation in the Postscript from Bishop Taylor personating the Anabaptist.

It was an Excellency of our blessed Saviour's Office, that he baptizes *all* that come to him with the *Holy Ghost* and *with Fire*: For so St *John*, preferring *Christ's* Mission and Office before his own, tells the *Jews*, not *Christ's* Disciples, that *Christ* should baptize them with *Fire*, and the *Holy Spirit*; that is, *all that come to him*, as *John the Baptist* did with *Water*; for so lies the Antithesis.

Quotation from Bishop Taylor, refuting his own Arguments for the Anabaptists.

This Place was verified in the latter and first Signification of it, and so did relate to the miraculous *Descent of the Holy Ghost* in the Likeness of Tongues of *Fire*. But this concerns not *all* for *all* were not so baptized.

And whereas it is said in the Objection, that the Baptist *told not Christ's Disciples*, but the *Jews*, and that therefore it was intended to relate to *all*; it was well observed, but to no Purpose; for
Christ

A R E P L Y to the

Christ at that Time had no Disciples. But he told it to the *Jews* : and yet it does not follow that they should *all* be baptized with the Holy Ghost and with Fire ; but it is meant only, that that glorious Effect should be to them a Sign of *Christ's* Eminency above him ; they should see from *him* a Baptism greater than that of *John*, &c.

And you may as ——— So that hence to well conclude, that argue, that we may Infants must pass as well conclude that through the *Fire* as Infants must also pass through the *Water*. through the *Fire* as through the *Water*, is a false Conclusion, inferr'd from no Premises : Because this being only a Prophecy, and inferring no Duty, could neither concern Men or Children to any of the Purposes of their Argument, &c.

And that we may ——— To this I reply, not think this a Trick that when Water is to elude the Pressure taken exclusively to of the Place, *Peter* the Spirit, it is very says the same Thing. true that it is not *Water* that cleanses the For when he said that *Baptism* Soul ;

Baptism saves us, he adds, by Way of Explication (*not the washing of the Flesh, but the Confidence of a good Conscience*) plainly saying that it is not *Water*, or *the purifying of the Body*, but the cleansing of the Spirit that does that which is supposed to be the Effect of Baptism.

Soul; and the cleansing of the Body cannot save us. But whoever urges the Necessity of Baptism, urges it but as a necessary Sacrament or Instrument to convey or consign the Spirit. And this they might with a little Observation have learned; there being nothing more usual in Discourse than to deny the Ef-

fect to the Instrument, when it is compared with the Principle, and yet not intend to deny it an instrumental Efficiency.—So St Peter, it is not *Water*, but the *Spirit*, or which may come to one and the same, not *the washing the Filth of the Flesh*, but *purifying the Conscience that saves us*, and yet neither the one nor the other are absolutely excluded, but the Effect which is denied to the Instrument is attributed to the principal Cause.—But that *Water* also is in the ministry, and is not to be excluded

from its Portion of the Work, appears by the Words of the Apostle, *The like Figure whereunto, &c. viz. Baptism, as it is a Figure saves us* in some Sense or other; by Way of Ministry and instrumental Efficiency; by Conjunction and Consolidation with the other but the Ceremony, the Figure, the Rite, the external Ministry must be in, or else his Words will in no Sense be true, and could be made true by no Interpretation; because the Spirit may be the Thing *figured*, but can never be *the Figure*.] Taylor's *Polemical Works*, Fol. Lond. 1674. p. 1059 and 1060. and the same in his first Edition of the said Collection, Lond. 1657. p. 579, 580.

p 19.

The *Author of the Flail* is of Opinion, that the *Vindicator* ought rather to have answered this Objection out of the *Anabaptist Plea* himself, than to *have made such an Outcry about the Postscript*. But the *Vindicator* had no Occasion to answer it, when he referr'd to so good an Answer as this is; and the better the Answer is the greater Reason for the *Outcry* that was made about the Usage of Bishop Taylor in the *Postscript*. And our Author would have spent his Time much better, if, instead of attempting

tempting to defend such *Usage* of that learned Man, he had seriously read and considered those Answers that the *Vindicator* had referr'd to, out of *his Works*; whereas it doth not appear that he hath so much as consulted either of the *Editions* of *those Works*, from whence he might have had Satisfaction.

S E C T. II.

HAVING now cleared *the Vindicator's* Charge from the Exceptions that our Author has made to it, let us see, in the next Place, how he supports the Pedlar against it, and how he defends himself, so far as he is concerned in it. He tells us, in the first Place, that *the Author of a Letter to the Clergy of Flail*, p. 2: Northumberland professes himself to be of the Number of those to whom Bishop Taylor's Arguments against Infant-Baptism have seem'd successful and victorious (as Dr Hammond expresses it;) p. 3: and therefore selected such Arguments out of those which the Bishop had advanced against Infant-Baptism, as he thought to his Purpose, and joined them by a Postscript to his Letter, not imagining that by doing so he had any ways abused
his

his Readers. But how doth this Account consist with what our Author twice tells us, of *these Passages being taken from the Writings of a Friend?* How could the Pedlar be of the *Number of those* whom Dr Hammond speaks of, as *preferring* Bishop Taylor's Arguments on one Side of the Question to those on the other Side, when he had never read the Book himself, but had only met with these Passages collected out of it? Or how could he *select such Arguments as he thought to his Purpose*, much less how could he *discover Skill and Judgment in selecting* (as it is said, p. 19.) when these Excerpts were done to hand, and no Room was left for the Trial of his own Taste and Judgment in the Matter?

Now which of these contrary Accounts are we to follow? If the Pedlar was indeed deceived, relying upon the Authority of a Friend, and so unwittingly fell into this Snare, why doth that Friend here represent him as acting with his Eyes open, and upon his own Discretion? If, on the other hand, the Pedlar really knew what he did, and acted upon his own Judgment, how can this Friend plead for him, that he did *not imagine that by so doing he had any ways abused his Readers?* Or that

p. 3.

Pref. p. 5.

was conscious of his Innocence, and far from designing any thing that was unfair in the Quotation? Since whoever made these Excerpts, with Design to produce them as Bishop Taylor's Sentiments, (whether the Pedlar, or his Friend, it matters not) could not but know that he was dealing unjustly with the Author from whom he took them, and unfairly with the Reader to whom he offer'd them; unless we suppose him neither to read, think, nor write, as other People do.

He pleads, in the next Place, that *these Pas-* p 3.
sages were barely cited out of Bishop Taylor's Writings. But this, instead of being an Excuse, is the very Circumstance of *Unfairness* and *Deceit* in the Quotations which the Author of the *Postscript* is charged with. 'Tis said, *He* *Pref. to the Flail, p. 5.*
had only cited the Bishop's own Words, as they are to be seen in his Book, without any Comment or Paraphrase upon them, except Thus far Bishop Taylor, and says Bishop Taylor; which are Words commonly used at the Beginning or End of a Quotation. But because there is no Comment or Paraphrase, because no Account, or Hint is given to inform or advertise the Reader under what Character the Bishop was then writing,

writing, therefore his Words are *disguised* in the Citation, by being *left unexplained*; and therefore, they are not cited as they *are to be seen in his Book*; for whoever sees them there, will see their Meaning; whoever sees them in the *Postscript*, will be apt to mistake it. Nor is the Matter helped, by saying that the Citation was made *in the same Words that are commonly used at the Beginning or End of a Quotation*; for though this is enough where an Author is cited speaking his own Sentiments, as is commonly the Case; yet where the Case is uncommon, it will require an uncommon Distinction: As, *Thus saith Bishop Taylor, personating an Anabaptist*; or, *Thus far Bishop Taylor, urging the Anabaptists Arguments*. But, by our Author's Rule of fair citing, an Atheist may quote Scripture thus, *There is no God, says the Psalmist. Let us eat and drink for To-morrow we die: Thus far St Paul.*

P. 3.

But he goes on: *Had indeed the Author of the Letter taken some of Bishop Taylor's Words and suppressed others, in order to make the Bishop say what he never meant.*—Why; hath he not done so? Hath he not taken some Passages and suppressed others which were absolutely necessary

necessary to give Light to the Bishop's Intention, and this in order to make him seem to say what he never believed? And is not this the very thing *the Vindicator* had represented as dishonest and disingenuous? — He proceeds; p. 3. Or had he put a different Gloss or Construction upon his Expressions than what they naturally import. — Why, hath he not, by putting no Gloss, in Effect put a different Construction upon the Expressions, greatly injurious to the Author of them? And by a sinister Application of the common Forms of citing, *Thus far Bishop Taylor*, and *says Bishop Taylor*, made what the Words naturally import, to seem to be the Writer's proper and genuine Sentiments; whereas he designed them in their *natural Import* only to express the Sentiments of a Sect which thought differently from himself? And was not the leaving them thus to their *natural Force*, naked, and without any of their Guards and Fences about them, the very Injury complained of? — Then, says he, *he had* p. 4. *grossly abused his Readers, by a false and most unjust Representation of Bishop Taylor.* Agreed. This was all *the Vindicator* had said, and he said well, as it seems, since the Pedlar's great Advocate

Advocate is forced at last to fall in with him in the Conclusion, though he comes at it by a different Expression of his Premises.

p. 4.

As to what he adds: *But this is not the Case, for he has fairly cited the Bishop's Words as they stand in his Book, without putting the least Gloss or Construction upon them*; we say, and repeat it, that for the Reasons above given, *this is the Case*; and when our Author has made the best of it, he will find it to be so.

p. 5.

Well; but he has a Reserve yet, that he thinks will bring him and his Client quite off. *To satisfy our Readers, says he, and confute the Vindicator's Assertion, we say the Passages were transcribed Verbatim from Bishop Taylor's Discourse of the Liberty of Prophecy, printed in Octavo, Lond. 1709. which, the Reader sees, is above thirty Years after the Other (viz. the Folio Edition of 1674.) and yet has none of Bishop Taylor's Answers to his own Arguments as are in that Folio Edition.* The more Shame for the Man that published it so imperfectly. He injured his Author, and spoiled his Edition by doing so. But the Reader will also see, that this is no more a *Confutation of the Vindicator's Assertion*, than what was pleaded above, that

the Passages were taken out of the Writings of a Pref. p. 5.
Friend; or what was charged upon him for an
Untruth, in saying they were taken out of his P. 4.
Polemical Works; which might truly have been
said even of this Octavo Edition, out of which,
it is now owned, they were taken.

But *how was it possible, says he, for one who P. 5.*
had purused no other Edition but that of 1709,
or that of 1647, to know that the Bishop had re-
futed his own Arguments? Yes, he might have
known it from other Writers, had he been
versed in this Controversy of Infant-Baptism,
and especially from Dr Wall, from whom he
quotes a Passage, containing an Account of P. 6.
this very Thing.——And yet, upon that Sup- P. 5.
position, says he, all the Vindicator's false Insi-
nuations are grounded. But this is a wide Mis-
take. For though the Vindicator might reason-
ably suppose that the Compiler of the Post-
script had seen one or other of those Editions
where the Bishop's Answers to his own Argu-
ments are published, and that he had not wholly
followed so defective an Edition as that of
1709; yet the Charge stands good notwith-
standing, being founded upon another Bottom;
and is not materially affected, much less refu-
ted,

ted, by this Diversity of Editions. For even those which have not the Bishop's Answers to his own Arguments, have yet Proof enough of his having been unjustly treated by the Writer of the *Postscript*; that is, they have *his Profession* of writing the Anabaptist's Plea, by Way of Trial how strongly those Arguments might be enforced: They have *his Declaration* of that Doctrine being erroneous, and *they contain* his own Arguments on the other Side of the Question. And therefore the *Postscript* is indefensible even upon this footing upon which our Author has put it; unless he pleads Privilege with the Anabaptists, of insisting upon what Bishop *Taylor* says in one Place, without minding what he says in another. For he tells us from Dr *Wall**, *That it is a common thing with the Anabaptists to cite the Passages in that Treatise of the Liberty of Prophecy that make for them, as if they had been spoken by the Author from his own Judgment, and had never been answered by him.* Our Author indeed rather bespeaks than directly claims the Benefit of this Prescription: If he lays

* See Hist. of Infant Bapt. Part II,

hold of it as his last Refuge, much good may it do him.

And now *he thinks he has said all that is* p. 19.
necessary in Defence of the Postscript of the Letter.

And we think, that if he can say no more for it, he had much better have let the Defence of it quite alone; for *the Vindicator's* Charge stands where it did, for any thing he hath yet said to remove it.

Had he but confessed a Mistake in the whole Proceeding, had he made any decent Excuse of Inadvertency, and Negligence, and Haste in making those Excerpts; or been content on any Terms to have fairly given up what his own Arguments give up for him; *the Vindicator* might have been willing to have retracted something from the Severity of his former Animadversions, and to have made all the Allowances that an ingenuous Acknowledgment of an Error could have merited. But instead of this, our Author defends the *Postscript* with all his Might; will not allow Bishop *Taylor* to have been injured *so much as by Mistake*; nay, persists in suggesting that the Bishop might have been nevertheless of that Opinion which the *Postscript* lays to him. He

- P 7. 17. twice intimates something very obscurely from a certain *Frontispiece*, or Picture, at the beginning of the Edition in 1647, *where the Apostles are portrayed in different Attitudes*, with a
- P 8. *Greek Motto* near their Heads: *He doth not take upon him to say what Sense* Jeremy Taylor *intended thereby to convey to his Reader, nor what his Sentiments were directly.* To what
- P 17. Purpose then is this Remark concerning the *Frontispiece*? If it hath no Relation in the World to his Sentiments upon Infant-Baptism, what hath it to do here?

- P 7. But *this remarkable Cut is in the Edition of*
- P 5. *1647, which was published while Bishop Taylor was yet living, and in which there is no Answer to his Plea for the Baptists, and he hath seen the Cut in no other Edition.* What then? The
- P 7. same Cut or the same Device is the *Frontispiece* in the Folio Edition of 1657, which was published while Bishop Taylor was yet living, and in which was published his Answer to his Plea for the *Baptists*. And we have seen it in that Edition, though both our Author and his Friend appear to be Strangers to it.

He tells us likewise of *some learned Men* P. 3.
who about the Time that Bishop Taylor published
his Discourse of the Liberty of Prophecyng,
 held certain Opinions supposed to be alluded
 to in the said Frontispiece, viz. *That every*
Minister of the Gospel ought to wait for the In-
fluence of the Holy Spirit to enable him to prophesy
or preach, and that every one so influenced might
speak in the Congregation; and thereupon *From p. 8.*
 produces a String of Paragraphs, for eight *to p. 17.*
 or nine Pages together, out of a Treatise
 published in 1651 by *William Dell*, a great
 Enthusiast; which Passages, if fairly quoted,
 are as little to *that Author's* Credit, as those in
 the *Postscript* were to Bishop Taylor's. But as
 they do not touch upon the Subject that our
 Author is here engaged in, nor help any way
 towards removing the Complaint that was
 made of the Injury done by the *Postscript*,
 they are as insignificant in this Place as the
 Description of the Frontispiece; and can be
 supposed to serve no other End than drawing
 off the Attention of the Reader from discover-
 ing our Author's Distress upon the Point in
 Debate. We shall therefore pass them all

over, as foreign to our present Purpose, and draw to a Conclusion of this Chapter.

r. 5.

We observe upon the Whole, that our Author, who has undertaken *to satisfy his Readers* with respect to the Passages transcribed from Bishop *Taylor*, has in Effect made no Defence at all; but instead of that, has studied a few Shifts to amuse his Readers withal, and offered them a Bundle of insufficient Excuses, with a tacit unwilling Surrender of the Question to *the Vindicator*, as of a Post not tenable. He hath found indeed some Employment for his *Flail*; he hath beat the Air, and threshed Chaff; made a Noise, and raised a Dust; would seem to have done something, and go off with some Degree of Credit; yet, in reality, hath nothing more to support this Shew of Defence, than only appearing not to be yet convinced, or at least not to acknowledge, that he and the Pedlar were in the wrong.

It is hoped that both of them will be so wise as to let the Matter rest at length, and receive a Piece of friendly Counsel; which is, that for the future, whenever they are minded to cite Authors, to do it with more Care and Caution; and, for a Preservative
from

from running into such Difficulties as they have done upon this Occasion, it would be of great Use to them when they make Quotations, to fancy *the Vindicator* at their Elbow, and whispering in their Ear, *Remember Bishop Taylor*.

CHAP. II.

REPLY to Chap. II.

SECT. I.

THE Author of the *Flail* proceeds, in the second Chapter, to examine a certain obnoxious Passage in the *Vindication*, &c. which hath given him great Offence, and put him to much Trouble; for he has spent near 40 Pages, viz. the Remainder of his Pamphlet, in his Remarks upon it.

The whole Passage is this.

“ He says, p. 7. *that the Baptism of Christ* ^{*Vind. p. 18.*}
 “ *cannot be proved from Scripture to be Water-*
 “ *Baptism.* The Reason which he gives, is,
 “ that in the Institution of Baptism, *Matt.*
 “ *xxviii. 19. there is no mention of Water.* No

“ more there is of *Christ*. And therefore,
 “ if *Water-Baptism* cannot, for this Reason,
 “ be proved from thence, no more can the
 “ *Baptism of Christ*.

“ But it is as certain that *Water-Baptism*
 “ was here instituted, as that *Christ* did insti-
 “ tute it. And it is certain that the Apostles
 “ understood it so, as appears both by their
 “ Practice and Writings, *Acts* x. 47. viii. 36,
 “ 38. *Eph.* v. 26. *Heb.* x. 22. In all which
 “ Places *Water* is expressly mentioned.

“ But all the Misinterpretations of this Text
 “ in *Matthew*, by the *Quakers*, are owing,
 “ as hath been observed often, to their Igno-
 “ rance of the learned Languages, and Ina-
 “ bility to judge rightly of the Translations.
 “ Here, for Instance, *Baptize* is a *Greek Word*,
 “ which becoming a *Technical Term* in other
 “ Languages to express this Sacrament, is only
 “ made *English* by Usage. Otherwise, our
 “ Translators might have render'd it here, as
 “ they have done in other Places, *Go, and*
 “ *wash Men in the Name of the Father, &c.*
 “ and then there would be no Room for this
 “ Cavil, or for the Nonsense that follows about
 “ understanding the Form, not of the Name,
 “ but

" but *Power of the Father*. But though our
 " *Letter-Writer* hath got here what is proper-
 " ly and truly a *Quaker's* Argument, yet he
 " doth not care to trust himself with the
 " Management of it, but calls in the Assi-
 " stance of a *Friend*; and brings in a *Quota-*
 " *tion* from one of the *Brotherhood*. The flen-
 " der Substance of which having been confu-
 " ted again and again, shall only be answered
 " here, by referring to Mr *Leslie's Divine In-*
 " *stitution of Water-Baptism*, Sect. 1. and 2.
 " and *Wall's Defence of his History of Infant-*
 " *Baptism*, Chap. 3. and 4."

This is the entire Passage; and is the only
 one it seems, in all the *Vindication*, &c. wor-
 thy of the Consideration of the Author of the
Flail, who says, it is the *first Remark to the*
Question, or Point in Debate, between the Vindi- p. 20.
cator and Letter-Writer; and contains, in Sub-
stance, all that the Vindicator hath said for Wa-
ter-Baptism. But perhaps he had said more p. 23.
 justly, that it is the *first Remark that concerns*
himself, and touches upon that *Point in the*
Debate, upon which some of his own *Writings*
 had been cited by the *Letter-Writer*^h. But,

F 4

however

^h See the Reasons of this Supposition in the Preface.

however that be, it is the only Point in Debate at present; and might have been drawn into a little Compass, had not many old Objections against Water-Baptism been brought together in the *Flail*, and urged as if they never had been answered, or were unanswerable; which hath made it necessary in this Reply to go distinctly through them all, and shew, that *this Writer* hath neither established, nor so much as improved any of the *Quakers* Arguments upon this Subject.

p. 38.

He takes Notice, that one of the Observations contained in this Passage is *borrowed* by the *Vindicator*; for, says he, *it is to be seen in that Chapter of Leslie's Book he refers his Readers to.* The *Vindicator* therefore acquits himself *by making this Reference*, making a proper Acknowledgment of what he borrowed. But supposing he had not referr'd to Mr *Leslie*, and yet had made Use of the same Arguments, *in Substance*, that Mr *Leslie* and other Writers for Water-Baptism had used before him, is this Plagiarism? Is it unfair? If so, what will become of the Author of the *Flail*, who hath little of his own but his Style, and the peculiar Turn he hath given to some of the com-

mon

mon Arguments used by the *Quakers*; neither of which will do *him* any Credit, nor *his Cause* any Service. For it shall be shewn, as we go along, that he offers little new, little but what some or other of their Sect have said before, and in a better Manner; and that where he attempts to put any Arguments into a new Dress, or give a new Turn to it, he generally makes it worse than it was, and reforms it to its Disadvantage.

S E C T. II.

THE first Point in the present Dispute, is, Whether *Matt. xxviii. 19.* is to be understood of Water-Baptism, though Water be not expressly mentioned in that Text.

Rob. Barclay puts them who understood this Text of Water-Baptism “to prove that Water “is here to be understood, since the Text is silent “about it. Yet he grants, that if the Etymology of the Word should be tenaciously adhered “to, it would militate against most of their Adversaries, as well as against the *Quakers*;ⁱ” And Will. Penn observes, there is not a Word of

ⁱ See this replied to by Geo. Keith's Arguments of the Quakers against Baptism and the Supper answered.

of *Water* in the Text alledged for *Water*, nor yet in the Context; and unless there were no other Baptism than that of *Water*, as there are several, it must at least be allowed to be a Question what Baptism Christ meant by that Commission^k. But the Author of the Flail exalts this Shadow of an Argument into a Demonstration; and declares
 p. 20, 25. it to be just Matter of Admiration, that any should ground their Use of *Water-Baptism* upon a Place in Scripture, where *Water* is not so much as mentioned.

When the *Vindicator* made his Remarks upon the *Letter to the Clergy of Northumberland*, where the Argument was put into this Form, he thought it sufficient to reply, *That if Water-Baptism could not, for this Reason, be proved from Matt. xxviii. 19. (viz. because Water was not mentioned in the Text) no more could the Baptism of Christ (as the Quakers speak in Contradistinction to Water-Baptism); because the Word Christ was not to be found in the Text any more than Water. Which,* though it had been no Answer to the Objec-

^k Defence of Gospel-Truths against the Bishop of Cornwall's Testimony, p. 72. 8vo. Lond. 1698. And Reason against Railing, p. 106.

tion as suggested by *Robert Barclay* and *Will. Penn*, yet was a proper Answer to it, as it was dogmatically and crudely put by the *Letter-writer*, and *his Friend*, from whom he took it.

But the *Author of the Flail*, has undertaken at length to support this Objection with sufficient Reasons.

He sets out with telling his Reader "*how the Quakers distinguish between Water-Baptism and the Baptism of the Holy Spirit. The First belong'd to the legal Dispensation, and was the Office of John the Forerunner of Christ. The Second belongs to the New Covenant Dispensation, and is the Office of Christ. For this Reason they call the Baptism of the Holy Spirit the Baptism of Christ.*"

But let it be observed, first, that this Distinction of theirs, though it may be right so far as it goes, yet it is not determinate enough to answer the Ends for which it is produced. For if they mean that Water-Baptism did *so peculiarly belong to the legal Dispensation*, that it could not also belong to the Gospel-Dispensation, their Distinction is erroneous, and without

out Foundation: But if it *might also belong to the Gospel-Dispensation*, then their Distinction is useless and insignificant in the present Dispute. So likewise if the *Baptism of the Holy Spirit* is understood by them to have been the Office of Christ *in such Sense*, that he could not consistently with that Office have appointed a Water-Baptism, they only beg the Question by their Distinction. But if they mean it *in such Sense*, as not to exclude Christ's Power or Right to institute a Water-Baptism, then their Distinction is to no Purpose here.

But secondly, this Distinction of theirs is too defective and short. For it doth not take in all the Water-Baptisms which they themselves allow to be scriptural. It excludes, for instance all those Baptisms which our Author himself owns the Apostles administer'd with Water in the Name of the Lord *Jesus*. For he cannot say, that these either *belonged to the legal Dispensation*, or *were the Office of John the Forerunner of Christ*. He who professes to ground his Defence upon Scripture, should ground his Distinctions upon Scripture too, or at least not use them as Arguments. The scholastic

Distinction

1 2
p. 45
System

Distinctions¹ of the several Kinds of Baptism, are the fullest, and are well supported from Scripture. And if Distinctions be of any Authority in the Case, *they* will claim the Preference, and are on the Side of Water-Baptism: But the Quakers Distinction, as our Author gives it, neither proves nor illustrates any thing in the present Subject, and consequently makes nothing against Water-Baptism in *Matt. xxviii.*

19.

He proceeds next to his "*clear and authen-* p. 23.
"*tick Proofs that the Baptism of the Holy Spi-*
"*rit, and not that of Water, is the Baptism*
"*of Christ.*" And, first, he proves, from *Luke iii. 15.* that *John's Water-Baptism* was not *Christ's Water-Baptism*, which is readily granted; and that *Baptism with the Holy Ghost and with Fire* was *Christ's Baptism*, but not *John's Baptism*, which is as readily allowed. He makes no Inference from this, nor Observation upon it. Therefore we shall observe for him, that whosoever will infer from hence, that

¹ They will be found in the Works of Forbes a Conf. Vol. II. p. 457. Vossius's Disputations, &c. Thesis 1. And in most of the Systems of Divinity.

that Baptism with the Holy Ghost and with Fire in *Matt.* iii. 11. and *Luke* iii. 16. in Opposition to, and in Exclusion of a Water-Baptism appointed by Christ, falls into the Heresy of the *Seleucians* and *Hermians*, who rejected Water-Baptism upon Account of these Texts^m.

p. 24.
Mal. iii.
1, 2, 3.

His two next Paragraphs are taken up with a Quotation out of *Malachi*, and a Conclusion from thence, that "*the Office or Business of Christ was to be inward and spiritual.*" But he doth not attempt to shew from thence, that *the Office or Business of Christ was to be so entirely and absolutely inward and spiritual*, that it would be contradictory to the Nature of his Office or Business to suppose he should institute an external Ordinance of Water-Baptism. And therefore

^m St Augustine says of them, *Baptismum in Aqua non accipiunt. Lib. de Hæres. Num. LIX. And Philastrius, another Writer in the fourth Century, gives this Reason for it; Animas Hominum de igne & spiritu esse æstimantes isto baptismo (sc. in Aqua) non utuntur, propter Verbum hoc quod dixit Johannes Baptista, Ipse vos baptizabit in Spiritu et Igne. Lib. de Hæres. Bib. P. P. Tom. IV. And hence came the Practice among some of substituting the Baptism of Fire instead of Water by a Caustery, with which they marked the Sign of the Cross upon the Foreheads of those whom they baptized. Fred. Spanhemii Dub. Evangel. Parte Tertia, Vol. II. Dub. 39. p. 143.*

therefore his Remark hath no Use in this Place.

In the three next Paragraphs he shews that p. 24, 25.
Christ fulfilled his Promise made to *the Apostles*, of baptizing them with the Holy Ghost on the Day of *Pentecost*. As to what he says *Acts i. 15; ii. 4.*
of *the one hundred and twenty Disciples* being all likewise filled with the Holy Ghost, and made Partakers of the same Gifts, it is more than he can prove, if it were disputed with him. But granting this also, still here is nothing to discourage us from understanding *Matt. xxviii. 19.* of Water-Baptism.

His last Observation is, that the Prophecy of *Joel* was fulfilled in the extraordinary Gifts *Joel ii. 28.*
of the Holy Spirit conferred on the Day of *Acts ii. 16.*
Pentecost. This also is granted.

He hath now laid down his Premises in due p. 25.
Order for a Conclusion. Let us observe him,
" 'Tis therefore, says he, most clear and evident,
" that the pouring out of the Spirit, or baptizing with the *Holy Ghost*, is the *Seal* of the
" New Covenant, the *Promise* of the *Father*,
" and, according to the express Declarations
" of *Malachi* and *John*, the *Office* of *Christ*."

If

If he means only in a qualified Sense, *a Seal, a Promise, an Office*, his Conclusion is no more to the Purpose than his Premises were. But if he speaks of them absolutely and emphatically, as *the only Seal, the only Promise, the whole Office*, then his Conclusion is not warranted by any of his Premises.

P. 25.

But whatever he means, he has proved nothing yet against our understanding *Matt. xxviii. 19.* of Baptism with Water; and yet he is in Raptures with the Demonstration which he fancies he hath given against it. “*Is it not then, says he, justly Matter of Admiration that any should ground their Use of Water-Baptism upon a Place of Scripture where Water is not so much as mentioned?*” But what Relation hath this to the Things he hath been speaking of before? Or what is there in his Detail of Observations to make this appear a Matter of such Admiration? He has not given *one* Reason yet why Water *may not* be understood in a Text where it is not expressly mentioned. Nay, he hath given a Reason why it *may be* understood. For he tells us of *express Declarations of the Office of Christ by Malachi and John the Baptist*, when he knows that

that neither of these Words, *Office* or *Christ*, are in the Texts he refers to. And he that can see *an express Declaration of an Office of Christ* in a Text where neither of these Words are used, need not be in such Admiration that others can clearly discover that Christ instituted a Baptism with Water in another Text, though neither of these Words, *Christ* or *Water*, are expressly Part of it.

But there is another thing, it seems, excites his Wonder; and that is, "*that any should tak* P. 25.
"*Christ to have instituted and ordained such an*
"*external Rite after his Resurrection, and just*
"*when he was about to ascend to Heaven.*"

He is sensible that he hath said nothing yet to forbid our making such a Supposition; and therefore he proceeds, in the next Place, to shew us *how improbable* it is that Christ should do any such thing.

Now let us attend to his Reasoning again. p. 25.
"*It is declared, says he, in Scripture that*
"*Christ spake to his Disciples at that Time (viz. Acts i. 3.*
"*after his Resurrection) of the Things pertain-*
"*ing to the Kingdom of God: Now what Rela-*
"*tion or Congruity is there betwixt the ceremo-*
"*nious Rite of Water-Baptism, and the King-*
VOL. II. G "*dom*

Rom. xiv. 17. “*dom of God, which, the Apostle says, is not
“ Meat and Drink ?*”

He would insinuate here, that *Water* being *Drink*ⁿ, can have no Relation to the Kingdom of God. But why so? Though the Kingdom of God be not, or doth not consist in Meat or Drink, yet why may not Meat and Drink consist with the Kingdom of God? Christ, after his Resurrection, *eat and drank* with his Disciples, as well as *spake of his Kingdom*. Besides, as Water is not used as *Drink* in Baptism, the Application of Rom. xiv. 17. to this Subject, is as much out of the Way, as if it were applied to Circumcision. It comes therefore now to our Turn to admire that any Persons should defend their Disuse of Water-Baptism with a Text that hath *no Respect at all* to Baptism, and no nearer Relation to *Water* than it hath to *Milk*, or any other thing that is *drinkable*.

He

ⁿ *This is like John Gretton's Argument, in his Treatise of Baptism and the Supper; where, from the Word Elements, used in Gal. iv. 3, 9. he concludes that Water-Baptism is one of those beggarly Elements that St Paul disparaged and opposed, because Water is an Element. And G. Keith tells us, that divers others of the Quaker Teachers have argued in the same Manner. Arguments of the Quakers answer'd, Sect. 9.*

He proceeds : *How very unlikely is it, that* P. 26.
when Christ was speaking of the Things pertain-
ing to the Kingdom of God, and putting his Dis-
ciples in mind of what John had said about the
Baptism of the Holy Ghost, that he then institu-
ted Water-Baptism, and commanded them to bap-
tize all Nations with Water ? A most impro-
 bable Thing indeed, that when he was discour-
 sing of his Kingdom, and acquainting his Dis-
 ciples how they should be sufficiently enabled
 to act as his Ministers in it, he should further
 tell them how they were to make Disciples
 for him, and admit them into his Kingdom.

But perhaps, in this Author's Opinion, the
 Improbability rests upon what he says after,
viz. that Christ should appoint Water for that
End, which, he says, can neither wash away P. 26.
Sin, nor purge the Conscience. But this is no
 more than his own private Opinion, founded
 on the Consideration of the natural Powers and
 Qualities of Water, when it is not consider'd
 sacramentally. But before he can make Room
 for this Suggestion of Improbability, he ought
 to shew, if he can, that *Water* administer'd in
Baptism to worthy Receivers is not, and cannot
be a Means both of washing away Sin, and of
 G 2 *purging*

purging the Conscience. For however unfit it may be in itself to serve to these Purposes, yet if it tendeth in certain Circumstances to produce these Effects, *as a Means appointed thereunto by Christ*, then it is in Baptism something more than mere *Element*, or mere *Drink*, viz. it is both *a Sign*, and *a Pledge* of some *inward and spiritual Benefit*.

p. 26.

Matth.
xxviii.

19

However, he hath said enough to satisfy himself, and thereupon comes to his grand Conclusion: “*We therefore, says he, infer and conclude, that the Words of Christ, Go ye, therefore, teach all Nations, baptizing, &c. have no Relation to Water-Baptism, but to the Baptism of the Holy Ghost.*” To which, all we need say further, is, that we wish him happier in his *Inferences* and *Conclusions* for the future.

S E C T. III.

HE proceeds, p. 26. to make three Observations, which he supposes will appear to be *clear* and *strong Proofs*, that his *Inference* is both *just* and *true*.

First,

First, says he, we do not read of all the P. 26.

Persons whom the Apostles baptized, or commanded to be baptized, that any one of them was baptized in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Neither do we read, on the other hand, that any of them were not baptized in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And therefore we conclude, as in all Reason we ought, that all were baptized with that very Form. For, as he himself argues in his very next Words: It cannot reasonably be thought, p. 26. *that if the Apostles had taken Matt. xxviii 19. to have been a Precept of Christ's concerning Water-Baptism, they would in any Instance whatsoever have omitted that Form of Words. Here we entirely agree with him; and as it doth not appear that the Apostles did, in any one Instance, omit that Form, we think it unreasonable in the Quakers to charge them with omitting it, purely that it may be inferr'd from such Omission that the Apostles did not Baptize with Water, in Compliance with Christ's Command in Matt. xxviii. 19.*

And this is a sufficient Answer to the Objection as it stands in this Paragraph. But

as it is one of their capital Arguments^o, and which our Author wonders we are able to resist the Force of^p, and which he repeats no less than six Times^q in his *Flail* under some Shape or other, making it every where pass as a decisive Argument, against which there is no contending; it may be proper to give it a Consideration here once for all.

It is acknowledged, that where mention is made in Scripture of the Apostles, or Disciples baptizing Profelytes, there is no particular Recitation of the whole Form of Baptism, any more than in other Writers who mention the Baptism of Converts occasionally and historically. But there is generally some Expression or other in these Scripture-Passages to distinguish the *Christian* Baptism from the *Jewish* Baptisms, or *John's* Baptism. As baptizing in
the

^o Used by Will. Penn. Defence of Gospel Truths, p. 76. And by Rob. Barclay. See George Keith's Arg. of Quakers answered. Sect. 7.

^p We can but admire that any should take the Words, Go ye therefore and teach, &c. to be a Precept and Command of *Christ* to baptize with Water, when there is no Instance to be found in Scripture where any was baptized with Water in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, p. 20, 21.

^q P. 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 41.

the Name of the Lord, or in the *Name of the Lord Jesus*: Not to signify that the Form ran in his Name only, but to denote that Baptism which was instituted by himself, and administer'd by his Authority; and that the Persons receiving it were baptized into the Faith and Religion of *Jesus Christ*. When the Apostles are said *to teach or preach in the Name of Jesus*, it is not meant, as this Writer suggests in his third Chapter (which shall be consider'd hereafter) that *they taught or preached in the Power of Christ*, but that *they taught his Doctrines or preached his Gospel*^r. In like manner, when they are said to *baptize in the Name of Jesus*, the Meaning is, they baptized with his Baptism, or administer'd the Christian Baptism as opposed and distinguished from all other Baptisms. And it might, with as much Reason, be inferr'd from those Passages where the Apostles are said to preach *in the Name of the Lord Jesus*, or *to teach and preach Jesus Christ*,^{Acts v. 42.} that they did not teach the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though that was the

G 4 Foundation

^r Preached the Things concerning the Kingdom of God and *the Name of Jesus Christ*, *Acts* viii. 12.

Foundation or primary Article of the Christian Faith; as it can be inferr'd from these Passages where they are said to *baptize in the Name of Jesus* that they did not baptize into the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, though that was the express Form by which our Lord commanded all Believers to be admitted into his Church. And although the Expressions where the Baptism of Converts is mentioned in Scripture are not precisely the same (as neither are those Expressions which denote the Preaching of the Gospel by the Apostles) yet they are meant of one and the same Form of Baptism delivered by Christ, *Mattt. xxviii. 19.* And thus the several Passages (which our Author mistakes as denoting different Forms) have been generally interpreted by Catholick Writers, with such Concurrence of Sentiments, that not above one or two among the ancient Fathers seem to have had any Doubts about it: And the probable Reason^f of such Doubts have been likewise assigned.

^f See Bingham's *Antiquities*, Vol. IV. and Dr Waterland's *Sermon on Matt. xxviii 19.*

And now let the particular Objections of our Author to this Interpretation in the several Passages where this Expression occurs, be examined. He tells us, "*That Peter commanded p 27.*
"*Cornelius and the Gentiles to be baptized in*
"*the Name of the Lord, BUT NOT in the*
"*Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of*
"*the Holy Ghost, which was Christ's Command.*" True; the Text doth not so express it, viz. doth not give us the very Words of that Form, and yet it must be understood of that very Form, for this Reason, because it cannot consistently be understood of any other. For in this Sense of it St Peter's Practice will be reconciled to his Commission, and in any other Sense it will not: which Consideration alone is sufficient to fix and determine us to this Sense, and to exclude all others. To say, for instance that he baptized in Obedience to the Commission in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* and yet varied from the Form there prescribed, is to say what even this Author cannot believe. And to say, as p. 26, 27. this Author doth, that he baptized with Water, and *in the Name of Jesus*, without any Commission for so doing, is what no body else can believe. When, therefore, there is
but

but one consistent Account to be given of an Expression, and that Account moreover appears natural, easy and agreeable to the common Rules of Writing, we make no doubt to say, that it is the true Account.

p. 27. Now if we ask our Author what Defence *he* will make of *his* Interpretation of this same Expression, and by what Authority he excludes the Form of Baptism which he says was *Christ's Command*, from being intended in this Expression, he will find it a hard Matter to give an Answer. *He hath gathered* (as he tells us just before) *from the Silence of the Text*, that *none of the By-standers had forbidden Water*, when St Peter proposed it for baptizing the Gentiles. And why may he not as well gather from this Text, *though it be silent* as to the Words of the baptismal Form, that *that Form* was nevertheless intended, though not delivered at full Length. And he himself here again declares, that *he thinks St Peter would have never deviated from the Command*, had he understood or taken those Words (in Matt. xxviii.) to be a Precept of Christ concerning Water-Baptism. We think so too, and are therefore sure he did not deviate from it. And in this Opinion both

both *he* and *we* must continue, till he hath proved, by other sufficient Arguments, that *St Peter* did not understand *Matt. xxviii 19.* of Water-Baptism.

When he repeats the same Observation in p. 29. viz. "*That Peter commanded them to be baptized in the Name of the Lord, but not, as we observed before, in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he adds, What-ever, therefore, were his Reasons for commanding those Gentiles to be baptized with Water, he acted not in Conformity to Christ's Command, Matt. xxviii. 19. and consequently took not the Words of that Text to be a Precept about Water-Baptism.*"

That is, though no Account can be given how *St Peter* came to do such a thing as baptize with Water, unless it be that he understood *Matt. xxviii. 19.* of Water-Baptism, and acted in Conformity to that Command; yet we must not suppose him to have acted in Conformity to that Precept, lest we be obliged also to confess that he understood that Text of Water-Baptism.

And what will the Quakers *not say*, rather than admit both Matter and Form in any Christian

Christian Baptism recorded in Scripture. When we produce our Saviour's Commission, they tell us *there is no mention of Water in it*. When we produce undeniable Instances of Water in the Baptisms of Converts to Christianity, they tell us *there is no mention of the Form of Words according to the Commission*. When we reply, that it is not to be supposed that the Apostles should use any other Form than that which Christ gave them, then they tell us that the Apostles, even when they baptized with Water, *did not act in Conformity to the Command in Matt. xxviii. 19*. When we answer, that then no Account can be given of their baptizing at all with Water, they reply, no matter for that, *whatever were their Reasons, they did not baptize in Compliance with the Command in Matt. xxviii. and consequently did not understand that Text of Water-Baptism* ^t.

“ But,

^t Our Author, indeed, seems a little ashamed of letting the Matter rest upon a Supposition of certain *Reasons* that *cannot be assigned*, and therefore subjoins to his Expressions, *whatever were his Reasons*, by Way of Note, the following Conjecture, which he offers to the *judicious and considerate Reader*; viz.

“ *That the Practice of the Jews in baptizing Profelytes with Water, might be a sufficient Reason for Peter's commanding them,*

“ *whom*

“ But, says he, *it may be the Vindicator will say as some Contenders for Water-Baptism have done,*

“ whom he esteemed good Converts, to be baptized with Water, without any Command or Precept of Christ; and goes a great Way towards accounting for all the Water-Baptism we read of in the Acts of the Apostles” He speaks with some Diffidence as to the Practice, as if he a little distrusted the Account that he hath from Dr Wall, from whom he hath picked up this Piece of Knowledge, which he knows not how to make use of now he hath got it. *If it was, says he, the Practice of the Jews in those Days to baptize Profelytes with Water, was not that sufficient Reason for Peter to baptize Converts without any Command of Christ? By no means. For what the Jews did, was not arbitrary, was not founded in mere Custom. They looked upon it as Part of their Law, and pleaded the Direction of their Law-giver. But St Peter could neither plead Law, nor Tradition, nor Reason, for using this Ceremony with the Christian Converts, in the Name of Jesus Christ, upon our Author's Supposition, that he had no Precept from his Master concerning it.*

And will our Author, after the Exceptions he hath made against our Saviour's having borrow'd a carnal and external Rite from the Jews, be content to allow that the Apostles did it? He hath but just now *inferred and concluded, that Christ p. 25. could not ordain a Water-Baptism, when he was speaking of the Things pertaining to the Kingdom of God and putting his Disciples in mind of what John had said about the Baptism of the Holy Ghost: p. 26.* And yet he can suppose St Peter, who was specially sent by a Vision to preach the Gospel to Cornelius, likely enough to command a Water-Baptism, even while *he was speaking of the Things pertaining to the Kingdom of God, and was put in mind, by the miraculous Descent of the Holy Ghost upon his Hearers, of what John had said about the Baptism of the Holy Ghost.* He can suppose

“ *done*, that to baptize in the Name of the
 “ Lord *Jesus*, or only in the Name of the
 “ Lord, is all one and the same as baptizing
 “ in the Name of the Father, and of the
 “ Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” If the Con-
 tenders for Water-Baptism have said so, they
 have spoken in a different Sense from what
 our Author has apprehended; *viz.* that to
baptize in the Name of the Lord Jesus, is an
 abbreviate

p. 25.

suppose St Peter forgot that *there is no Relation or Congruity be-
 tween the ceremonious Rite* (as he calls it) of Water-Baptism, and
the Kingdom of God, which is not Meat and Drink; and that
Water can neither wash away Sin, nor purge the Conscience. If
 these Reasons were but lately very good ones, why our Lord
 should not be supposed to have instituted a Water-Baptism, are
 they not as good now why St Peter should not be supposed, on
 this Occasion, to have consented to, much less to have propo-
 sed, to have insisted upon Water-Baptism? Let our Author
 reconcile what he says three Pages before with this grave Que-
 stion of his, *Was not this sufficient Reason for Peter, &c.*?

But he supposes this *Jewish* Practice will account for all the
Water-Baptism we read of in the Acts. Query, how it will
 account for the Baptism of St Paul by Ananias, Acts ix. 18.
Will. Penn therefore thought it the wisest Way to call in Questi-
 on, *Whether this Baptism of St Paul was with Water, or no*;
 though Ananias said unto him, *Arise therefore, and be baptized,
 and wash away thy Sins*. George Keith observes justly enough,
 that this Doubt of *Will. Penn*’s bespoke as great Inadvertency
 in him, as when he printed in his *Christian Quaker*, that *Jesus
 Christ was born at Nazareth*.

abbreviate Way of expressing Baptism in the Name of the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost; and not that it is one and the same thing whether Baptism be administer'd *with* or *without* the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; or that it is tantamount to substitute the Name of Jesus Christ *in the Act of Baptizing*, instead of the Form delivered *Matt. xxviii.* And this Misapprehension of their Meaning (for if any of them have spoken so in the Meaning of our Author, *viz.* that a Change in the Form was actually made, let them defend themselves) has led him to ask some Questions out of the Way; as, *Why* p. 30. *have not all Water-Baptists since the Apostles Days used the same Form of Words?* If he means by Form of Words, *in the Name of the Lord Jesus only*, the Water-Baptists have not used it, because the Apostles themselves did not use it, in the Act of Baptizing. But as to the proper Form delivered in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* it hath been from the Apostles Times invariably and constantly kept to and observed by all Catholick Churches; and also by most Hereticks; for *St Augustine* says, *One might more easily find Hereticks that did not baptize at all,*

all, than such as retained Baptism without using those Evangelical Words of which the Creed consists, and without which Baptism cannot be consecrated.

P. 31.

He asks again, *What Authority have Water-Baptists to vary from the Form of Words used by the Apostles?* We answer, they have none, neither have they pretended to any Authority to do so, neither have they varied from the Form used by the Apostles, but have universally kept to it excepting a few Hereticks; an Account of whom, and of their Variations from the Apostolical Form, may be found in *Bingham's Antiquities*, Vol. IV. and elsewhere. He proceeds still upon the same erroneous Supposition

P. 31.

And if the Form of Words used by the Apostles ought to be a Rule and Standard to others, does it not necessarily follow that all who have baptized with Water in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have done it without either an Apostolical Precedent, or a Divine Command? Had he not espoused an Error in this whole Matter, he must have known that they who baptize in the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do it upon an *Apostolical Precedent, founded on a Divine Command.* And that they

who

who do not practice Water-Baptism at all, do neither regard *the Apostolical Precedent, nor the Divine Command.*

SECT. IV.

WE come next to the second Observation; which he offers as another *strong and clear Proof, that Matt. xxviii. 19. hath no Relation to Water-Baptism, but to the Baptism of the Holy Ghost.* It is this:

“ When *Peter* rehearsed to the Brethren at P. 26.

“ Jerusalem what had happened in the House
“ of *Cornelius*, he said, *As I began to speak, Acts xi.*
“ *the Holy Ghost fell on them, as on us at the*
“ *Beginning. Then remember'd I the Word of*
“ *the Lord, how that he said, John indeed bap-*
“ *tized with Water, but ye shall be baptized*
“ *with the Holy Ghost.* This shews plainly,
“ that *Peter* understood the Words which
“ Christ spake concerning the Baptism of the
“ Holy Ghost, to be *relative* not barely to
“ himself and the other Apostles, as some have
“ weakly argued, but *also to the Gentiles.*”

The Force of this Observation lies entirely in these Words, *Relative also to the Gentiles.*

If he means them only of those *Gentiles* upon whom the Holy Ghost fell at the Conversion of *Cornelius*, we own *such a Relation* as arises from the Likeness of Circumstances. God hereby shewed that he had consecrated the *Gentiles* to his Service, by endowing these first Fruits of them with the like Gifts that he had given on the Day of *Pentecost*. And this naturally brought into *St Peter's* Remembrance our Lord's Promise to himself, and the rest of the Apostles, as he himself declares. But what is this to our Author's Purpose? Or to what End doth this Observation tend? No: But he would insinuate hereby, that the Promise of Baptizing with the Holy Ghost, was *an universal Promise to all* who should believe the Gospel, and consequently *relative to all the Gentiles*, being as extensive as Christ's Commands to his Apostles, *to teach all Nations*. And if this be granted, his Way will lie more open to assert the Baptism in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* to be that of the Holy Ghost *promised to all Nations*. But we answer, that the Promise of this Baptism made by our Saviour in the Place above-cited was to *the Apostles only*, or at least to as many as were endowed with the

the like Gifts at *Pentecost*. It was indeed an Honour, a Prerogative, a Privilege bestowed on several of the first Christians, both *Jews* and *Gentiles*; but was neither *promised* to *all in general*, nor to any Persons *in particular*, the Apostles excepted: So that although it be true that this Promise made to the Apostles expressly, was *relative* in some Sense to all those who were likewise made Partakers of the like Gifts and Privileges, and among others to these *Gentiles* converted with *Cornelius*; yet this is a *Relation* so remote, and so insignificant to our Author's Purpose, that it doth him no manner of Service. Nor can it by any means be so understood, as to become an Argument, that the Baptism instituted by Christ in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* was the Baptism with the Holy Ghost, or that *Peter* ever thought so; and least of all, that he thought so upon this Occasion, when he commanded Baptism with Water to be administer'd to those who had received that of the Holy Ghost in his own Presence.

What therefore doth our Author mean, when he proceeds in these Words, "*Which made him put this Question to the By-standers, p. 27.*" "Can any Man forbid Water, &c.?" Why

Should the Discovery that he supposes St *Peter* to have made upon this Occasion, viz. that Christ's Promise of Baptism with the Holy Ghost was *Relative to the Gentiles*, occasion his putting any Questions, or making any Proposals concerning the baptizing these Converts *with Water*? It had been far more natural for the Apostles, upon our Author's Hypothesis, to have argued the contrary Way, viz. that seeing these *Gentiles* are already baptized with the Holy Ghost, and it doth unexpectedly appear to us that this is the Baptism *promised by Christ to all Nations*, upon our preaching his Gospel, and that it is entirely a spiritual Thing, brought about by our Preaching, and not minister'd by our Application of the Elements of this World ^u, therefore what Use can there

^u This is the Quakers Doctrine, that the Apostles taught baptizing, or baptized teaching. *Answer to Baptism with Water asserted.* — Thus also Geo. Whitehead, in his *Antidote* It is not said, Go, teach, and then baptize with Water, but, Go, teach, baptizing; making Baptism only a concomitant Circumstance of Preaching; or, as he terms it, *A spiritual Baptism attending immediately on the Apostles Ministry*. But by the like Argument, because it is not said first Go, and then Teach, but πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε, *Going teach*; the Apostles were to teach *all the Way they went*, or at least in a *deamulatory Way*,
like

there be of Water, or Baptism, or any other Rite to initiate these Persons into the Service and Religion of Christ? This had been speaking consistently, and agreeably to those Notions that are here imputed to *St Peter*. But as our Author has ordered the Matter for him, he makes him appear no wiser a Person than himself.

But now that we are upon this Question of *St Peter's*, *Can any Man forbid Water, &c.*? let us make an end of it. He tells us, p. 28. that this Question being introduced by these Words, "*Then answered Peter, it is a plain Token of some Reasoning that had passed betwixt him and those of the Circumcision.*" This Remark is a plain Token that the Man who made it doth not understand a very common and familiar Expression in the sacred Writers; frequently used by them when no Question at all was asked, and when no previous Reason can be supposed *.

H 3

But

like the *Peripatetick Philosophers*. For there is no Reason why one Participle in the Text should be interpreted in this Way more than the other.

* See several Instances collected by Mr *Leslie*. *Disc. on Water-Baptism*, Sect. 6.

Will.

But we may safely give him his own Way and ask what this Reasoning was about, or what was the Difficulty in Debate? Why he tells us, “ *that the Reason of St Peter’s putting this Question to them, is apparent; they being of the Circumcision, were much prejudiced in Disfavour of the Gentiles, as Peter also was before he saw the Vision at the House of Simon the Tanner.*” Were these of the Circumcision for or against the baptizing of the Gentiles? This he doth not tell us. Nor is it any matter which Way they inclin’d since St Peter was for the Affirmative; and we think his Authority decisive in the Case. So that supposing a Dispute to have arisen upon this Head, yet what can our Author infer from thence to serve his Cause.

But, says he, p. 29. “ *If Christ, by the Words of that Text (Matt. xxviii. 19.) did certainly institute Water-Baptism, as the Vindicator asserts, then those of the Circumcision that believed could not well be ignorant of it: And Peter’s putting such a Question as Can* “ any

Will Penn finds a Reason, such a one as it is, for this Question of Peter’s, upon the Quakers Scheme, without supposing, as our Author does, any thing to have pass’d by Way of Reasoning before-hand, Defence of Gospel-Truths, p. 81.

" any Man forbid Water, &c. ? to them, must
 " have been quite needless and absurd. For it is
 " presumed they who believed in Christ would not
 " forbid what Christ had commanded to be done."

Very true ; and therefore the *Absurdity* lies,
 not in St *Peter's* Expression by Way of Que-
 stion, but in the Man who supposes he made
 a real *Question*, or *Matter of Doubt*, or *Diffi-*
culty about it ; or intended to ask the By-standers
 what he should do in the Case. Our Author
 is as unhappy in his Observation upon the *Que-*
stion here, as he was just now in that upon the
 Word *answered* ; and seems to imagine, that a
 Man cannot use an Expression in the Form of
 a Question, without really putting an Interro-
 gatory. But may we not say, for instance,
Can any Man wonder that they should make very
bad Expositors of Scripture, who are unacquain-
ted with some of the common Rules of Writing
and Speaking ? May we not say this, though
 none that we speak to *be ignorant* of it, or will
doubt it ? Or must such a Question be there-
 fore *needless and absurd*, because *it is presumed*
every body believes it, and no body will *gain-*
say or contradict it ? Affirmations or Negati-
 ons thus put, are very often more emphatical

than in a plain declaratory Form: And so this Question of *St Peter's* is to be understood as a strong and exprefs Declaration that Water-Baptism was not to be denied to those new Converts, but was by all means to be administered to them.

S E C T. V.

p. 27.

1 Cor. i.
17.

HIS next Observation, which is his third and last *clear Proof*, that *Matt. xxviii. 19.* hath no Relation to Water-Baptism, is, that *St Paul told the Corinthians that he was not sent to baptize but to preach the Gospel.* Whence he thinks it evidently follows, that *St Paul* also understood the Words of Christ in *Matt. xxviii.* not to concern *Water-Baptism*: His Reason is, that if they were a Command both to teach and to baptize with Water, how could *St Paul* say he was not sent to baptize? And he desires his Reader to reflect on this Declaration of the Apostle, and try how he can reconcile it with the Command of Christ to baptize with Water.

This is one of the tritest Objections the Quakers have against Water-Baptism^y And is
an

^y Answer to *Baptism with Water asserted*, p. 8. and *Will. Penn's Def. of Gospel-Truths*, p. 76.

an old Argument of the *Quintillians* revived, and not one jot improved. This Sect took its Rise from one *Quintilla*, a *Woman Preacher* at *Carthage*, a little before *Tertullian's* Time, who made it her Business to disparage and cry down Water-Baptism. Against which Heresy, *Tertullian* wrote his *Book of Baptism*, to establish the Importance of our Lord's Institutions: In which Book, c. 14. this very Objection is consider'd and refuted. And also by *St Chrysostome*, Hom. 3. on the first Ep. to the *Cor.* Among the Moderns, by *Limborch*^z, and *Dr Forbes*^a; and as many others almost, as have wrote against the Quakers upon the Subject of Baptism^b. Our Author seems to own he has looked into *Mr Leslie's Divine Institution of Water-Baptism*: He has a whole Chapter or Section on this particular Objection^c. Why has not our Author made some Reply to him, or taken some Notice of those Things that are urged against the Quakers Way of Reasoning upon

^z L. 5. cap 67.

^a *Forbesii Op.* Fol. Vol. II. p. 464.

^b *Geo. Keith's Arg. of the Quakers against Baptism and the Lord's Supper refuted*, Sect. 4 ——— *Dr Bennet's Confutation of Quakerism*, Chap. 25.

^c *Leslie's Div. Inst. of Wat. Bapt.* Sect. 7.

upon this Head. To repeat and reprint what has been so often given them in Answer, is needless, at least so long as those Answers stand good, and are unreplied to. When any of the *Quakers* can start any Difficulty, or do give any new Turn to an old Objection, or make any direct Reply to what is given them in Answer to their Objections, then it is worth while to give a particular Attention to what they say. But when they offer *nothing*, which is our Author's Case upon this Point, *nothing* but what is stale and trite, and worn threadbare, why should we begin the Dispute anew with him? If we tell him that this Text of *St Paul* is to be understood thus, *that he was not sent so much to baptize as to preach the Gospel*, like *Hosea* vi. 6. *I desired Mercy, and not Sacrifice*; then he will except against this Parity, as *Rob. Barclay* and *Geo. Whitehead* did; and affirm, *that the whole Gospel, by this Liberty of Interpretation, may be perverted*. Then we must proceed to shew the Necessity there is of interpreting divers Places in this Manner, and to lay down the Rules whereby it may be known when we are right and when we are wrong in so doing. Which is all sufficiently

done

done to our Hands, by the Writers against the *Quakers* Inferences from this Passage.

If we press him with this Consequence from their Interpretation, How came *St Paul* to baptize *Crispus* and *Gaius*, &c. as he declares he did, if he knew that he had no Command or Commission to do so? Then he will guard against this Question with a Distinction that the *Quakers* are wont to use when they are thus pressed, viz. that the Apostles baptized by *Permission*, and not by *Commission*, and put what *St Paul* did on this Occasion upon the same footing with his circumcising *Timothy*. And then we must repeat all those Arguments which are proper to shew the Invalidity of this Distinction, when thus applied. They will be found in *Geo. Keith*^d and others.

Referring therefore to what has been said upon this Text by former Writers, and more especially by the Author of *The Defence of Baptism with Water and Infant-Baptism asserted*, we shall only desire the *serious Reader to pon-* p. 27.
der and reflect upon this positive Declaration of St Paul, that he baptized Crispus and Gaius,
and

^d *Answer to the Quakers Arguments against Baptism and the Lord's Supper.* Sect 4. p. 9. Quarto, Lond. 1698.

and the Household of Stephanus; and that he gives this Reason why he baptized no more, viz. lest any should say that he baptized in his own Name; and that the whole Passage necessarily implies, that all the Believers at Corinth, universally, were baptized; the Apostles not only countenancing such Baptism, but commanding it, and occasionally performing it themselves wherever they came; let him, we say, seriously ponder these Things, and try if he can fairly reconcile them with that total Neglect and Disuse of this Institution which the Quakers are guilty of.

S E C T. VI.

THE Author of the *Flail* having now done with his *clear and strong Proofs* in Support of his *just and true Inference*, that *Matt. xxviii. 19.* hath *no Relation to Water-Baptism*, proceeds to examine the four Texts that *the Vindicator* hath referr'd to, in these Words:—“It is certain, that the Apostles “understood it so (viz. *Matt. xxviii. 19.* of Water-Baptism) “as appears both by their “Practice and Writings, *Acts. x. 47.* and

Vind. p.
18.

“ viii.

“ viii. 36, 38. *Eph.* v. 26. *Heb.* x. 22. In
 “ all which Places *Water* is expresseley mentio-
 “ ned.”

His Objections against the first of these, *viz.*
 the Text relating to the Baptism of *Cornelius*
 and his Friends, have been already sufficiently
 consider'd above. What he says upon the
 second, *Acts* viii. 36, 38. must now be attend-
 ed to.

He owns that *Philip* baptized the Eunuch
 with Water, but observes *that it is only said he* p. 30.
baptized him. So that no Form being mention-
 ed wherewith he baptized him, he concludes,
that he did not baptize him in Compliance with
the Command of Christ, Matt. xxviii. 19.

“ But so Men may say, if they please (to
 quote the Words of a good Author *) “ *that*
 “ *when Philip and the Eunuch went into the Water,*
 “ *he baptized him with Fire.*” And this might as
 reasonably be concluded from the Silence of
 the Text, as that *Philip* either used no Form,
 or not the right Form, prescribed by *Jesus Christ*.

But our Author has an Hypothesis here,
 that *If Philip baptized the Eunuch with the* p. 30.
same

* Dr Sim. Patrick's *Aqua Genitalis*, 8vo Lond. 1676.

same Form of Words with which he baptized the Samaritanes, of whom it is said a few Verses before, that the Holy Ghost was fallen upon none of them, only that they were baptized in the Name of the Lord Jesus (which he further supposes to be in the Name of the Lord Jesus only) then he neither executed nor complied with Christ's Command. That is to say, if Philip had done what it doth not appear he did, then he had furnished our Author with something of an Argument which at present cannot by any Means be wrested from his Proceedings.

We refer our Author to the Pamphlet entitled, *A Defence of Baptism with Water, and Infant-Baptism asserted*, for a full Answer to his own and another Quaker's Observations from this History of Philip and the Eunuch^f;

And

p. 29.

^f Our Author has observed, at the End of a little Note in the Page before, "*that the Eunuch's saying to Philip, See here is Water, what hindereth me to be baptized? seem'd to be a plain Indication of a Practice among the Jews of baptizing Profelytes.*" It is much that he can find no better Evidence for such a Practice; for this is a very *obscure Indication* of it: And is one of the last Things that another Man would have seen in the Eunuch's Words.

There

And so pass on to the next Text which he takes to Task, and that is *Ephesians* v. 26. *Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of Water by the Word.*

This Place the *Vindicator* had referr'd to, as an Instance that the Apostle understood the Christian Baptism to be a Water-Baptism; for this Reason, because *Washing of Water* is an Expression that cannot otherwise be well accounted for. For which Reason the best Interpreters

There is an Observation made by *Grotius* upon another Question of the *Eunuch* much more to the Purpose. It is upon these Words, ver. 31. *How can I (viz. understand the Scriptures or the Prophets) except some Man should guide me? And he desired Philip that he would come up and sit with him.* “Non putabat tam perspicuam ubique esse scripturam & expositum omnibus habere sensum, ut nunc faciunt non *Sellularii* tantum. sed & *Fæminæ*, qui rectius facerent qui duce sibi opus esse agnoscerent.” “*The Eunuch did not think the Scriptures every where so plain and clear, and the Sense of them so obvious to all, as now a-days not only Handicraftsmen, but even Women do; who would do better if they acknowledged a Want of a Guide to instruct them.*”

Our Author, who appears to be a great Reader of the Prophetical Books, and the more abstruse Parts of Scripture, would find it more to his Advantage to enquire and ask what they mean, than to set up for an Interpreter of them, without any *Academical Learning*.

terpreters have constantly expounded it in the same Way, viz. as either directly signifying Baptism, or (which is the same thing to our present Purpose) alluding to the *Water* which is by Christ's Appointment the Matter of Baptism. And they who will compare this Text with *John* iii. 5. *Tit.* iii. 5. *1 Pet.* iii. 1. will be apt to be of the same Opinion.

p. 31.

But our Author is once more "*in Admiration, that the Vindicator should be so weak and shallow of Understanding, as to take the Apostle to be here speaking of material Water, such as a Priest sprinkles a Child's Face with, and*

p. 32.

"*calls it Baptism—Some of the meanest Tradesmen among the Quakers, whom he (the Vindicator) advises to mind their Packs, and their Shops, and not to meddle with the Scriptures, could have told him, at first Sight on Hearing of those Words, that the Water which the Apostle there speaks of, is the living Water which Christ himself spake of John iii. and vii. 37, 38, 39.*"

It is probable some of their meanest Tradesmen might tell him so, and he would easily judge from thence that they dealt in Packs and Shops, and had more understanding in

them

them than in the holy Scriptures, or else were very mean Tradesmen indeed. For none who know the common Rules of expounding Scripture would interpret *Water* in a Passage where it may be understood literally in a very natural and consistent Sense, by the *only two Places* in the New Testament (except the Apocalypse) where it is *confessedly figurative*. Much less when it is further considered that the Word *Washing* with *Water* (for so is the Phrase in the Passage) cannot be applied with any Justice to that *Living Water* which is mentioned in those two other Places. For the figurative living Water is figuratively *to be drunk by those* John iv. *that thirst for it, that it may become a Well of*^{14.} *Water in them springing up to everlasting Life, or a River of Living Water flowing out of their* John vii. *Bellies.* Now had the Apostle alluded to this^{37.} *Living-Water*, he would not have used the baptismal Phrase *Washing*, but rather some other Word which might make the Figures correspond the better with each other.

If we were to make use of one of his own Arguments, we might say, that this *living Water*, being *Drink* (for all who *thirst* are ex-

Rom. xiv.
17.

precisely invited to come and *drink* of it) cannot therefore consist *with the Kingdom of God*, which is *not Meat and Drink*, but *Righteousness and Peace*, &c. This would be as good an Argument as that which he uses p. 25. to shew that Water being *Drink*, cannot be any Part of the Baptism commanded in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* And how would he answer it? Why he might tell us, that *Meat and Drink* in *Rom. xiv. 17.* is to be literally understood, but *Drink* in these Texts of *St John* to be understood figuratively, viz. of a spiritual *Thirst* and spiritual *Drinking*; and that therefore these Texts are not to be expounded of each other § We

grant

§ *Rom. xiv. 15, 17.* If thy Brother be grieved with thy *Meat* now walkest thou not charitably. Destroy not him with the *Meat* for whom Christ died. ——— For the Kingdom of God is not *Meat and Drink*, but *Righteousness and Peace and Joy* in the Holy Ghost.

John iv. 14. Whosoever *drinketh* of the Water that I shall give him, shall *never thirst*; but the *Water* that I shall give him shall be in him a Well of Water *springing up into everlasting Life*.

John vii. 37. If any Man *thirst*, let him come unto me and *drink*. He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said *out of his Belly shall flow Rivers of living Water*. But this is of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive. For the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because *Jesus* was not yet glorified.

grant it ; and lay Claim to the Liberty of making the same just Distinction. That *Water* in this Passage of *St Paul* which we are upon, is to be understood literally, and therefore is not to be expounded of two Texts where *Water* is confessedly *figurative*. And consequently this Text of *St Paul* has no more to do with those of *St John*, than that other Text of *St Paul* about *Meat* and *Drink* hath.

These are the first and most obvious Exceptions against his Exposition. But let us examine it further. It doth not appear with any Certainty whether Christ meant any thing more by *living Water*, than the extraordinary Gifts that were to be bestowed upon the Disciples at *Pentecost*. This Opinion many learned Men have espoused ; and chiefly from that Text which our Author ought to have quoted at length, instead of stopping short at these Words, *but this he spake of the Spirit*, for it immediately follows, *which they that believe on him should receive, for the Holy Ghost was not yet come*. And if it be right to expound this Text of *the extraordinary Gifts of the Spirit*, then it cannot, with any Propriety, be brought

to interpret another Text, which relates only to the *ordinary Work and Office of the Holy Ghost, in sanctifying the Church of Christ.*

See Dr
Whitby.

Tit. iii. 5

Again ; supposing the figurative *living Water* is to be understood of the *ordinary Operations of the Spirit*, cleansing and purifying the Souls of Believers, and in that Sense to be applicable to this Text of *St Paul* which we are considering ; yet the Application will lie, not where our Author places it upon the Phrase *Washing with Water*, but on what follows, *viz. by the Word*, that is to say, *by the Word of his Grace* ; for thus some have thought it might be consistently interpreted, and agreeably, to another Expression of the same Apostle, *Acts xx. 32. And now, my Brethren, I commit you to God, and to the Word of his Grace, which is able to build you up, and to give you an Inheritance among all them that are sanctified.* And in this Sense it is made parallel to another Passage of the same Writer, where he speaks likewise of Baptism, calling it *the Washing of Regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost.*

There

There is indeed another Construction of *ἐν ῥήματι* approved of by good Expositors, viz. that it means *the Form of Baptism*. Which, to be sure, our Author will not hear of. Nor shall we need to take any Pains with him about it, since it matters not at present which of these Interpretations be the best. Let the judicious Reader judge of them. But that Exposition which our Author fathers upon their meanest Tradesmen, is such as we believe cannot be found in any good Commentators, nor perhaps to be met with any where but among the Blue and Leathern-apron'd Divines

Well; but he says further, "*We are bold* p. 32. "*to affirm, in Contradiction to the Vindicator, that the Water of the Word, which the Apostle speaks of, is the clean Water which God promised to sprinkle upon his People, Ezek. ver. 2. xxxvi.*"

But now, in the first Place, he is a little too bold in altering the Scripture-Expression to make it speak for him. For the Apostle useth no such Phrase as the *Water of the Word*^h, but

I 3

the

^h By comparing this Phrase, which our Author affects, viz. *The Water of the Word*, with his late References to Texts that mention

P 33.

P. 31.

the *Washing of Water by the Word*. This is no accidental Slip of his Pen, for he repeats it twice again in the next Page; and what is more, he tells the *Vindicator*, that he might as well say, that St *Peter* spake of *material Milk*, when he said, *As new-born Babes desire the sincere Milk of the Word, as take St Paul here to be speaking of material Water*. So that he manifestly has espoused a Notion, that as St *Peter* spoke of the *Milk of the Word*, so St *Paul* did of the *Water of the Word*. But as this latter is his own Text, he himself is the properest Person to comment upon it.

xxxvi. 22,
23, 25, 26,
27.

As to the Quotation out of *Ezekiel*ⁱ, why St *Paul* should rather be thought to allude to this

mention *living Water*, one would be apt to imagine that he had taken up with some Notions like those of the *Paulicians* of old; who, according to *Euthymius* (*Panoplia*, Par. 2. Tit. 21. p. 48) though they really rejected and despised Baptism with Water, yet they pretended to receive it. But that was only with a deceitful Equivocation; for they maintained that the *Word of the Gospel* was Baptism, because our Lord said *Ego sum Aqua Viva; I am the Living Water*. See Bingham's *Ant. Book 4*.

1 ver. 25. *Then will I sprinkle clean Water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your Filthiness, and from all your Idols, will I cleanse you. And a new Heart also will I give you, and a new Spirit will I put within you—— And I will put MY SPIRIT WITHIN YOU.*

this Prophecy than to the Rite of Christian Baptism, he doth not tell us; or why it may not be said, that he alluded both to this Prophecy, and to Baptism too, he cannot shew us. For the Prophet's Expression is taken from the legal Purifications, which were by *Sprinkling with Water upon the Unclean*, as well as by *Washing*^k. And denotes likewise the Sacrament of Baptism under the Gospel-Dispensation; by which true Believers are cleansed from their Sins, and sanctified in their Persons^l. So that this Passage out of *Ezekiel* affords no Colour for a Pretence, that St Paul had not the *material Water of Baptism* in his Eye when he wrote these Words to the *Ephesians*. Nor will any one be easily persuaded^{Eph. v. 26.} to understand this Place as our Author does, but such a one as reads the Words as he does, *Water of the Word*, instead of *Washing of Water by the Word*.

Nor is he more successful in his other Observation upon the fourth and last Text that the *Vindicator* had referr'd to, viz. *Heb. x. 22.*

I 4.

Having

^k Numb. viii 7. and xix. 13, 18. 19, 20, 21.

^l See Lowth upon Ezek. xxxvi ver. 25. And Mr D'Almon's *Mystery of Anabaptism Unmask'd.* 8vo. Lond. 1709. p. 95.

Having our Hearts sprinkled from an evil Conscience, and our Bodies washed with pure Water.

Here is a manifest Allusion to the Methods appointed in the *Mosaical* Law for the Purification of the Unclean from Ceremonial Defilements; which were by *sprinkling of Blood*, and of *Water*; and *batling or washing of the Body with Water*, Lev. xvi. Num. xix. By the sprinkling of the Blood of the Sin-Offering before the Mercy-Seat, the *People were made clean from their Sins*, Lev. xvi. 30. To this the Apostle alludes, *Having therefore, Brethren, Boldness to enter into the Holiest by the Blood of Jesus——let us draw near——having our Hearts sprinkled from an evil Conscience.* And he makes the like Allusion in a parallel^m Passage in the Chapter before. And as by the *sprinkling of our Hearts* the Apostle expresses the inward Sanctification or cleansing of our Souls from Sin by the Blood of Christ (in which

^m Heb. ix. 13, 14. For if the *Blood of Bulls* and of *Goats*, and the *Ashes of an Heifer sprinkling the Unclean sanctifieth to the purifying of the Flesh*, how much more shall the Blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without Spot unto God, purge your *Conscience* from dead Works to serve the Living God,

which both the Author of the *Flail* and the *Vindicator* do agree) so by the having our Bodies washed with pure Water he expresses the outward Means or Sign of that internal Purity, viz. Baptism and pure Water; pure on Account of the Analogyⁿ, that it may the more fitly represent the inward Effects, of which it is the Symbol and the Pledge. No, says our Author, by pure Water, in this Place, we are p. 34. to understand that pure Water^o of Life, clear as Chrystal, which John the Divine saw proceeding out of the Throne of God and the Lamb. Surely he could have no other Reason for this Imagination, than that in all the Scriptures he could not find St Paul's very Expression of pure Water, but in the Revelations, where St John comes very near it, a pure River of Water; which struck his Fancy so strongly, that he forgot that St Paul was speaking of an Ab-lution pertaining to this Life, St John of a Circumstance of the New Jerusalem; the one of a thing that was over and passed, the other of something future in the World to come.

Yet

ⁿ See *Vossius de Baptismo*, Disp. 1. Thesis 4.

^o Rev. xxii. 1. And he shewed me a pure River of Water, &c.

P. 34.

Yet he is so sure of its being a just Exposition and a clear Case, that *he is willing to leave the Decision of it to any Clergyman in the County of Northumberland, except the Vindicator.* This had been a bold Step indeed, if he had not immediately withdrawn his *Appeal*, and retracted it by a *Proviso*, that *such Clergyman shall give us his Thoughts and Opinion as fairly and candidly as the Author of the Sermon preached at Derby, Sept. 20. 1730. has done upon this Head.* That is, if he will deliver his Opinion in such a manner that the *Quakers* may fancy him to be one of the *Brotherhood*, and cite him as their *Advocate*. For such doth the *Preacher of this Sermon* appear to be from those Passages that are cited in the *Flail*. But knowing what a desperate Hand our Author has at quoting, and being warned by the Fate of Bishop *Taylor*, not only to pity all Writers out of whom he makes Excerpts, but to suspend Judgment concerning them, till we are assured he has not mal-traited them, we shall forbear all Censure, as well as all Defence of the said *Preacher at Derby*, till we have Opportunity of knowing how his Passages lie, and whether he be fairly used or no.

C H A P.

CHAP. III.

REPLY to the Remainder of Chap. II. in the
Flail, and to Chap. III. in the same.

SECT. I.

THE *Author of the Flail*, p. 38. passes on to the *Vindicator's* third and last Paragraph. Where he remarks, that the *Vindicator* has said no more than Mr *Leslie* had said before him. However, he is obliged to the *Vindicator* for referring to Mr *Leslie*; otherwise he had not known perhaps that both made use of the same Exposition of the Word *Baptize*. The more Testimonies one can produce from good Writings, who have agreed in the Interpretation of any Passage, and in their Reasons for it, the greater the Authority of such Interpretation, so far as human Authority goes. And the *Vindicator* could have shewn this Exposition that he gave, to have been commonly approved by the best Authors from the earliest Times of Christianity; and so of most, or all the other Texts he hath made use of; whereas our Author
can

can go no higher for the Arguments and Expositions which he borrows, than 1650; unless he have Learning enough to discover that some of them are the same that were urged by the ancient *Hereticks* that rejected Water-Baptism.

His Business in the Remainder of this second Chapter, and in that which follows, is to shew us the true Way of expounding *Matt. xxviii. 19.* which it seems the Water-Baptists, for want of knowing *the Rules of true Interpretation and Construction*, have widely mistaken. And here we shall see whether he hath a better hand at building up, than he has in pulling down.

p. 38.

He lays his Foundation thus: "*That the true Sense of the Word Baptize in Matt. xxviii. 19. is better understood by comparing the several Places in the Evangelists where the Word is used, as spoken by Christ, than by looking into the Derivation of the Greek;*" that is, the Sense of the Greek: for the *Vindicator* had only said that *baptize* was a Greek Word that signified *to wash*; and this is the customary and obvious Sense of it whenever it is used *literally* in the Evangelists. But, according to

our Author, without regarding the true *Sense* or Meaning of the Word itself, we must find out Christ's *Meaning* by comparing the Places where he has used the Word. But unless we know the Meaning of the Word itself, either by its Derivation, or its Usage by the *Greek* Writers, especially the sacred ones, how shall we know what Christ *meant* by it in any of the Places where he has used it? Or how shall we know when he intended to use it *literally*, and when *figuratively*; for that is the very Point in Dispute?

However, upon this Foundation our Author begins his Superstructure: "*As this*, says he, p. 38. "*is the best and most certain way of knowing in what Sense and Signification Christ used the Word Baptize, we shall lay before our Readers the several Places in Scripture where Christ is said to have used it.*" And then he cites *Matt. xx. 20* ^{p.} with its parallel Place, *Mark.*

x. 35.

^p Then came to him the Mother of Zebedee's Children, &c.

— Are ye able to drink of the Cup that I shall drink of, and be *baptized* with the *Baptism* that I am *baptized* with?

— Ye shall indeed drink of my Cup, and be *baptized* with the *Baptism* that I am *baptized* with, &c.

- x. 35. and also *Luke* xii. 50^a. In all which Places Christ uses the Word *Baptize* in a figurative Sense, denoting *Sufferings for the Truth's Sake*, and called by the Schoolmen, the *Baptism of Blood*. Next he quotes *Acts* i. 5^b where our Lord mentions the *Baptism with the Holy Ghost*. In these Places (says he) it is evident that Christ used *Baptize* in a figurative Sense. We grant it; because the Words in the Context oblige us to understand it figuratively.
- P. 39. " There are, says he, in all the four Evangelists
- P. 39. " but two Places more^c, *Matt.* xxviii. 19. and
- P. 39. " the parallel Place, *Mark* xvi. 16. where
- P. 40. " Christ used the Word; and whoever therefore
- " would rightly understand in what Sense the
- " uses the Word *Baptize* in those Places, they
- " being last spoke by him, ought to consider in
- " what Sense he used it in the foregoing Places.
- " Now it must be granted, that in the foregoing
- " Places he used it altogether in a figurative
- " Sense.

^a But I have a *Baptism* to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished?

^b John truly baptized with Water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many Days hence.

^c Baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. — He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved.

*" Sense. Therefore it is most rational to conclude,
" that he also used the Words in a figurative
" Sense in Matt. xxviii. and Mark xvi."*

This is his Argument truly stated. For as to the Guard that he puts in against a Difficulty that he foresaw, by telling us that he considers only those Passages, *" in which* P. 40.

*" Christ applied the Words Baptize and Baptism,
" either to himself and his Disciples together, or
" to them only,"* it is a trifling Limitation, when we are considering in what Sense our Lord used those Words; which cannot be known without considering all the Places where he used them. And it is a Limitation that destroys our Author's own Argument. For he excludes by it those very Texts that are in Dispute, *Matt. xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16.* And is forced to own as much himself. For having said, p. 39. *" That in all the four Evan-
" gelists there are but these two Places more
" where Christ used the Word by applying it to
" his Disciples;* and having said, p. 40. that *" these two Places are the only remaining Texts
" to be found in Scripture, in which Christ
" using the Words Baptize and Baptism, applied
" them either to himself and his Disciples together,*

P. 40.

or to them only ;” subjoins before he comes to a full Stop, that “ *he applied the Word to such as should be taught by his Apostles in Matt. xxviii. 19. and he applied it to such as should believe in Mark xvi. 16.*” When he can reconcile the latter Part of this Period, or Sentence, with the former, we will subscribe to all his Observations upon the Use of this Word.

In the mean time, by setting aside his impertinent Limitation, we quite alter the Face of his Argument. And whereas in the Manner he had contrived to put it, it appeared, that Christ had never the Word *Baptism* but in *two* Senses, and both of those *figurative*, viz. *Baptism of Sufferings*, and *Baptism of the Holy Ghost* : We can now assert, that he used it in *two other Senses*, and both of those *literal*, viz. *Baptism of John*, Matt. xxi. 25. with the parallel Places, *Mark xi. 30. Luke xx. 4.* And the *washing of Pots and Cups*, βαπτισμὸς ξεστῶν καὶ ποτηρίων, *the Baptism of Pots and Cups*, *Mark vii. 8.* We call these *two different Senses* of the Word, because the former is commonly supposed to have been performed by

Immersion

Water

Immersion, and the other by *Sprinkling* †. And they are both, though literal, as evidently distinguishable from the Water-Baptism among Christians, as the Figurative-Baptisms mentioned above are.

Now let us see how the Argument stands. Christ hath used the Words *Baptize* and *Baptism* in two distinct figurative Senses. He hath also used them in two distinct literal Senses. According to our Author, “ *If we would under-* p. 40.

“ *stand rightly in what Sense he uses the Word*
 “ *in Matt. xxviii. and Mark xvi. they being last*
 “ *spoke by him, ought to consider in what Sense*
 “ *he used it in the foregoing Places.*” Agreed.

But as it is used in the foregoing Places sometimes figuratively, sometimes literally, by what Rule must we proceed in making our Choice either of the literal, or figurative Sense? Our Author says, that “ *by the known* p. 40.

“ *Rules of Interpretation and Construction, no*
 “ *one is at Liberty to interpret the Word Bap-*
 “ *tize in a literal Sense, which Christ had con-*
 “ *stantly, at all other Times, used in a figura-*
 “ *tive Sense.*” We have shewn this to be a

VOL. II.

K

Mistake

† See the Reasons for this in the *Defence of Baptism with Water, and Infant-Baptism asserted.*

Mistake that Christ constantly used the Word so. But if he had done it, still the Rule is a false one; for we say, on the contrary, that it is a known Rule of true Interpretation and Construction, that *no one is at Liberty to interpret the Word Baptize (or any Word) in a figurative Sense, where it will easily bear to be understood in a literal Sense.* And we are willing to take it in either, or both those literal Senses in which Christ used it, that is to say, as it may be understood to comprehend both; *Immersion*, as in *John's Water-Baptism*; and *Aspersión*, as in the *Baptism of Pots and Cups*, *Mark vii. 8.*

But let us take our Author in his own Way; and argue the Point upon those Texts only which he hath produced. We observe, that in our Lord's Discourse with the Mother of *Zebedee's Children*, *Matt. xx.* and in other Places where he hath *figuratively* called a State of Sufferings for the Truth *Baptism*, he hath used the Words *Baptize* and *Baptism* in this Sense no less than twelve or fourteen Times. But he hath only used it *once* in the other *figurative* Sense relating to the *Holy Ghost*, *Acts i. 5.* Now in which of these two *figu-*
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rative Senses are we to understand these two last Texts where the Word occurs, and which must be expounded by the foregoing Places? In that Sense in which he hath used it fourteen Times, or in that Sense in which he hath used it but *once*? Our Author says, in that Sense in which it is but once used by our Saviour. But then Query, Why must two Passages, in which no Figure appears, be interpreted after one Passage which is manifestly figurative? Especially since that one Passage contains a peculiar Promise to particular Persons to be fulfilled within a few Days; and since in that one Passage our Lord not only uses the Word *Baptism* figuratively, but also literally; John *truly baptized with Water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many Days hence*. Since this is the only Place in the Bible where our Lord himself useth these very Expressions *Baptism with Water*, or *Baptism with the Spirit*, why must *Baptism*, when it stands alone, as in *Matt. xxviii.* be understood rather of a Baptism with the Spirit, than of a Baptism with Water? Or, by what Rule of Interpretation is our Author at Liberty to interpret the Word *Baptize* in a figura-

tive Sense, purely from the Authority of a Passage, in which Christ has also used the Word in a literal Sense? For as to all his other Reasons for this Interpretation, they have no Place in this present Argument of his, which is wholly concerning *Christ's Usage of the Word Baptize*.

But lastly, to convince him, if possible, that this Rule of his will by no means stand good, let us try it by some other Word occasionally used by our Saviour. We will take, for instance, the Word *Cup*, which occurs in one of his Quotations along with Baptism, and which also is a Word used in the Institution of the other Sacrament: And so may be deemed a parallel Instance.

Christ saith, *Matt. xx. 22. Are ye able to drink of the Cup that I shall drink of? — Ye shall indeed drink of my Cup.* And so again in *Mark x.*

He saith, *Matt. xxvi. 39. O my Father, if it be possible, let this Cup pass from me.* See the like Use of the Word *Matt. xxvi. 42. Mark xiv. 36. Luke xxii. 42. John xviii. 11.* In all which Places (to use our Author's own Words) it being evident that Christ used the Word *Cup*

in a figurative Sense, and there being in all the four Evangelists but two Places more where Christ used the Word, by applying it to his Disciples, it only remains to enquire in what Sense he there uses the Word.

Mark ix. 41. *Whosoever shall give you a Cup of Water to drink in my Name, &c.*

Luke xxii. 20. *This Cup is the New Testament of my Blood.*

These two Places (to proceed in our Author's own Expressions) being the only remaining Texts to be found in Scripture in which Christ using the Word Cup applied it either to himself, and his Disciples together, or to them only: Whosoever therefore would rightly understand in what Sense he uses the Word Cup in these Places, ought to consider in what Sense he used it in the foregoing Places. Now it must be granted, that when Christ applied the Word Cup to himself, and to Zebedee's Children, that he used the Word altogether in a figurative Sense; and also when he applied it to his own Sufferings and Passion in the Garden of Gethsemane. We think it therefore most rational to conclude, that he also used the Word in a figurative Sense (that is, for a State of Sufferings and Passion, for he had

used it *constantly* in this Sense) in these Texts also, *Whoſoever ſhall give you a Cup of Water;* and, *This Cup is the New Teſtament in my Blood.* For by the known Rules of true Interpretation and Conſtruction, no one is at Liberty to interpret the Word Cup in a literal Senſe, which Chriſt had *constantly*, at all other Times, *uſed in a figurative Senſe.*

How ſtrangely have all former Expoſitors of Scripture (being deceived, as it ſeems, and blinded by their Academical Learning) miſſed *the Rules of true Interpretation and Conſtruction!* Come and learn of our Author, all ye who would be Criticks in Language.

S E C T. II.

p. 41.

Acts viii.
21.

HIS next Obſervation is, “ *We think it*
 “ *very abſurd and contradictory to ſound*
 “ *Senſe to interpret the Words of Chriſt, Mark*
 “ *xvi. 16. He that believeth and is baptized,*
 “ *ſhall be ſaved, of Water-Baptiſm; for then*
 “ *it would follow, that Simon the Sorcerer*
 “ *was in a State of Salvation, though the Scrip-*
 “ *ture affirms, that his Heart was not Right in*
 “ *the Sight of God. But the Baptiſm which*
 “ *Chriſt*

Christ there speaks of, most certainly is the
Baptism that saveth; not the putting away the
Filth of the Flesh, but the Answer of a good
Conscience towards God, 1 Pet iii. 21.

As the Expression, *being in a State of Sal-*
vation, hath a two-fold Meaning, our Author
 should have told us in which of the two Sen-
 ses he applies it to *Simon the Sorcerer*, and then
 our Answer might have been sufficient to con-
 fute him. But as he hath not declared his
 particular Meaning herein, we are under a
 Necessity of replying to his Objection in both
 Senses of the Phrase.

And first, if he means that the Scripture
 represents *Simon the Sorcerer* to be out of a
State of Salvation, in such Sense, that it was
 not possible for him to obtain Forgiveness and
 Salvation by Repentance, then how will he
 account for what *St Peter* said to him on this
 Occasion, *Repent therefore of this thy Wicked-* Acts viii.
ness, and pray God if perhaps the Thought of^{22.}
thine Heart may be forgiven thee. He was so
 well aware that this Exhortation to *Simon*
 would spoil his Remark in this Sense of *State*
of Salvation, that he takes Care to suppress
 these Words in the very Middle of the Quo- P. 42.

tation of St *Peter's* Answer to *Simon*. And indeed he was under a Temptation to disguise this Circumstance upon another Account; for admitting that *Simon the Sorcerer* was capable, through Repentance, of Forgiveness, and consequently of Salvation, he was so by Virtue of his Faith and Water-Baptism, without the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, which St *Peter* denied him.

But, secondly, if he only means that *Simon* was at that Time out of a State of Salvation because of his Crimes yet unrepented of, and his Heart not being right in the Sight of God, we acknowledge it true: But then we observe that this makes nothing against the Business in hand, which is Water-Baptism. For we say, as St *Peter* did in the other Place cited, that the Baptism which saveth is not the putting away the Filth of the Flesh, is not the outward Washing or Sign in Baptism, but the Answer of a good Conscience towards God. And, consequently, we agree with our Author, that the Baptism which Christ speaks of, Mark xvi. 16. is the same with that which St *Peter* speaks of in his first Epistle, Chap. iii. ver. 21. Neither of them being the Baptism of the Holy Ghost

Ghost promised by Christ, *Acts* i. 5. but both of them being the same Baptism that was instituted by Christ according to *Matt.* xxviii.

19. How then doth *the Inefficacy of Water-Baptism, to procure any Man or Woman's Salvation*, appear from either of these Texts? Even the external Ablution, or *putting away the Filth of the Flesh*^u, is *so far* efficacious to the putting both Men and Women into a State of Salvation, as it is necessary to their Admittance into that Covenant with God, out of which there is no Salvation. They who would give it any other Sort of Efficacy than what may be ascribed to an instituted Means, made necessary to the Attainment of an End, go farther than they can warrant. And they who hold it unnecessary, *as a Means*, and reject it purely because it is Outward, and hath Respect unto the Flesh, *put from them the Word of God*, and *make the Commandment of* Christ^{6.}

^u Upon this Text of St Peter, see Leslie's *Div. Inst. of Wat. Bapt.* Sect. 8. G. Keith's *Arg. against Bapt. and the Lord's Supper answered*, Sect. 3. Dr Bennet's *Confutation of Quakerism*, §. 24. and others.

Christ of none Effect through their own Traditions *.

Acts viii.
16, 17.

Our Author has some more Observations in this History of the Samaritan Converts, which he lays down in order to make a Conclusion from them. The Samaritans had been baptized with Water, but they had not received the Holy Ghost: *for as yet he was fallen upon none of them.* But the Apostles coming from Jerusalem, *prayed for them, and laid their Hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost.*

p. 42.

Now the Receiving the Holy Ghost was, according to Peter's Interpretation, a being baptized with the Holy Ghost, Acts xi. 15. We allow

* "After all their Exceptions against outward Institutions, the Quakers do as eagerly promote George Fox's Institutions about outward Things, as they labour to throw down the outward Institutions of Christ." *George Keith's Arg. of the Quak. answer'd*, Sect. 6.

John Gretton, in one of his Pieces, lays the Foundation of his Argument against Water-Baptism in this Text, *Heb. vi. 1. Leaving the Principles of the Doctrine of Christ, let us go on to Perfection.* From the Word *Leaving*, he infers, that *Water-Baptism* is to be left off, as a first Principle. And by the same Way of Arguing the Quakers may get rid of *all the Principles* of the Christian Religion.

This Book is entitled, *John Baptist decreasing*, first published some Years since, but reprinted in 1697. See this Account in *Geo. Keith's Arg. of Quak. Answ.*

all this. What follows? *Why*, says he, *from St Peter's Interpretation, as well as from the Concern which the Apostles had that the Samaritans might receive the Holy Ghost, though they were baptized with Water, WE CONCLUDE the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, and not Water-Baptism, was that which Christ spake of Matt. xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16.* Suppose we were to answer thus (making use of the same Premises to bring out a quite contrary Conclusion :) But *from St Peter's Interpretation, as well as from the Concern that he had that Cornelius, and the Gentile Converts with him, might receive Water-Baptism, though they were already baptized with the Holy Ghost, WE CONCLUDE that Water-Baptism, and not the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, was that which Christ spake of Matt. xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16.* This Conclusion is every whit as good as his. Nay, it is the more warrantable. For *St Peter* insists upon the Water-Baptism after the Holy Ghost had fallen upon the Converts, as *necessary*, and by all means to be administer'd. But in the Case of the *Samaritan* Converts, there doth not appear the like *Necessity* that they should be endowed with the extraordinary Gifts of
the

the spirit. St *Peter* in the one Case *commanded* Water-Baptism to be administer'd. In the other Case he only *prayed* that they might be endowed with those Gifts. The one he *did* by *Authority* and *Commission*, as a Thing indispensable. The other he *sought for* by *Prayer*, as a Thing highly expedient, and tending to the Edification of the Church. If Water-Baptism be therefore *the Baptism* which is strictly and indispensibly necessary, and there is but *one Baptism*; then Water-Baptism, and not Baptism with the Spirit (meaning the extraordinary Effusions of it, as all along understood in this Controversy) is the *One Baptism for all Nations* in *Matt. xxviii. 19.* and the *Baptism by which Believers are saved* in *Mark xvi. 16.*

p. 57.

“ But, says he, p. 43. *by taking Matt. xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16. to be spoken of the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, and not Water-Baptism, several absurd Consequences are avoided.*

“ For is it not very strange, says he, and absurd for any to affirm that Christ by these Words instituted Water-Baptism in the Room of Circumcision? If this indeed should be affirmed

affirmed

affirmed as a necessary Consequence from these Texts alone, it might perhaps seem strange. But it is no direct Consequence from them. Neither is it in its self an absurd Position. For if there be other Reasons^y for saying that Water-Baptism came in the Room of Circumcision, or *succeeded it*, as many learned Men have expressed themselves, why may it not be said? or, what has our Author to object against it? Yes, he thinks it “*strange and* p. 43.
“*absurd that Christ should abolish one Ceremony*
“*of no moral Efficacy, and institute another in*
“*the Place of it, that neither rectifies the Mind,*
“*nor purges the Conscience.*” But here he considers not that Circumcision had a *positive Efficacy*; and he considers only the Sign in Baptism, or the outward Washing, abstracted from the internal Effects of it in all worthy Receivers. And this, we think, is a strange and absurd Way of representing either the one or the other. But he goes on, “*How is* p. 43.
“*it possible to conceive, that baptizing a Person*
“*with Water shall put him into a State of Sal-*
“*vation?*” Just as possible as to conceive,
that

^y Vide Selden. *de Synedriis Vet. Ebraeorum*, l. 1. c. 3.

that a Person wilfully rejecting Baptism shall not be put into a State of Salvation; or that a Man-Child of the Seed of *Abraham*, who was not circumcised, *should be cut off from his People*. But, he adds, "*How can it render him ever the more acceptable to God, who looks only at the Heart and Frame of the Mind?*" But the Heart and Frame of the Mind is concerned in all Instances of Obedience or Disobedience to the divine Commands. And though the *Matter* of those Commands be in its own Nature *indifferent*, yet the *Obligation* to perform them is *moral*; and renders the Performer *the more acceptable in the Sight of God*; and the Neglector of them the more odious.

And these now are *his several absurd Consequences* that follow upon Water-Baptism.

P. 43. "Whereas, says he, *if we take these Words of Christ, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned, to be spoken of the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, and the purifying Virtue of it, no Absurdity follows.*"

Yes, surely. I. The interpreting this Text where *baptize* may be understood literally, by another, *Acts i. 5.* where it is confessedly figurative.

gulative. See above, what has been said in the Beginning of this Chapter, Sect. 1.

2. The extending a Promise of Christ made to the Apostles, and fulfilled in them, and several of the first Converts to Christianity, to all Ages, and to all People who should believe throughout the World: Contrary to Experience and Fact.

3. The making it requisite to a State of Salvation that Men and Women be endowed with the miraculous Gifts of Tongues and Prophecy, and discerning of Spirits, &c. by which no Man alive can be now in a State of Salvation.

4. The making this Text in *Mark* inconsistent with the parallel Text in *Matt.* xxviii. by which it is directed, that all Men should be baptized in the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Which Direction was followed in all the Water-Baptisms of Christian Converts that we read of in Scripture, but was no Part of the Baptism of the Holy Ghost in any one Instance there recorded.

To these we may add one Absurdity more, in our Author's own Way of Reasoning. He has been pleading hitherto for the Baptism of the

the Holy Ghost, as being the Baptism mentioned in *Matt. xxviii. Mark xvi.* and explaining it by *Acts i. 5. and x. 44. and xi. 15. and viii. 15, 17, 19.* where it signifies the extraordinary Gifts of the Holy Ghost conferr'd upon the Apostles, and many others whom they converted by their Preaching, or confirmed by their Prayers, or the Imposition of their Hands. But now all of a sudden he shifts his hand, and shuffles another Kind of Baptism with the Holy Ghost in the Room of that he had been talking of, and explains it by the *purifying Virtue* that attends it; which is none other than the internal Grace and Effect of Water-Baptism duly received. And then he adds,

p. 43.

“ *Certainly he that receiveth the Holy Ghost, or*
 “ *is baptized with it, is in a State of Salvation;*
 “ *as, on the contrary, he that receiveth not, but*
 “ *resisteth the Holy Ghost, is in a State of Dam-*
 “ *nation.*” Right and true enough, if understood of the ordinary Graces and Assistances of the Holy Spirit; but whether it be so, if understood of the miraculous Gifts of the Holy Ghost, is another Question. For however we may grant, *that he who receives the Holy Ghost (viz. the purifying Virtues of the Spirit,*

as he now explains it) *is in a State of Salvation*; yet this is neither Baptism with the Holy Ghost (which is the Baptism he hath all along asserted, in Opposition to that of Water) neither is it ordinarily to be obtained or expected without Water-Baptism. And however we may grant, that *he that receiveth not, but resisteth the Holy Ghost* (that is, the ordinary Influences of the Spirit, called inward and spiritual Grace) *is in a State of Damnation*; yet it is not equally true nor true at all, that every one is in a State of Damnation who *receiveth not the Baptism of the Holy Ghost*, as distinguished in Scripture from Water-Baptism; or that *resisteth the Baptism of the Holy Ghost*, which it is in no Man's Power to do, since that Baptism hath long ceased in the World.

The Reader now is left to judge, whether it is our Interpretation of *Mark xvi. 16.* or our Author's, that is chargeable with the absurd Consequences.

S E C T. III.

*Letter to
the Clergy
of Nor-
thumber-
land. p. 8.
Vind. p.
18.
p. 54.*

HAVING finished his Observations upon *Mark* xvi. 16. he proceeds, in his third and last Chapter, p. 44. to support his former Interpretations of the Word *Name* in *Matt.* xxviii. 19. He had said, *that the Word Name was to be taken here in a figurative Sense for Power.* The *Vindicator* happened to say, that this Piece of Criticism was no better than *Nonsense*; at which our Author is much displeased; though he should not be so, till he hath first of all made *good Sense* of this Construction. And whereas he complains that the *Vindicator* gave *this Argument the Go-by*, and did not vouchsafe to consider it in his Answer, the true Reason of such Neglect may easily be guessed at; namely, that it appeared to be an Argument quoted by *an anonymous Writer*, who was no ways concerned in the Dispute between *the Letter-Writer* and *the Vindicator*. But now since it appears that the Argument is owned, and patronized by our Author, we shall give him those Respects which were before omitted, and consider his Defence

of

of it very carefully. And *though the Vindica-* P. 44.
tor was pleased to call the Quakers Argument
Nonsense, without attempting to shew wherein ;
we will forbear to make use of so severe an
Expression, while we shew that the Vindicator
was not mistaken in the Thing.

We own that *Name* is sometimes used in
Scripture for *Power*. There are some (and
Writers of Note too) who will not yield so
much as this. Yet we are willing to allow it.
But then we say that the Word *Name* is never
to be interpreted of *Power*, but when the Con-
text requires that Sense to be put upon it ;
which is *not the Case* of the Passage in Dispute ;
much less may it be interpreted of *Power*,
when a manifest Force is put upon the Words,
and Violence done to the Context thereby ;
which is *the Case* of the Text in Debate.

To *baptize in the Name*, is a Phrase used at
least seven Times in the New Testament *.
And we have shewn before, that in all these
Places one and the same Baptism (*viz.* that
commanded in the Text) is denoted †. Now

L 2

though,

* Matt xxviii 19. Acts ii. 38. and viii. 16. and x. 48. and
xix. 5. 1 Cor. i. 13. and i. 15.

† Chap. 2. Sect 3.

though, as has been just said, it is against all Rule to interpret *Name* by *Power* in any of these Texts where it most naturally bears its primary and literal Sense; yet we will further suppose, for the present, that the Word *Name*, in all these Texts, is *capable* of his Construction, and may indifferently signify *Power*, or *Name* in its first and obvious Sense. But then we say, that it is highly reasonable to expound the *same Phrase* where ever it occurs in the *same Manner*, viz. to expound it always of *Power*, or never. And that it is highly unreasonable to allow the Word *Name* its proper and literal Meaning in all these Passages but *one*, and to interpret it by *Power* in that *one* only, which is the principal Text to which all the others refer.

Let us now examine the Point by this equitable Rule, and see how our Author's Argument will turn out.

George Fox, whose Writings are the Oracles of all the *Quakers*, was the Person that rather hinted than gave them this Interpretation of *Name* in *Matt. xxviii 19*. And it is the only Argument he is said to have offered against understanding that Place of Water-Baptism.

His Words are these, ^b *And doth not that in Matt. xxviii. say, Baptize into the Name? and is not that more than in the Name?* Next, *Barclay* and *Penn* argue, that *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, into the Name, must signify into the Power of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. *Will. Penn's* Reason is, *Since it is to become their Likeness, and bear their Image, which is Holiness* ^c. And for this Reason, according to them, Baptism in this Text, is the Baptism with the Holy Spirit.

But if this Observation be a just one, then it will follow, that the Converts at *Samaria* who were baptized by *Philip*, *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, into ^{Acts viii. 16.} the Name of the Lord Jesus, were baptized into the Power of the Lord Jesus. But as it hath been already shewn, that these Baptisms in the Name of the Lord Jesus were the very same in Point of Form, with that commanded in *Matt. xxviii.* (see Chap. 2. Sect. 3.) Therefore these *Samaritans* must be understood to have been baptized into the Power, not of the Lord Jesus only, but of the Father, Son, and

L 3

Holy

^b In his Book, entitled, *Something in Answer to the Old Common-Prayer Book.* Printed at London. 1660. p. 18.

^c *Defence of Gospel-Truths, against the Bishop of Cork's Testimony.* Lond. 1698. p. 72.

Acts viii.
16, 17.

Holy Ghost. And that is, as they tell us, with the Baptism of the Holy Spirit. And yet this cannot be, for the Holy Ghost *as yet was fallen upon none of them, only they were baptized into the Name of the Lord Jesus.* Then the *Apostles laid their Hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost.*

Acts xix.
1, 2.

ver. 5.

ver. 6.

The Case was just the same as to those Converts which St Paul found at Ephesus, who had not so much as heard of the Holy Ghost, and consequently had never been baptized with Christian Baptism. He baptized them *eis τὸ ὄνομα*, that is, according to this Interpretation, with the Baptism of the Holy Ghost. And yet we are told presently after, that *when he had laid his Hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came on them, and they spake with Tongues, and prophecy'd.* Therefore, either this Interpretation cannot be right, or they were baptized with the Holy Ghost, ver. 5. in the manner directed, *Matt. xxviii. 19.* And were baptized with the Holy Ghost again, ver 6. in the manner promised by Christ, *Acts i. 5.* Will our Author agree to this?

And what shall we make of those Passages of St Paul to the *Corinthians.* Were ye bapti-
zed

zed in the Name of Paul, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα, into the ¹ Cor. i. Power of Paul? I thank God that I baptized ^{13, 14, 15.} none of you but Crispus and Gaius, lest any should say that I had baptized in mine own Name; εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα, into mine own Power. Had the Corinthians been capable of saying, or suspecting this, the Apostle had greater Reason still to thank God that he had baptized so few of them.

And this may suffice to shew the Absurdity of this Criticism upon the Phrase into the Name ^d.

If our Author shall think fit to quit this Distinction made by his Brethren, between *in* and *into*, and assert, that εἰς τὸ ὄνομα means no more than ἐν or ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι, in the Name, and signifies and should be render'd in the Power (for so it is he renders it himself) or by ^{p. 21, 54,} Virtue of the Power; yet still these four Pas- ^{and 55.} sages above-mentioned, even when thus understood and render'd, will equally overturn his Hypothesis, and remain effectual Proofs, that to be baptized in the Power, &c. cannot mean

L 4

Baptism

^d The true Meaning of baptizing in or into the Name of any Person, may be seen in *Vossius de Baptismo*, Disp. 2. Thes. 5. *Marlorat*, and *Musculus*, and most of the Commentators on *Matt.*

Baptism with the Holy Ghost, for the Reasons just now given. We may also now add the other two Texts, *Acts* x. 48. and ii. 38. St *Peter* commanded *Cornelius* and his Friends to be baptized, ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, in the Name, or in the Power (according to our Author) of the Lord. But this could not be Baptism with the Holy Ghost, for that, as he himself observes, they had received but just before; for it was the Reason why they were also to be baptized with Water. And when the same Apostle, on the Day of *Pentecost*, exhorted the *Jews* to repent and be baptized every one of them, ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι, in the Name of Jesus Christ, this Baptism was for the Remission of their Sins: And then he further promises them, that they shall receive the Gift of the Holy Ghost, which was the Baptism of the Spirit.

Acts ii.
38.

In all these Instances therefore there is a manifest Distinction between the Baptism which was administerd with Water in the Name of the Lord Jesus, and the Baptism of the Holy Ghost. One was not the other.

We say then, to sum up this Argument, How comes it to pass that, of all the Places where this Expression occurs, βαπτίζεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα, or ἐν, or ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι, which are no
fewer

fewer than seven, it should in six of them signify *Baptism with Water, in the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, and here only in *Matt. xxviii.* where the Expression first occurs, and by which all the rest are to be expounded, it must needs signify a quite different Thing, viz. *Baptism with the Holy Ghost, in the Power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?* For, to use Dr Bennet's Words on a like Occasion, where he is speaking of the Texts relating to the Baptism of the Holy Ghost.

“ If there be seven Texts in which the
 “ Phrase is found, and if the Phrase doth
 “ evidently signify after this manner in six of
 “ them, I appeal to any Person whatsoever,
 “ whether it ought not to be so understood
 “ also in the seventh and last, provided that
 “ Sense will fairly suit the Place.”

We are willing to put the whole Point upon this Issue. There are six Texts expressly mentioning Baptism with the Holy Ghost, which is not a Water-Baptism. There are
 six

* Bennet's *Confutation of Quakerism*, Chap. 19. The Texts that the Doctor refers to, wherein the Baptism of the Holy Ghost is mentioned, are *Matt. iii. 11. Mark i. 8. Luke iii. 16. John i. 33. Acts i. 5. and xi. 16.*

fix more that speak of *baptizing in the Name*, &c. which in all those six Texts is a *Water-Baptism*. Now query, Whether the Phrase in *Matt. xxviii. 19. baptizing in the Name*, &c. doth not oblige us to understand it, as we do those six Texts, of Water-Baptism *in the Name*, &c. rather than understand it, as we do those other six Texts, of Baptism with the Holy Ghost? In none of which either the Word *Name* or the Word *Power* is to be found.

When our Author has cleared up these Difficulties, that attend his Construction of *Matt. xxviii. 19.* and shewn that he hath something more for it than his own Will and Pleasure, or that of his Brethren the *Quakers*, then we will be bound that the *Vindicator* shall retract his having charged him with talking *Nonsense* in this whole Matter.

S E C T. IV.

IN the mean time, let us consider how our Author supports his Position, that *Name* and *Power* are equivalent Expressions, or promiscuously used in Scripture.

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Lord J

“ In the first Place then (*saye he*) we ob- P. 54.
 “ serve, that when Christ said, *Where two or*
 “ *three are gathered together in my Name, there*
 “ *am I in the Midst of them*, he manifestly
 “ spoke of his Power and Spirit.”

He did so, as all agree, in those Words,
there am I in the Midst of them. But his
Power or *Spirit* is not signified by the Word
Name, as our Author supposes ; for that would
 make the Sense of the Passage to be this,
Where two or three are gathered together in my
Power and Spirit, there am I in my Power and
Spirit among them.

But we have not yet got his whole Sentence,
 which is this : *He manifestly spoke of his Power*
and Spirit, which are synonymous Terms in Scrip-
ture. Whether he means that *Power* and
Spirit are *Synonymous* in Scripture, or *Power*
 and *Name*, or *Spirit* and *Name*, or that all
 three are *synonymous* with each other, we will
 not undertake to determine. Nor do his In-
 stances produced so much as *shew* what he
 meant, so far are they from *proving* what he
 designed by them. In his first (1 Cor. v. 4^f.)
 all

^f In the *Name* of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are
 gathered together, and my *Spirit*, with the *Power* of the
 Lord Jesus Christ.

all the Words, *Name*, *Spirit*, and *Power* occur, but are plainly distinguished from each other, as bearing different Senses. In his second (*Phil. iii. 3^e*.) neither *Name* nor *Power* are so much as mentioned. *Spirit* indeed is but not so as to be capable of signifying either *Name* or *Power*. In his third (*1 Cor. vi. 11^b*.) *Name* and *Spirit* occur, but in different Senses, and neither of them signifying *Power*.

Most certainly then he hath ventured upon this Academical Word *Synonymous*, without knowing what it imported, for otherwise he could hardly have brought three Testimonies to vouch for a Thing which they all declare against.

p. 45.
Mark xvi.
17.

“ Secondly, says he, When Christ said,
“ *In my NAME shall they cast out Devils; they*
“ *shall speak with new Tongues; they shall take*
“ *up Serpents, &c.* he certainly meant, *in and*
“ *by his Power, &c.*”

§ For we are the Circumcision which worship God in the *Spirit*, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no Confidence in the *Flesh*.

¶ But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the *Name* of the Lord Jesus, and by the *Spirit* of our God.

No doubt he meant they should do these Things through the *Power* he would give them for that Purpose ; but that *Power* is not expressed in this Text by the Word *Name*. Yes, he supposes it is, “ *For* (mind his Reason) “ *in the parallel Place, Luke x. 19. the* ^{p. 45,} “ *Word Power is expressly used. Behold, I* “ *give unto you Power to tread on Serpents* “ *and Scorpions,” &c.*

But to this we Answer, that the Words, *in my Name*, Mark xvi. 17. relate only to the first Clause of that Text, *they shall cast out Devils* (and what is meant by casting out Devils in the *Name* of Jesus, we all may easily know from the Instances that Scripture and Antiquity afford us ; it was by pronouncing *his Name*, or by exorcising in *his Name* ;) but are not to be extended to every Clause that follows, as if it were said, *In my Name they shall take up Serpents* ; or if, *in my Name they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them*. Therefore his parallel Text is really no Parallel in that Particular where he supposed it would be allowed so. The Parallel to that Particular, are the Words in *Luke*, at ver. 17. *Lord, even the Devils are subject to us through thy Name*.

Besides,

Besides, he gives us no Reasons, even in his own Way of urging this Parallel, why *Name*, in a Passage in *Mark*, spoken to the Apostles, is *synonymous* with *Power* in a Passage in *Luke*, spoken to the seventy Disciples; or, why a third Passage in *Matt.* xxviii. which relates to a different thing, should be interpreted by either of them.

p. 45.

His third and last Argument is taken from the Question of the High Priest and Rulers of the *Jews* to *Peter* and *John*, who had healed the lame Man that sat at the Gate of the Temple, and from *Peter's* Answer to their Question.

p. 46.

The Question was, *By what Power, or by what Name have ye done this?* Here, says he, we plainly see that *Name* was used by them in a figurative Sense for *Power*. That is, he will needs have it that they asked the Apostles, *By what Power, or by what Power have ye done this?* Whereas the Disjunctive shews, that they meant to distinguish them, and did not intend one and the same thing by two Words of an obvious different Signification. And this is confirmed by *St Peter's* Answer, *In the Name of Jesus of Nazareth, even by him doth this Man stand before you whole.*

As

As to his other Text out of the New Testament, *Acts* iv. 12. and *Phil.* ii. 9. where ^{p. 45 and} he says *Name* is used for *Power*; we shall refer ^{46.} him for an Answer to Mr *Keach's Key of Scripture Metaphors*, under the seventh Instance of a *Metonymy of the Adjunct*.

" Name is put for the Thing itself. *Acts*
" iv. 12. *There is no other Name under Heaven*
" *given unto Men whereby we must be saved*;
" *i. e.* there is no other Way or Means of
" Salvation but by Christ. *Eph.* i. 21. *Every*
" *Name that is named*; *i. e.* every thing in
" Nature.

" It notes also Dignity or Eminence, *Phil.*
" ii. 9. *Wherefore God also hath highly exalted*
" *him, and given him a Name which is above*
" *every Name* ^{i.}"

And " *having now shewn* (says our Author) ^{p. 46.}
" *that Christ and his Apostles used the Word*
" *Name for Power, we shall shew that it was*
" *common with the Prophets to do the same*; and
" *how light soever the Vindicator may set by the*
" *Quakers Argument, yet we trust this three-*
" *fold Cord is not quickly broken.*"

Ecc. iv. 3.

Two

^{i.} *Keach's Key of Scripture Tropes.* Fol. B. I. Chap. 4. p. 31.

Judges
xvi. 9.

Two *Folds* of his *Cord*, which ought to have been the strongest, have proved, upon Examination, like the *Withs* that *Delilah* attempted to bind *Sampson* withal; and are broken *as a Thread of Tow is broken when it toucheth the Fire*.

What Strength remaineth in the third or prophetical Part of this *Cord*, we shall not enquire into, for these Reasons. 1. That we believe the Reader hath already had enough of his Manner of Interpreting, from the Specimens given of it on the New Testament, and will have no Curiosity to see his Expositions on the Prophets examined. 2. That we have already said all, and perhaps more, than was requisite to justify that Passage in the *Vindication* which was excepted against, and occasioned this Debate. And, 3. which is the most material, That we cannot, with sufficient Certainty, find what it is our Author aims or drives at for ten or a dozen Pages together: For having got into the Prophetical Book and Style, and into a spiritual Way of Interpreting, he writes so incoherently and loosely to the End of the Chapter, mixing *Prophecy*, *Mystical Divinity*, and *Quakerism* together, that it

is

is difficult to discern and pursue his Reasonings (if they may be called so) through such a Mist. Only we observe what is the Drift of his Quotations, and the final Result of his Reasonings, viz. the old Story, that “Name is used p. 54. 55.
 “ in a figurative Sense for Power in Matt. xxviii.
 “ 19.”——“ That the Baptism there spoken of
 “ is not a Water-Baptism, but the Baptism p. 57.
 “ of the Holy Spirit.”——And “ that the p. 59.
 “ Quakers have this Baptism, as Numbers of
 “ them have experimentally proved and witness-
 “ ed.”

The shorter and wiser Way, since this *must* at last be the Conclusion, had been not to have reasoned the Point at all: For that Academic Way of coming to a Conclusion never doth and never will succeed with our Author. He had better take Example from *Will. Penn^k*, who, speaking of *Baptism* and the *Lord's Supper*, makes use of this short and decisive Argument against their being received, as they al-

^k In his Book against *Tho. Hicks*, called, *Reason against Railing*. See *George Keith's* Preface to his *Arguments of the Quakers against Baptism and the Lord's Supper answered*. And also his *Fourth Narrative of the Proceedings at Turners Hall*. P II. p 108.

ways have been in the Catholick Church: *We can testify*, says he, *from the same Spirit by which Paul renounced Circumcision, that they (viz. Baptism and the Lord's Supper) are to be rejected, as not now required.* Or he may take the same compendious Way of dealing with his Adversaries, that another of their Authors has made use of, who says¹, *All are Heathens, and no Christians, who cannot witness this (viz. the Quakers spiritual Baptism) and who can witness this, denies all others.*

This is a concise and effectual Way. There are *Flails* against which there is no Defence. It is safer to *affirm* without giving any *Reason* at all, than to give *such Reasons* as only contradict and disprove the *Affirmation*.

In short, if the Quakers would but be content to keep their Principles and Doctrines to themselves, and not preach them about, and endeavour to obtrude them upon every Body, they might both escape those Censures, and that *Scorn* which they bring upon themselves.

p 57, and Our Author tells us, “ *That the principal Con-*
58. *cern of the People in Scorn called Quakers,*
“ *from*

¹ In a Book, entitled, *Some Principles of the Elect People of God, in Scorn called Quakers*, p. 75.

*“ from their trembling at the Power and Word
“ of God, has been to call and invite all Men
“ to witness with them the Baptism of the Holy
“ Spirit, knowing it to be the Sum of Religion,
“ the ALL in ALL in the Worship of God.”*

But Men must be *invited* by something that is worthy their Attention : If any of the *Quaker Teachers* could testify their having the same Spirit that *St Paul* had, not barely by saying so like *Will. Penn*, but by the same kind of Testimony that *St Paul* gave of his Spirit, it would be an Invitation to hearken to them : Or could we see *“ the Liberty of the Apostolick and Primitive Churches restored among them,”* as our Author tells us, p. 58. this would be something. Or could they give us any sound and sufficient Reasons for what they would teach us from the written Word of God, which is both *their and our Rule of Faith and Practice*, there would be proper Means of *inviting* and *persuading Men to testify with them*. But if their *Calls and Invitations* amount to no more than confident Assertions, and upon Points too, which when they offer to reason upon, they shew that they do not understand; and these

delivered likewise with a kind of Contempt of all human Learning, and without any Testimony of their being preternaturally instructed themselves; they are likely still to retain to themselves *all those Blessings, and Comforts, and wonderful Effects of the Baptism of the Spirit*, which our Author so much magnifies and extols in his three last Pages.

p. 58, 59.
60,

As for any thing which is *really good* in them, we are far from *blaming it*, farther from *scorning it*: And as for any Happiness or Comforts they may partake of in their own Way of Religion and Worship, we are far from envying them in their Felicity: We sincerely wish them to improve in every good Word and Work, in every thing that may tend to their real Benefit, and final Happiness. But if they will strictly argue the Point with us, that they are the *only* People that are *Christians*, the *only* People that have any true *spiritual Religion*, or *spiritual Worship*, the *only* People that *renounce the World*, that *govern their Passions*, that *love their Enemies*, that have *Sobriety and Gravity in their Habit, and Speech, and Conversation*, and whatever is *becoming the Holiness of the Christian Name and Profession*; we may

p. 59.

may happen not only to differ from them upon this Question, but to refute them also upon the Enquiry.

It would indeed be a blessed thing; as Bishop Patrick says, *if we would all lay aside our* ^{P. 61.} *Dissentions, Strifes, and Quarrels, and study the Lessons our Lord hath taught us.* But let them who causelessly bring on these *Strifes and Dissentions*, and who obstinately maintain them, bear the Blame of them. Why are the *Quakers* most commonly found to be the Aggressors and Challengers to the Disputes between us and them? Why will they not let us peaceably follow the Institutions our Lord hath commanded us to observe, but reproach us with being imposed upon *by the Ignorance and* ^{Letter to the Clergy of Northumberland,} *Tricks of designing Men, who make a Gain of* ^{of} *Godliness?* If they think they justify themselves in these Calumnies, by saying, that *they preach* ^{P. 12.} *themselves without Reward*, they are mistaken; for that will neither indemnify them for misrepresenting others, nor free their own *Calls and Invitations* to their own Gospel from Exception. *They need no HIRE to preach*, says our ^{P. 58.} Author. But if they *need* both *Commission* and

Abilities to do so, the *Hire* is out of the Question. For neither is their *Labour* worthy of it, nor themselves entitled to it, because they are not *sent*.

p. 63.

He concludes all with a Problem, which he leaves with his Reader to consider of, in order to find the Solution; viz. *What People now bear the nearest Resemblance to a certain excellent Description of a PEOPLE formed upon the Plan and Principles of Christianity, and transcribed from Erasmus by Bishop Patrick, in the Close of his Preface to his Paraphrase on Ecclesiastes?* Which Description he has set

p. 61, 62,
63.

down at length. He endeavours indeed to put us into a Way of expounding it, by printing in large Characters all those Expressions in it that he thinks are any ways applicable to the *Quakers* in particular; otherwise we dare answer for it, no body would have thought of *them*. However, he seems to think that *Erasmus* prophesied concerning their Sect, and that the Prophecy, now that it is fulfilled, and explained by the Completion, is clear and evident to all who attend to it. And he calls upon the

p. 63.

Vindicator to skew that the Words were not Bi-
shop

shop Patrick's Sentiments, though he has so far adopted them as to incorporate them with his own.

If he means that Bishop Patrick thought the *Quakers* bore the nearest Resemblance to this Description of any *People* in the World; we answer, that we believe that Prelate, whose Judgment was undeniably good, had no more an Eye to the *Quakers*, or a Respect to their Principles and Manners, in quoting this Description, than he had to the *Mahometans* and the *Turkish Maxims and Customs*. Nay, that he thought of them as little as *Erasmus* himself did, who lived before they were a *People*.

But yet, so far as this Description will really suit them, so far as it is applicable to them on Account of any thing that is Praise-worthy in them, let them in God's Name have the Benefit of it. The nearer Resemblance they have to it, the more for their *Credit*; which we are so far from desiring to impair from an invidious Disposition, that we heartily wish they may daily grow more and more like that *People* which *Erasmus* describes. For however we may find it necessary to clear up to them their Mistakes, and to oppose their novel Doctrines

and false Reasonings ; yet whatever is good and commendable in any of their *Persons, Principles, or Manners*, we shall always be ready to acknowledge, and give it its due Respect and Honour.



A R E P L Y

A

R E P L Y

T O T H E

A P P E N D I X.

ONE would imagine, from the account given of this *Appendix* in the *Title-Page* of the *Book*, that some new and great discovery had been therein made : For it is said to contain, not only *some Remarks on the Preface to a late Reply to the Protestant Flail*, but to shew that the *Reformation from Popery in England* was in a great measure owing to the zeal and constancy of illiterate men and women ; and that the people called Quakers have been and are the most thorough Protestant Reformers in the world. But after all, the real contents of this *Appendix* are no more than a brief repetition of what has been already said in another shape and refuted, without any improvements or amendments, unless the addition of *George Fox's Declaration against Popery* may be called so.

The

The writer of it begins with renewing the complaint of the contempt shewn of the poor *Pedlar*, who first gave occasion to the present dispute; and would gladly have it interpreted as *a contempt of the Laity* in general. The *Prefacer* will be always ready to retract whatever he hath wrote, that doth not well comport with charity and good-manners. But he apprehends he hath not offended in these respects: And he willingly leaves it to every intelligent reader, whether his animadversions on that particular person, on that particular occasion, (how much soever complained of) were not both seasonable, and likewise made with all besitting tendernefs and decency.

But this writer would infer from thence, that *if any layman shall attempt a manly and rational enquiry, &c.* he must in the *Prefacer's* opinion incur the same or like censure. But why he should thus put the laity in general upon the same footing with *Pedlars*, he gives no reason; nor hath the *Prefacer* given him any handle for so mean a suggestion. None can possibly be aggrieved at any expressions in the *Preface*, that were pointed at the *Pedlar's* busy ignorance, but such as are conscious to themselves

themselves that they deserve the like. This may indeed be the case of some of our Author's own sect, and it is for that reason most probably that these rebukes in the *Preface* are so much excepted against. But nevertheless they are so well grounded upon reason and truth, that our Author will not find it easy, by any such sleight as he has used, to set them aside, or evade their force.

His next charge against the *Prefacer* is, that *speaking of our first Protestant Reformers, he had said he knew of none who merited or were dignified by that name, but such as had been trained up in schools and academics.*

This will soon be set right. The Author of the *Flail* had a conceit that he could warrant the whimsical title he gave to his book, from the *success* of the *first Protestant Reformers* in defending their own tenets with the Bible, though destitute of academical learning.* In the *Reply* this fact referred to was rather questioned than directly denied: It was said, *He should have told us what Reformers he meant; for we know of none dignified with that name,*
but

* *Preface to the Flail*, p. 7.

but such as were men of sound learning, &c.* But before any answer is returned by him, the *Appendix Writer* steps in of his own accord to clear up this matter. And to convince the *Replier* of his ignorance or mistake, he brings four instances (referring to more †) of illiterate persons that were burnt in the reign of *Queen Mary*; and then gravely asks him, *What he thinks of those zealous tradesmen, religious mechanicks, and holy women, who were sacrificed in the flames, and sealed their testimony against Popery with their blood?* || Why, he thinks they were martyrs in the Protestant cause, and not the less *eminently so* for wanting the advantages of human learning. But withal he thinks he doth not in the least derogate from the honour due to them for their constancy and patience, when he denies that they were numbered among *the first Reformers, who so successfully defended the Protestant tenets with the Bible*. The question was not concerning those who by their sufferings were instrumental in confirming others in the Protestant religion; but concerning those who by their writings,

* Preface to the Reply, p. 8.

† See the Notes to his *Appendix*, p. 90, 91.

|| *Appendix*, p. 90.

writings, conferences, and disputes first began, and then defended the Reformation upon such solid proofs from reason, scripture, and antiquity, that the powers of *the Church of Rome* could not withstand the force of their arguments. When any of *these*, who alone were dignified with the name of *Reformers*, can be found to have been *destitute of academical learning*, the *Prefacer* will acknowledge himself informed of what he knew not before. But till that is done, he thinks himself at liberty yet to question whether there were any such among them.

The *Appendix Writer* puts four *Queries* upon his four instances of unlearned martyrs, which, if no answer be given to them, he will perhaps begin to suspect are unanswerable.

1. His first is, *Whether Thomas Watts, the memory of whose piety and constancy has been retained and transmitted down to this day about 180 years, fresh and fragrant among some of the inhabitants of the town he lived in, had not a better title to the name of Reformer, than any of the learned men then and there living, of all whom the very names are long since forgotten by*
the

*the inhabitants?** But if the names of all these learned men are long since forgotten, how shall we know whether there were any in that place? If there had been any, dignified with the name of Reformers, to have compared Thomas Watts with, their names would not have been forgotten. But if Thomas Watts had no other or better title to be called a Reformer, than by a comparison with no body, or at least with *we know not who*, he is no instance to our Author's present purpose.

2. *Whether John Leaf, who could neither write nor read, suffering for the same cause together with John Bradley a man of academical learning, did not in some sort merit the name of Reformer as well as his fellow-sufferer?*† Why doth he say *in some sort merit*, if he himself did not plainly discern a difference in their claims? And what should make this difference, as their sufferings were the same, but only that one of them did eminent service to the Reformation by his learned labours, and the other did not? Or supposing he might in
some

* Appendix, p. 91. among the Notes.

† Ibid.

some sort merit, yet was he ever dignified with the name of *Reformer*? In either sense he is also wide of the question between the *Prefacer* and the *Author of the Flail*.

3. *Whether Alice Driver, who had been brought up to the plough, was not also well skilled in the use of the Flail, viz. the Protestant one, when by mere dint of Scripture she put the academies to so profound a silence?* * She might be better skilled in the use of the Bible, in some points especially, than they were, notwithstanding their academical learning, if they had any: Yet what is this to the purpose? If learning cannot support a bad cause, is it therefore of no use in a good one? Though it cannot bear up against *truth* and *plain scripture*, doth it follow that it is not generally necessary to maintain truth in the world, and to preserve the genuine sense of scripture? The quickest and most sensible eyes, that can least bear to look *against* the sun, can yet make the best advantages of his light upon other objects. Learning quickens and cleanses the eye of the understanding, thereby rendering it less capable of setting

* *Appendix, p. 91, among the Notes.*

setting itself against revealed truths, and better disposed to judge of them and discern them perfectly upon reflection. Well, but many of the *zealous tradesmen, religious mechanics, and holy women among the early Protestants of this nation* had not any of this literature. What then? They are supposed to have been so instructed by those that had it, as to be able to *give a reason of the faith and hope that was in them*, and upon occasion to baffle their Popish examiners. And this shewed them to be properly among the *Reformed*; but is no proof that they were *Reformers*, much less the *first Reformers* of this nation.

4. The fourth instance of *Prest's* wife, and the Query put upon it, is of the same kind with the last; and the same answer will serve both. Only whereas our Author lays a particular stress upon her declaration to her examiners, *that it was the Spirit of God which led her, which called her in her bed, and at midnight opened his truth to her*; * he should be advised

not

* So it is in the last edition of *Fox's Martyrology*, printed 1684, Vol. III p. 748. Though the words *at midnight* are left out of the *Appendix*, either because the Author did not find them in his edition, or thought it more discreet to suppress them.

not to build too much upon private revelations. This assertion of her's (which he is so fond of) if it was really her's, was neither for her credit to have made, nor for his to repeat. He asks, *Whether her voluntary offering her life for her testimony did not give a convincing proof of this her assertion?* * No: It was the greatest proof indeed that she was able to give. But because she could not give a greater, she could not give a sufficient one to convince us of *the truth of her pretensions*; though it were a sufficient one to clear her of any designed fraud or imposture.

He immediately asks another question upon her case, viz. *Whether those persons who ridicule All revelation now, do more resemble that pious holy reforming woman, or the priests of that time, who, as Fox tells us, made a great shout and laughing at that assertion of hers?* † In putting this, he has taken for granted that the private revelation which she spake of was as true as the Gospel. But if this be not allowed him, he must look well whether they who pretend

* *Appendix, p. 91. among the Notes.*

† *Ibid.*

to revelations *that are not such*, and which are destitute of all proper proof, do not injure *true* revelation (in causing it to be *ridiculed*) as much at least as they who *ridicule* all such pretences. If he includes among those *who ridicule All revelation*, such as interpret all private claims to immediate inspiration and revelation from God in these ages of the world, as the mere effects of enthusiasm, he will have a large party against him, who will neither be found *to resemble the reforming woman* he speaks of, nor *the priests that laugh'd at her assertion*. Infidels may flout at these things as they please: But serious and sober men will neither make a jest of the *weakness* of well-meaning people, nor take their *reveries* for the oracles of God. They will never admit of reforming men and women upon the bare footing of their own declarations, *that the Spirit leadeth them, and that the truth is revealed to them in midnight visions*, or in any other extraordinary manner. These and such like pretences may have upheld or countenanced Popery in some countries, and formerly in this; but could never have brought on a Reformation. That was
a thing

a thing that required a much better bottom to stand upon. And though the *Prefacer* is taken up for having said, *that in all human probability without the help of academical learning there had been no Reformation at all*,* yet he is persuaded that the more that matter is examined into, the more probable will his conjecture appear.

Even the Writer of the *Appendix* is willing to allow something to *academical accomplishments*.† So far, says he, *as they were well applied in translating the Scriptures into the vulgar languages, we deny not their use and service.*—So far.—But does he consider *how far* this goes? If the *Reformation*, according to his principles, *was defended by the Bible alone*, yet was not this defence put into mens hands by the advantage of learning? Did not they then *who*, he owns, *had little literature* (he should have said *none*) *except that of their Bibles*, ('tis an idle exception when we speak of translations into the vulgar languages) did not they owe a great deal to that acquired human knowledge, which

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yet

* Preface to the *Reply*, p. 8.† *Appendix*, p. 92.

yet they affected to despise? If they could, and can now do such execution with the *Flail* when it is once in their hands, they should never, out of mere gratitude, disparage the means, no nor the workmen, that put it there.

But to come to the point. The same erudition that was requisite for translating the Scriptures into the vulgar tongues, will ever be requisite for guarding and defending the true sense and meaning of them; which is sometimes impaired or obscured by versions themselves, but oftner wrested and distorted by fanciful illiterate men, who pretend only to judge from the versions, and are too frequently incompetent judges even of *them* with regard to religious controversies, especially with regard to such matters of dispute as depend upon understanding the idioms of the original languages, and knowing the customs of the *Jews* and *Eastern nations*. The want of which knowledge in the dead tongues, and in antiquity, unhappily accompanied with a contempt of it, hath occasioned several errors in the different sects that have arisen in this kingdom since the Reformation; and in none more
than

than in that of the *Quakers*, who, in the judgment of the *Appendix Writer* himself, are for the most part destitute of all such learning.

But he thinks abundant amends are made for this defect by their being a set of Reformers more zealous for the extirpation of Popery, not only in some, but all the branches of it, yea the very root itself, than any that went before them.

In proof whereof he exhibits George Fox's Declaration or Protestation against Popery, which he makes no doubt will satisfy every reader, that he was a very hearty Protestant Reformer.*

We shall have no further concern with Geo. Fox or his Declaration, than to examine our Author's opinion concerning both the one and the other. He says George Fox was an honourable man among them. How he became so is not said. Perhaps he was in the higher esteem among them, because he was remarkably low in his learned attainments, and could not so much as spell his mother's

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tongue.

* *Appendix*, p 92.

tongue.* And if this *Protestation* of his had but been printed just as he penned it, with the advantage of his orthography, it would have appeared more worthy of him.

But he was an hearty Reformer, and zealous for the extirpation even of the very root of Popery.† So it appears; for under pretence of reformation he has left nothing remaining of a visible church, that he could take away. He was not content to lop off the superfluous branches, and cast away all her corrupt fruits, but he must pluck her up by the very roots.

By this declaration of his the Replier may see what kind of Reformation it was that appeared in these kingdoms in the last century‡. Fully and sufficiently, insomuch that he desires not to see or hear of any more such.

He may see what effectual work the Protestant Flail can make, when managed by the skilful hands of honest, plain, disinterested, New-Testament-taught countrymen.|| He hath seen to his sorrow

* Many and remarkable instances of his not being able to spell the most common words are given by *Francis Bugg*, in his *Hidden things brought to light, whereby the Fox is unmasked* Bugg in Folio, 1712. p. 210.

† Appendix, p. 92. ‡ P. 97. || Ibid.

sorrow what work it hath made, and continues to make, in such hands.

Should the Prefacer (continues he) *take up that instrument, I am apt to think he would not dare to attempt the handling it so effectually.** No: God forbid he should. Our Author is not very *apt to think*; but he has thought herein very justly, that the *Prefacer* would dread to attempt such effectual handling as he speaks of, to the utter abolition of sacraments, rites, ceremonies, orders of ministers, and every outward institution of religion whatsoever. And he hath other and better means to deter him from such a sacrilegious attempt, than what our Author suggests in his next words.

For the Flail, to use his own description of it, is an instrument which doth of all others require some art and skill, &c. † Nay, if he comes at last to *art and skill*, he has surely got out of his road, and is running into some blunder upon his own and *George Fox's* principles. He seemed to be going wrong in his last sentence but one, when the word *skilful* was impertinently tacked to the *hands of New-Testament-*
N 4 *taught*

* *Appendix*, p. 97.

† *Ibid.*

taught countrymen. And now he has quite lost himself in a *simile* that the *Prefacer* had occasionally made use of to relieve his reader. It had a meaning, and was sense at least when it was first offered to the consideration of *the Author of the Flail*: But it is now returned back again upon the *Prefacer's* hands with so little poignancy, and so like nonsense, that he can scarce acknowledge his own metamorphosed offspring.

How comes it that *art and skill* in interpreting the Bible should at length be confined to those who are *New-Testament-taught*, and who generally disclaim the very imputation of such foreign advantages? who with their infallible master *deny all colleges, and universities, in which ministers are made by tongues, arts, and schools?* * How come *they* at last to claim the privilege of using these carnal weapons, and excluding those from whom they borrow the little they have of them from sharing in the title with them? It should not be quite forgotten, that these *New-Testament-taught countrymen* owe something to academical accomplishments,

* *George Fox's Declaration, p. 94.*

plishments, by our Author's own concession; for they had not come so easy by their *New-Testament-Learning*, if the way had not been opened and cleared to them by the labours of much abler hands, and wiser heads, than their own.

But it seems this *art* and *skill* in the hands of *academies* hath done much mischief. It hath opposed *the honest zeal of these sincere-hearted Protestant Reformers*, which might have spread itself more generally to the extirpation of all the matters and things which George Fox declared against, had not the men of academical literature consulted their own interest, in still retaining not a few of them.* They did verily consult their own interest, and the interest of the whole kingdom, in retaining not only the essentials of a Church, but such indifferent things as contributed to order and decency: also in retaining *schools* and *colleges*, for the attainment of *tongues* and *arts*, to prevent in times to come any such utter extirpation of *All the matters and things* which George Fox declared against, as our *Appendix Writer* calls
thorough

* *Appendix*, p. 97.

thorough Reformation, and in the zeal of his heart is desirous according to his slender abilities to promote.

'Tis therefore (says he) *altogether unequal to ascribe the whole merit of the Reformation to a set of men who have been indeed the principal retarders of its progress.** What does he mean? By *the Reformation*, we do in common construction understand *that* of this Church and Nation from Popery in the *century* before the *Quakers* had a being. But by *the progress of it being retarded* he manifestly intends the opposition that was given to that *thorough Reformation* he has been recommending, and *which*, he says, *appeared in these kingdoms in the last century*. Now in this view, it would be, as he says, *altogether unequal to ascribe the whole merit of what was done by Reformers* in one generation to those that followed in the next. But if this shall prove not to be his meaning, he must tell us *what is*; since his words give us no other that is sense. He will say perhaps it was a set of these academical men that promoted the former Reformation, and another

* *Appendix*, p. 97.

ther set of them obstructed the latter. Be it so. To their praise be it spoken. Without making comparisons between them, each have a merit to be ascribed to them. They both fought a good fight, though against adversaries of different denomination : and both defended the Church ; the former against those that had corrupted her with idolatry and superstition ; and the latter against those who would have reformed her quite out of sight, through enthusiasm and want of knowledge and discretion : And both made use of the same kind of weapons, which they fitted to them, and learnt the true use of in the schools and academies, viz. scripture, and reason, and the writings of the Antients.

Thus at length we have gone through the points that our Author boasted of in his Title ; and have found that, instead of proving what he gave out for the contents of his *Appendix*, he hath only served up *George Fox's crude Protestation*, garnished with a few withered flowers of his own picking, as the last dish of an insipid entertainment.

But though he has fallen short of his promise in one respect, yet he hath exceeded it in

in another ; and hath carried his remarks further than the *Preface*, and delivered his opinion of the *Book itself*, in very few words, as a specimen of the great judgment wherewith he reads controversies.

*As to the controversy about the Quotations from Bishop Taylor, it seems to him that the Author of the Flail has done that great man much more honour than the Replier. How ? By placing his real sentiments on an equality with his very cogent and convincing arguments against Pædobaptism.**

Was ever a Prelate *so* honoured before ? It was with much ado that what he declared to be his real sentiments, was allowed to be so. And now this being once allowed, they will do him this further favour ; they will put his *real sentiments upon an equality* with his mere fictions and inventions, or at least what were *not his own sentiments*. Our Author indeed calls them *very cogent and convincing arguments against Pædobaptism*. That is to say, when the *art and skill* which he would be thought to disparage, do but seem to come
over

* Appendix, p. 92.

ever to his party, though it be only a *feinte*, he is ready to acknowledge and admire them. What Bishop *Taylor* has wrote in great abundance as a Divine, as a master of Scripture and good sense, doth by no means hit our Author's delicate fancy: But when the Bishop only plays a part occasionally, and designedly acts the *subtile academic*, then our deluded Author is charmed with his ingenious disguise, and contrary to his own principles applauds the disputer of this world.

But the *Replier* it seems has done *no honour* to Bishop *Taylor*, in *debasing his real sentiments to a level with his much lower and weaker pleas for the practice of Pædobaptism*. How could he bring them to a level with those that were *much lower*?

But perhaps what is said of *lower* and *weaker* pleas, is spoken of the *Replier's* pleas, or spoken with respect only to the Bishop's arguments in *prosopopæia*, to which it is an honour to him to have his real sentiments equalled. Now if this be the meaning, take it either way, the *Replier* will be under no concern about these *epithets* of comparison given to the pleas: For he has done the Bishop *justice* however,

ever, which is preferable to the *honour* they would bestow upon him. And though the pleas may perhaps appear *low* and *weak* in our *Author's* sight, when compared with the *flights* of the Bishop's fancy, and the *strength* of his imagination, yet if they be measured by another standard, *viz.* that of truth, they will be found *more cogent and convincing* than those artful flourishes which have beguiled our Author to give them undeserved praises, and such as the Bishop himself proved afterwards they were not entitled to. He goes on.

*If the Bishop had been always firm and steady in his opinion on the side of Infant-Baptism, 'tis no small discredit to that cause, that his great abilities could never put his own sentiments in as advantageous a light as those of his adversaries.**

But what if this *advantageous light* that he speaks of, be only a *false light*? an artful position of his adversaries arguments to make them appear to less discerning eyes something which they really were not? Which cause will be most discredited by it? Whatever credit

* Appendix, p. 97.

did arise from setting the *Anabaptists tenets* in so plausible a view, belongs to Bishop Taylor, and not to *their cause*. And that he did not use any such method with the *Pædobaptists tenets*, is to the credit of *their cause*, which needed no such artful and laboured recommendation; but only wanted to be exhibited in its own proper and native light: Which, as the dispute is now with a *Quaker*, may be termed *the light within*; whereas the advantageous light he speaks of is no more than *the light without*.

He had said towards the beginning of his *Appendix*, that *academical learning was an instrument more apt to defend error, than to discover truth*. * Bishop Taylor has indeed shewed him how far it can *defend error*, even to make it seem to some people *cogent and convincing*. But he hath also discovered how it can likewise *support and establish truth*, and do it effectually.

It is true, learning is apt to make the best of every subject it is applied to. But why it should have any peculiar aptness *to defend error* rather

* *Appendix*, p. 90.

rather than *truth*, can hardly be conceived. For, of all human means that can be applied to, it is the best preservative against error, and the surest guide to truth. Unless our Author means by this odd character he has given of it, that the persons endowed with it have been *more instrumental in proving* what the *Quakers* deny, than in *finding* any good reason for what they affirm. For this may be, in his way of thinking, *to defend error, and miss of truth*. But if these are his complaints against literature, (and it seems most reasonable to interpret him thus in this place) we shall allow the fact, and have no further contest with him upon that head.

Lastly, he gives his opinion of the success of the other part of the controversy, which was *Water-Baptism*. He says, *that the arguments advanced by the Author of the Flail are rather evaded than answered by the Replier.** By his leave he would have said more properly and truly, that *the strokes* of the *Flail* were *evaded*. But if he will needs have it that these *strokes* were *arguments*, and that some of them

* *Appendix*, p. 98.

them were neglected, and *not answered* by the *Replier*, the true reason has been, that they were such arguments *as answered themselves*, and recoiled upon their author's own head; as the *Replier* had observed in his *Preface* was likely to be the case, affigning withal the probable cause of such mischances.

He concludes with saying, that it is *by no means the design of his Appendix to save the Replier from any future strokes of the Flail.** In this verily he is to be believed; and yet he hath by this very *Appendix*, contrary to his design, put the *Replier* out of all fear of them; and taught him by this previous attempt, how to presage of what is to follow, *viz.* that the man with the Flail will have no better success with his *strokes* at the *Book*, than this *Writer* hath had with his *Remarks* on the *Preface*. They may therefore threaten as they please, and join forces too, but will never be able to hurt any body.

However, *it is his desire that nothing said in this Appendix should prevent the Author of the Flail from improving the many ad-*

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vantages

* *Appendix*, p. 98.

*vantages that the Reply has put into his hands.** He may make himself quite easy, and rest assured of all that he desires in this matter; for nothing that he has said, or perhaps can say, is capable of *preventing any improvements* of these supposed *advantages* by another hand.

* *Appendix, p. 98.*



P R E F A C E

PREFACE to the Fifth and
Sixth Volumes of Archbishop
Sharp's SERMONS.

THE first volume of Archbishop *Sharp's* Sermons was published by himself, being a collection of such as he had printed upon several occasions before the year 1698.

The second volume was published by his Bookseller after his death, and takes in the remainder of his Sermons, which were printed in his life-time, and his *two discourses upon Conscience*, which were formerly published without a name, and make part of *the collection of London cases*.

And those two volumes contain all that he himself had suffered at any time to go abroad into the world.

But his executors were a little more liberal of his productions; and in 1717, they added to the collections made by himself, and then by his Bookseller, as above-mentioned, two volumes more, consisting of Sermons never before printed. But this step nevertheless was taken by them with due caution, and after ad-

vice had with some judicious prelates, who had read them after they were transcribed, and confirmed the resolution of making them public.

And now, after several years elapsed, two volumes more have passed the press, being the last addition that will be made to the collection of his works, save a small reserve of Discourses in the Popish controversy, which may possibly, some time or other, be published with other of his papers relating to that controversy, and penned likewise in those times.

The first and principal design of transcribing these, which are now printed, from the original manuscripts in short-hand, (for all his Sermons were wrote in characters) was to preserve and rescue them from the danger they were in of being irretrievably lost, by being buried in the cypher, if not extracted thence, and brought to light by one who was perfectly well acquainted with the characters he used, and with his peculiar manner of expressing and compounding them. The transcript was begun some years since, and proceeded very leisurely, and with several interruptions, under the uncertain view of whether it should ever
be

be made public or no, till the year 1730, when the greatest part of it was finished, perused and approved by competent judges, and at length prepared for publication.

The reader therefore may be assured (and it is chiefly for his satisfaction in this matter that this advertisement is prefixed to the edition) that these are the *genuine works* of the *Author*, to whom the title page ascribes them; and that they are not rashly obtruded upon the world, as posthumous works too often are, but offered after mature deliberation, and under a real conviction of their being as perfect in their kind as any wherewith this last age hath been presented.

Indeed, the bare avouching them to be *genuine*, supersedes any further recommendation of them. Both the character and writings of the Archbishop have been generally so well esteemed, that they stand in no need of the suffrage of the publisher, but will be able to support themselves (even in an age by no means favourable to good men and good books) so long as truth can stand her ground, and sound reasoning with perspicuity shall be accounted the chief character of perfection in writing, especially upon divine and moral subjects.

Most of the treatises in this first volume are compounded, some of two, some of three Sermons, joined together in the form of continued discourses, which will account for the length of several of them, as it also gave occasion to entitle them *Discourses* rather than *Sermons*. The design of this disposition was to preserve the chain of reasoning upon each subject entire and uninterrupted, without those recapitulations, which, though necessary indeed under their division into distinct Sermons, in order to accommodate them to the pulpit, yet are altogether unnecessary to be retain'd for the perusal of the reader, who would rather be incommoded than relieved by such unseasonable breaks in the body of a just discourse. But however no more liberty was taken with them, than would barely answer this end of convenience, by omitting the introductions or preambles to the subsequent Sermons, when more than one were formed upon the same text. And because the same liberty could not be so well taken with the four last Sermons in this volume, which are all likewise upon one text, therefore they are published intire, as they were found in the copies.

The

The other volume consists wholly of single Sermons, published *verbatim* as they were preached, at least without any designed omission or alteration. Most of them had been delivered at court, before their late Majesties King *William*, Queen *Mary*, and Queen *Anne*, as the dates prefixed to them will shew. And several of them were the Sermons which he usually preached in his diocese, and elsewhere, in the latter part of his life, as being best calculated, in his own opinion, (so it may be justly presumed) for doing good to mankind, and the discharge of his own duty, as a minister of the Gospel.

Could these sheets have carried any impression of that energy and zeal with which the living author of these discourses addressed them to his auditors, and to which they owed no small share of that beauty and influence which they once had from his own mouth, they would have been more welcome and more valuable to the reader. One excellence indeed they cannot be deprived of, which, in some measure, will supply the want of those external and additional graces that accompanied and adorned them in the pulpit, *viz.* that Spirit

of piety which yet enlivens and breathes through them all, and demonstrates them to be the real issues of his heart, and the very dictates of his soul, by such marks of evidence as are easy to be discovered, though difficult to be described, and impossible to be counterfeited.



P R E F A C E to the Seventh
Volume of Archbishop *Sharp's*
SERMONS.

IN the *Preface* to the two volumes of Archbishop *Sharp's* Works, which were lately printed, mention is made of *a small Reserve of Discourses in the Popish Controversy which might possibly, some time or other, be published with other of his Papers relating to that Controversy.*

When that Preface was wrote, the Editor had not determined with himself, whether this Collection should ever come abroad or no. Much less had he any Apprehensions that he should, in so short a Time, commit it to the Press. For he looked upon that Dispute as out of Vogue, and little attended to; and also considered, that the Writings of the Protestant Divines in the Reigns of *King Charles*, and *King James II.* were very numerous as well as excellent: and therefore that these Discourses (though properly enough a Part of the *Popish Controversy*) would seem superfluous and unseasonable. And under these Reasons
he

he was disposed to acquiesce, had not the late Attempts of the *Roman Catholicks* in and about *London*, given Occasion to revive the neglected Dispute, and to put Men upon a Review of the Subjects in Debate between the *Church of England*, and the *Church of Rome*. This he thought a seasonable Juncture for bringing to light the following *Treatises*, which have been suppressed above fifty Years, and perhaps might always have continued so, if some such Reason as this had not accidentally offered itself to usher them into the World.

They are all, or most of them, designedly calculated for the Use of the unlearned Protestant. The Author of them had the Care of one of the largest Parishes in *London*, during the whole Time the late *Popish Controversy* was on Foot. He was perfectly well acquainted with the Subtilties of the *Popish Divines*, and knew by abundant Experience among his own Parishioners, what were the principal Difficulties that the inferior Sort laboured under, from the fallacious and insidious Persuasions and Insinuations of those who strove to pervert them. What he wrote therefore, and is now published, was purposely contrived

as a present Antidote to the Mischiefs attempted among his Flock. For which Reason he entered as little as possible upon the learned or historical Part of the Controversy (as will be observed, though he was very capable of discharging that Part of it with Success) but confined himself chiefly to those Points which were more immediately necessary to guard the Weak from the Sophistry of the *Jesuits*, and to relieve and deliver the Unwary, who were already entangled in their Snares.

With this View he hath formed his Arguments so plain, and made his Chain of Reasoning upon them so natural and so familiar, that they appear to be adapted to the *Taste* as well as the *Capacities* of *ordinary Christians*. Something there is likewise to the *Taste* of the Party he opposes; such of them at least as have any Taste of Beauty and Excellence in writing upon controverted Points; *viz.* The Calmness and Temper wherewith he engages them, and the special Care he always takes, never to calumniate or misrepresent them. He was wont to say himself, *That in his Sermons against the Papists he had always dealt honestly and fairly with them, charging them with*
nothing

Preface to the seventh Volume

nothing but what their Church openly avowed in her Creed, and Councils, and public Offices. Which Candour of Temper and Equity of Conduct, in any Controversy, though it be not always the readiest Means of working upon the Vulgar, yet cannot fail of having a great Influence upon all serious and well-meaning People.

He was often pressed by his Friends to print these Discourses himself. But he declined it. When he was solicited to do so about the Time of the Revolution, or soon after it, he gave for an Answer, *that the Danger was then over, and the Design of them was superceded; and that to publish them at that Time would only look like making his Court.*

And it doth not appear that at any Time afterwards he regarded them, or meddled with them, further than to correct and transcribe one or two of them which he preached at York, in order to check some Attempts that the Popish Priests were suspected and reported to have made in that Neighbourhood. One of these was that remarkable Sermon which upon the first Delivery of it in his Parish Church at London, in 1686, had drawn upon him the Displeasure of King James and his Court,

and

and had given Occasion to the Order that was sent to *Dr Compton*, then Bishop of *London*, to suspend him, which brought on the *Troubles* of that *Prelate* from the *ecclesiastical Commission*. But whereas in his Transcript of this Discourse, upon the Revival of it, that *Passage* which was supposed to be most *offensive* and *obnoxious*, was entirely left out, (as being a particular Answer to a certain Argument that had been slipp'd into his Hand in *St Giles's Church*, as he supposed, by way of *Challenge*, and which therefore could not pertinently be repeated when he preached the same Sermon, above twenty Years after, at his own Cathedral) therefore recourse was had for that *Passage* to the first or original Copy. And whereas the other Differences between the two Copies did not appear to be material, but to consist rather in Correction of Expressions and Style, than of the Matter or Arguments, it was judged most advisable to follow the first Copy altogether in this Edition; † both for the Satisfaction

† Serm. VI. *A Discussion of the Question which the Roman Catholicks most insist upon with the Protestants, viz. In which of the different Communions in Christendom the only true Church of Christ is to be found? With a Refutation of a certain Popish Argument handed about in M. S. Anno 1686.*

satisfaction of the Reader, whose Curiosity would be better gratified with a true and faithful Representation of the very same Sermon that produced the Effects abovementioned; and also to vindicate the Author of it, from the unjust Reflections of *Father Orleans* upon it, who knowing nothing of the Contents of it, charged it arbitrarily and upon hear-say; and likewise (for that was another Consideration worth regarding) to make it of a Piece with all the rest, which are now published from the first Hand, and without Emendation of any kind, since the Time they were preached in *St Giles's Pulpit*. With this only Exception, that what were two Sermons upon *2 Pet. iii. 16.* appear now only as one. And whereas the Sermon upon *Auricular Confession* was connected with others upon the same Text, which were lately printed in the fifth Volume under the Title of *Confession of Sins necessary to Repentance, p. 145.* it became unavoidable both *there* and *here* to omit as much as served only to shew the Connexion between them, and which therefore could have no Place in their present State of Separation.

These

These were Liberties which *Dr Barker* owns he made no Scruple of taking with the *Posthumous Sermons of Arch-Bishop Tillotson*, whose Authority he also pleads for doing so. The Editor hopes he may be indulged in the same Liberty, having never used it but when he judged it necessary, and even then without altering the Sense, and with as little Change to the Words as possible.

And now the Reader has all before him that is requisite for his Information concerning these Sermons. If he shall not find them so finished and correct as those already printed, he will know where to ascribe the Defect. An Imputation of Rashness in the Publisher of them, grounded on this Reason only, will not much affect him, provided his sole Aim in the Publication be answered, which is the preserving some People, into whose Hands they may fall, from the *Errors of Popery*, and establishing them more firmly in the *Communion of the Church of England*. Once they contributed very much to this good End. And it is not unreasonable to expect they may do so again. And as it is certain that *Dr Sharp* owed to them much of his Reputation in the *last Age*, so it is presumed they may be received with some

some degree of Approbation in the present: at least it is hoped, that what tended so eminently to advance his Credit *then*, will not turn to the Disadvantage of his Memory now. The closing the Collection of his Works with his earliest Performances, is not unprecedented, neither can it seem improper to conclude his *Remains* with those Pieces which first served to raise his Character in the World.

As concerning the Papers subjoined in the Appendix, their Relation to the Subject of the Sermons to which they are annexed must speak their Propriety. The first is a Reply to a Letter from a Gentlewoman who had lately fallen into the Hands of Dr Cross (*a Jesuit, Author of the Contemplations of the Virgin, and of some other Popish Books.*) Mrs Kingsmill's Letter is printed from the Original, and the Answer from a Copy of it, of Dr Sharp's own writing; as all the other Papers that follow, are likewise found under his own Hand. They may have their Use; at least as there are but few of them, the Publication of them *at this Time* will deserve no Censure.

A T A B L E

A T A B L E of Questions for examining Children and Young Persons in the C A T E C H I S M. (Being an Enlargement of Dr *Ford's* Table of Questions, printed at the End of his C A T E C H I S M in 1686.) in which are contained, Several Questions for examining such Youths as learn Mr *Lewis's* Exposition.

ADVERTISEMENT

By the P U B L I S H E R.

*A*FTER thirty Years Experience of the Usefulness of the following Table in a Country Parish, where it hath been made Use of, not only for Catechizing Children in the Schools and in the Church, but also for examining Adults both before their Confirmation, and before their Admission to the Lord's Supper: It is at length recommended to the Publick for the Use of Families and English Schools; but more especially to the Parochial Clergy, upon a well-grounded Presumption that they will find more satisfactory

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Effects from this Method of Instructing Children and Youth, than it seems at first sight to promise.

It is not meant hereby in the least to disparage, much less to exclude the Use of Expositions, Lectures, &c. on the Church Catechism; which may, and should be continued along with this Method: (Especially Mr Lewis his Exposition, to which this Scheme is adapted, as well as to the Catechism:) But only to bear Testimony from sufficient Experience, of the singular Benefit of this Way of Catechizing, in that it gives the Instructor a better Insight into what the instructed do, or do not know of the Principles of Christianity, than can be gained by any other Method whatsoever. For which Reason only, this Table which was printed thirty Years since for the Use of a particular Parish, is now published for the common Use and Benefit of all who shall think it worth their while to make Trial of it.

Concerning the Use of this Table.

I. **T**HE Design of these Questions without Answers, is to make Trial by them, whether Children, who say the Catechism readily by Rote, do really understand and consider what they say. All these Questions which are numbered, and amount in this Table to 300 and upwards, are formed upon the plain Words, or plain Sense of the Catechism, and lead to no Answers, but what are contained in the very Words of it: So that this may be look'd upon as the twenty-five Questions and Answers of the Church-catechism, broken into a great Number of Questions and Answers, requiring and giving distinctly every Proposition that the Catechism contains. The Method will best appear by Example.

The TITLE is,
A C A T E C H I S M.

That is to say,

*An Instruction to be learned of every Person
before he be brought to be confirmed by the
Bishop.*

In this TITLE are these several Propositions.

1. A Catechism is an Instruction.
2. A Catechism is an Instruction to be learned.
3. The Catechism is to be learned of every Person.
4. The Catechism is to be learned of every Person, before he be brought to be confirmed.
5. The Catechism is to be learned of every Person, before he be brought to be confirmed, by the Bishop.

Now that Part of each of these Propositions, which distinguishes it from the Rest, will be drawn out by the following Questions into a distinct Answer.

Question

Question 1. What is a Catechism?

Answer. *An Instruction.*

Q. 2. For what Use is it?

A. *To be learned?*

Q. 3. Of whom is it to be learned?

A. *Of every Person?*

Q. 4. When is it to be learned of every Person?

A. *Before he be brought to be confirmed.*

Q. 5. By whom must he be confirmed?

A. *By the Bishop.*

In this Manner the following Table of Questions is contrived to draw into short and distinct Answers the whole Contents of the Catechism: Without which, or some such like Method, it is impossible to know whether Children mind what they repeat. If they can answer these Questions, it will then plainly appear, that they say their Catechism neither ignorantly, nor heedlessly, which will be a great Satisfaction to such as have the Care of their Education.

II. But considering how few Children there are, so well acquainted with the Meaning of
P 3 their

their Catechism, as to be able to go through their Examination upon the first or second Trial ; it is more proper to put this Table into their Hands, with Directions to them to find Answers out of the Catechism, to all these Questions : Which cannot fail of having this good Effect upon them, that it will oblige them to consider and weigh each Expression of the Catechism by itself, and to learn how the Words agree with, and refer to, each other ; which is a Thing they seldom attend to of themselves, and are found frequently to mistake in, by the false Stops and Pauses they make in Repetition. It will likewise make them see the Relation that one Part of the Catechism hath with another ; and teach them to distinguish between the Things for which Reasons are given and the Reasons that are given for them. And above all it will tend more to fix in their Minds a just and clear Sense of their Duty to God and Man, in Faith and Practice, as laid down in this short Catechism, than their Learning to repeat by Rote any Exposition upon it whatsoever.

III. But in order to make this Table more compleatly answer the Design, of making
Trial

Trial of Childrens Knowledge in the Catechism, it was necessary to add a few more Questions to those abovementioned, concerning the Meaning of some Words and Expressions, as *Catholick, Hallowed, take in Vain, bold Guiltless*, and the like ; which few Children can understand. And because these Questions could not be answered from the Catechism itself, as the others may ; there is added at the End, a little Table of Explanations, by the Help of which all these Questions may be answered too. They are distinguished from the other Questions by a *Star*, and Reference is made to the Table of Explanations, by some Letter of the Alphabet, the whole Number of these Questions being only twenty-four.

IV. There are a few other Questions thrown in, here and there, without Figure or Mark set before them ; being such as may easily be answered from the plain Sense of the Catechism, though the Answers lie not in the Words themselves ; most of them require no other Answer, than Yes, or No ; they are to be used at the Discretion of the Examiner.

V. Notice is to be taken, that all the common Questions in the Catechism are here retained in their Order, only something differently expressed; which was done designedly to teach Children to attend the Sense of a Question, and not the Words only.

VI. The other Questions out of Mr *Lewis's* Exposition of the Catechism, which are printed in a different Letter and Form, with the black Line drawn before them, being to be used only occasionally, were inserted for these Reasons.

First, For the examining such Youths as repeat his *Sections*, and obliging them to reflect upon what they say: For all Expositions are usually rehearsed as the Catechism itself is, merely by rote; by which Means, they often fall short of their designed good Effect: But the most effectual Way of making Children attend to the Explanations they recite, seems to be this, of selecting certain Questions for them to answer out of those Explanations.

Secondly,

Secondly, For the Use of such Persons, as have not Opportunity, or Capacity of Learning by Heart, all Mr *Lewis's* Answers and Proofs, but who may notwithstanding, by reading his little Book, be able to furnish themselves with sensible Answers to every Particular that is here demanded; and acquaint themselves thereby with the most material Points contained in his Exposition. The Questions are taken out of his Exposition, rather than any other, because it is one of the Shortest in its Kind, and most commonly made use of in that Parish for whose Benefit this Table of Questions was particularly designed.

It was thought proper to give the foregoing Account of the Use of this Table, to the End that Parents and others, who have the Charge of seeing Children educated in a religious Way, might be persuaded to make Use of it, in their own Houses, and examine those Children by it, that are committed to their Care. They are hereby enabled to make a good Judgment of the Proficiency of those whom they examine: And by using this Method frequently with their Children, they may do them more real Service, than
their

their Minister can by his publick Catechizing. It is to be hoped therefore that they, amongst whom these Tables shall be distributed, will exercise those young Ones under their Care, according to these Rules; and assist them in finding out their Answers, (if there be Occasion) that they may the better approve themselves to their Minister, when he Catechizes them after this Manner.



PART I.

Of the BAPTISMAL COVENANT.

CATECHIST.

1. **W**HAT is your Christian Name?
 — *What should this Name put you in mind of?*

2. How came you by this Name?

3. When did your God-fathers and God-mothers give it you?

— *Who gave Security to the Church, for your Christian Education?*

4. What were you made at your Baptism?

5. Whose Member did you then become?

6. Were you born his Member, or were you made so?

— *What were you then, by Nature?*

— *What Body is Christ the Head of; or what is that which is called his Body?*

— *Is it the same Thing to be a Member of Christ, and to be a Member of his Church?*

— *What is the Way that Christ appointed for admitting Men into his Church?*

— *Do*

—Do you think that you now belong to Christ?
and are united to him, as the Head of the
Church?

7. Whose Child were you made, at your
Baptism?

—What is it to be a Child of God?

—Why are we said in Baptism to be made
Children of God and Children of Grace?

—Through whom, are we made so?

—Could we not be so, unless we were Members
of Christ's Church?

8. What was you made an Inheritor of,
when you was baptized?

A. * What do you mean by the Kingdom
of Heaven?

—Is this Inheritance by Right, or by Promise
and upon Condition?

—How are we to make sure the Possession of
this Inheritance?

9. When your God-fathers and God-mothers
gave you your Name, what did they do for
you besides?

10. How many Things did they promise
and vow?

11. In whose Name did they promise these
Things?

12. What

12. What is the first Promise they made in your Name?

B. * What is it to renounce any Thing?

13. Whom are you first of all to renounce? What then is meant by *renouncing* the Devil?

—*Who is your chief Ghostly Enemy?*

—*Are there any other wicked Beings Besides him, that seek the Ruin of Mankind?*

—*Are you obliged by this Promise, to renounce all these too?*

—*Doth Renouncing, oblige us to have no Manner of Dealings with them whatsoever?*

14. Whose Works are you to renounce?

15. How many of his Works, are you to renounce?

—*Who was it that sinned from the Beginning, and brought Sin into the World?*

—*What are his Works, and as such to be renounced?*

—*Who was manifested, that he might destroy the Works of the Devil?*

16. What Poms and Vanities are you to renounce?

C. * What do you mean by the Poms and Vanities of the World?

Why

Why are they reckoned among our Spiritual Enemies?

— *Are we so to renounce them, as not to desire them at all, and to do nothing to obtain them?*

— *What Sort of Desires of Worldly Honours are we to refrain from?*

— *What Sort of Means of getting Riches are we to reject?*

— *What Customs and Fashions of the World must we refuse to follow?*

— *What Sort of Company are we to avoid?*

17. What Lusts are you to renounce?

18. How many of them are you to renounce?

D. * What do you mean by the *sinful Lusts of the Flesh?*

— *To whom are Lusts and sensual Inclinations of the Flesh, natural?*

— *In what Cases are we obliged to resist them and subdue them?*

— *What doth the Apostle threaten us with if we live after the Flesh?*

— *And what doth he assure us of, if we through the Spirit, do mortify the Deeds of the Body?*

19. What was the second Promise that was made in your Name?

20. What

20. What Faith is it, whose Articles you are to believe ?

21. How many of the Articles did they promise you should believe ?

22. What do you call that in which they are contained ?

—*Hath God made his Faith necessary to everlasting Life ?*

—*In whom or in what must we believe to be saved ?*

—*What doth Christ threaten to those who believe not ?*

23. What is the third and last Promise made for you, by your God-fathers and God-mothers ?

24. What are you bound by this Promise to keep ?

25. In what are you to walk ?

26. How long are you to walk in them ?

—*What did Christ bid his Apostles go and teach others to observe ?*

—*Unto what are we created in Christ Jesus ?*

—*How are we to serve before Him all the Days of our Lives ?*

27. Do you think that you are obliged to do this, and whatever else was promised in your Name ?

—*How*

—How could your Sureties bind you to do, and believe thus?

—If you do not thus believe and do, what will become of the Blessings of this State you are admitted into?

28. By whose Help are you to do these things?

29. What State are you called to by Baptism?

Is it a State in which you surely may be saved, if you will?

Whose Fault will it be, if you be not saved in this State?

—What is it that is able to make us wise unto Salvation?

30. Who called you to this State of Salvation?

31. When did God become your Heavenly Father?

32. Through whom did he call you?

33. What do you do to God for calling you to this blessed State?

34. How long do you desire to continue in this State?

35. Whose Grace must you have, that you may continue in it?

—What do you trust the Grace of God will do for you?

—Of

—Of whom is our Sufficiency?

36. How are you to obtain God's Grace?

—What has our Heavenly Father promised to them that ask him?

PART II.

Of the CREED.

CATECHIST.

I. **W**HAT was the second Thing promised in your Name, at your Baptism?

E. * What do you mean by Faith?

2. Say then, what do you believe as a Christian?

—What doth Creed signify?

—What do you call this Creed?

—What do you mean by Articles of Faith?

—Why do you call it the Christian Faith?

—Are the most necessary Things to be known and believed, contained in this Creed?

—What is the first Branch of this Creed?

—What kind of Spirit is God?

—From whence are his Perfections?

—What do you mean by his being an infinite Spirit?

—What was before God?

—Can the divine Nature be understood by us?

3. What is it you chiefly learn in this Belief?

—What Distinction of Persons do you observe in this Creed?

—In what Respect is there a Sameness and Equality in these three Persons?

—In what Respect is there a Diversity, or Difference between them?

—Is there in Scripture plainly a Distinction of Persons in the same divine Nature?

4. Do you say that you believe in God as one God, or in Gods as more Gods?

Do you mean then, that God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, in whom you believe, are three Gods, or only one God?

5. How do you distinguish the Father, what did he do?

6. How many Things did he make, besides you?

7. How do you distinguish God the Son, what did he do for you?

F. * What do you mean by *redeeming*?

8. How many of Mankind, did he redeem?

9. How do you distinguish God the Holy Ghost, or what doth he for you?

G. * What

G. * What do you mean by *sanctify*?

10. Doth he sanctify none but you?

H. * What do you mean by *Elect*?

11. How many of the Elect People of God doth he sanctify?

12. Of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, which is the first you are taught to believe in?

13. Why do you call him God the Father, whose Father is he?

—*In how many Respects is God a Father?*

—*Whose Father is he by Creation?*

—*Whose Father is he by Generation; or who was begotten of him?*

—*Whose Father is he by Adoption?*

14. What kind of Father is he, with Respect to his Power?

15. What was he Maker of?

Doth Heaven and Earth take in the whole World and all that therein is?

—*Out of what did God make the World?*

—*By what Power doth the World subsist now?*

16. Which of the three Persons in the Trinity was it, that wrought the Redemption of Mankind?

17. Whose Son is He?

Q 2

18. Hath

18. Hath God the Father any more such Sons?

19. What was the Name of this Son, when he took Man's Nature upon him?

——What doth the Name of Jesus signify?

——What doth Christ signify?

——To what Offices was Jesus anointed?

——By whom was he anointed to these Offices?

——Who is it that governs and protects the Church?

——In which of his Offices doth he act in doing this?

——Who was it that made Atonement for our Sins, by the Sacrifice of himself?

——In which of his Offices did he act in doing this?

——Who is it that now intercedes for us all?

——In which of his Offices doth he act in this?

——In which of his Offices did he act, in teaching Mankind the Will of God?

——In which of his Offices did he act, in guiding his Church by his Spirit, Word and Ministry?

20. What is Jesus Christ the only Son of God, with Respect to us?

——What Power is given unto him in Heaven and in Earth?

——What

—What State was he in during his Humiliation?

21. By whom was he conceived?

22. Of whom was he born?

Was he then both God and Man?

—Did the Divine Nature and Human Nature make but one Person?

23. How, or in what Respect, was his Mother Mary different from other Mothers?

—Why did he take upon him the same Nature, with those he died for?

—Did he, with our Nature, take upon him also the Corruptions of our Nature?

24. What became of Him?

25. Under whom, did he suffer?

26. What did he suffer?

I. * What do you mean, by being crucified?

—For what, did our blessed Saviour suffer?

27. What was done with him, when he was dead?

28. Whither did he then descend?

Where lay his Body, while his Soul was separated from it?

29. How long, did he lie in the Grave?

30. And what did he do then?

—On what Day of the Week did Christ rise again?

— *And what bath that Day, for that Reason, been called?*

31. And whither did he ascend?

— *In what Manner, did he ascend?*

32. And where is he now?

33. What doth he there?

— *What is meant by sitting at God's Right Hand?*

— *How doth he appear in God's Presence, for us?*

— *Who only is our Mediator, with God?*

34. Will he ever come from thence?

35. What will he come to do?

36. Whom shall he judge, when he cometh?

— *For what, will Christ judge them?*

Do you expect to be judged among the rest?

37. What Ghost, or Spirit, do you say you believe in?

— *What is his Office in Christ's Stead?*

38. What Church do you believe in, and acknowledge yourself a Member of?

K. * What do you mean, by the *Catholic* Church?

39. What should they be, that are in Communion, with that Church?

L. * What do you mean, by the *Saints*?

— *In*

—In what Fellowship with one another, do the Saints live?

—What Privileges do they partake of, in Common?

40. What do you believe the Members of the Church obtain, as to Sins?

—What is Sin a Transgression of?

—What doth it deserve, Temporal Death, or Eternal?

—On what Conditions, is it forgiven?

—Thro' whom, is it forgiven?

41. What will the Members of the Church obtain, as to their Bodies?

M. * What do you mean, by Resurrection?

—What shall the Body be, when it is united again to the Soul?

42. What shall they obtain, after the Resurrection?

—What will this happy State, called Life Everlasting, consist in?

43. What say you, at the End of your Creed?

—Why do you say Amen, at the End of your Creed?

PART III.

Of the COMMANDMENTS.

CATECHIST.

1. **W**HAT is the third Thing that your Godfathers and Godmothers promised for you?

2. How many of the Commandments are there?

—How many of them must you observe?

—What must you make them?

3. Who spake these Commandments?

—Who has confirmed these Commandments?

4. In what Chapter, and of what Book, do you find them?

5. What did God say to his People *Israel*, just before he gave them the Commandments?

6. From whence did he say he brought them?

7. What was the Land of *Egypt* to them?

8. What is the first Commandment?

9. How many Gods may we have?

Must we not have God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost?

Are all these then One God?

—What

—What is it to have no more Gods but one?

—To whom are you forbidden to give the Honour due to God?

—What is required of us in this Commandment?

10. What is the second Commandment?

11. What are we forbidden to make for a God?

12. May we make for a God any other Image, that is not graven?

13. What Likeness are we forbidden to liken God to?

—Is it barely the making any Image, or Picture, that is forbidden here?

—Or the making them, with some particular Intention?

—With what Design and Intention, are we forbidden to make them?

14. But may we not bow down to any of these, if they be made by others?

15. Nor pay any kind of Worship to them?

—Is there any Difference betwixt this, and the first Commandment?

—What Worship is it that is forbidden in the first Commandment?

—What Sort of Worship is forbidden, in this Commandment?

—What

—*What is required, in this Commandment?*

16. What Sort of a God doth he say he is, to deter us from Idolatry, or the Worship of the Creature?

N. * What do you mean by a *jealous* God?

17. How doth he express this Jealousy, with Respect to Idolaters?

18. Upon whom, doth he visit the Sins of idolatrous Fathers?

19. And how long, doth he thus visit?

20. How are they affected towards God, whose Children he visits to the fourth Generation?

21. And how are they affected to him, to whom he shews Mercy?

22. How do Men shew that they love God; or, what do they?

23. To how many Generations of these, doth he extend his Mercy?

24. What is the third Commandment?

25. How must we not take, or use the Name of God?

O. * What do you mean, by taking *his Name in vain*?

—*Doth the Name of God signify no more, than barely the Name by which he is called?*

—*What*

—What Sort of Swearing is it, that we are forbidden, in this Commandment?

—What Manner of Speech concerning God and Religion, are we forbidden?

—What Use of the Name of God, or of the Things belonging unto him, are we forbidden?

—How are we to read, and hear the Holy Scripture?

—How are we to treat, whatsoever hath a more immediate Relation to him and his Service?

26. What doth God threaten, to such as take his Name in vain?

P. * What is the Meaning of, that he will not hold guiltless?

27. What is the fourth Commandment?

28. What Day is that we must keep holy?

—What doth the Word Sabbath signify?

29. How many Days in every Week, may we labour?

30. What must we do in these six Days?

31. What Proportion of Time, in every Week, must God's Sabbath take up?

—What was the Sabbath set apart for?

—What is the chief Thing, in which both public and private Worship consists?

—What are we to hear, in public Worship?

—What

—What are we to set forth?

—What are we to receive?

—What are we to meditate on, in private?

—What Sort of Employment are we to rest from on the Sabbath?

32. What Reason doth God give for this Command, from his own Example?

33. What did God make?

34. How long was he making them?

35. What did he on the seventh Day?

36. What did he for the seventh Day, when he had rested on it?

Q. * What do you mean by *Hallowed*?

37. Why did he sanctify, and bless that Day?

—Why do Christians observe the first Day of the Week, as the Sabbath, instead of the seventh?

—What is the Sum of what is required, in these four Commandments?

38. What is the fifth Commandment?

39. Who are the Persons you are here commanded to honour?

40. What may these Persons expect, who thus honour their Fathers and Mothers?

—Are you required in this Commandment, only to honour Father and Mother?

—What

—What is the Duty of Subjects, towards their Princes?

—What is the Duty of the People, towards their spiritual Teachers?

—What is the Duty of Servants, towards their Masters?

—What is the Duty of Inferiors, towards their Betters?

41. What is the sixth Commandment?

R. * What is the Sin of Murder?

Whom, are you forbidden to murder?

—What Manner or Degree of Hurt, are you forbidden to do to your Neighbour?

—What are you required in this Commandment, to banish from your Heart?

42. What is the seventh Commandment?

S. * What is the Sin of Adultery?

—What are you forbidden to act, in general by virtue of this Commandment?

—What are you forbidden to encourage?

—What are you required to do, in this Commandment?

43. What is the eighth Commandment?

From whom, are you forbidden to do so?

—What is it, that we may not take away from another Man?

—But

——But may we not detain it by Force, or Deceit?

——Say then, what is required of you in this Commandment?

——How is it your Duty to relieve the Poor?

44. What is the ninth Commandment?

45. What kind of Testimony, or Witness, must you not bear?

——Is an unjust Accusation upon Oath alone, here forbidden?

46. Against whom, must you not bear such False-witness?

——What must you do for your Neighbour, when you know he is wronged?

——How must you judge of others?

47. What is the tenth Commandment?

48. What are you here forbidden to covet?

——What Desire of getting other Mens Goods, are you here forbidden?

49. What other Things of your Neighbours, are you forbidden to covet?

——What then is required of you, in this Commandment?

——How many Tables, are these Commandments divided into?

——What doth the first Table contain, and what the second?

——How

—How then doth our Saviour say of the Ten Commandments, that they are but Two?

50. How many Things are you chiefly taught, in these Commandments?

51. Which be they?

52. What is your Duty to Almighty God?

53. Say, What are the three first Duties, you owe to God?

54. How must you love God?

55. How much Trust must you put, in God?

56. What belonging to God, must you honour?

57. How must you serve him?

58. How long must you serve him?

59. What are you in Duty bound to, towards your Neighbour?

60. How must you love your Neighbour?

61. How must you do, unto all Men?

62. What must you do, unto your Father and Mother?

63. What to the King, and all in Authority?

64. What, to your Governors, Teachers, Spiritual Pastors, and Masters?

65. What, to all your Betters?

T. * Who are your Spiritual Pastors?

66. What

66. What are you not to do, to any Body?
67. What must you be, in all your Dealings?
68. What must you not bear, in your Heart?
69. What are you to keep your Hands from?
70. And what, your Tongue from?
71. How are you to keep your Body?
72. How are you to carry yourself towards other Mens Goods?
73. What are you to learn, and labour for?
74. How are you to labour for it?
75. In what State of Life, will you labour truly for it?
- How many of the Commandments contain your Duty towards God?
- Which be they?
- And how many of them, contain your Duty towards your Neighbour?
- Which be they?
76. Whom are you to believe in, and fear above all others?
77. What is it you are to do, with all your Heart, and Mind, and Soul, and Strength?
- Are you to fear and love no other God, in this Manner?

In what Commandment, are you required to believe in, and fear, and love no other God besides him?

78. Whom alone, are you to worship?

79. What are ye to do to him for all his Benefits?

80. Whom are you to trust and rely upon, in all Cases?

81. What are you to do, to obtain of him such Assistance as you want?

May you not worship, or give Thanks to an Idol, or graven Image?

May you not trust in, or call upon any Thing made in the Likeness of Creatures?

In what Commandment then is it required, that you should worship, and trust in, and call upon the only true God?

82. How are you to treat God's holy Name and Word?

What Commandment obliges you to treat his holy Name with Honour?

83. And what must you do all the Days of your Life?

84. What Day in the Week, must you remember particularly to keep holy, and spend in his Service?

What Commandment obliges you to observe this?

85. Who is it that you must love as yourself?

86. To how many must you do, as you would they should do unto you?

87. Who must you love, honour, and succour?

88. Whom must you honour and obey?

89. And whom, besides the King?

90. To whom must you submit yourself?

91. To whom must you order yourself lowly and reverently?

What Commandment requires you should do all these Things?

92. Whom must you not hurt, by Word nor Deed?

93. Where must you bear no Malice, nor Hatred?

What Commandment requires all this?

94. What must you keep in Temperance, Soberness and Chastity?

In what Commandment is this required?

95. In what must you be true and just?

96. What must you keep from Picking and Stealing?

Which of the Commandments require this?

97. What

97. What must you keep from Evil-speaking, Lying, and Slandering?

By which Commandment are you required so to do?

98. What are you not to covet nor desire?

99. What must you do, to get your own Living?

100. And what must you do in the State of Life, unto which God shall call you?

By what Commandment are you bound to all these?

PART IV.

Of Christian PRAYER.

CATECHIST.

1. **M**Y good Child, are you able of yourself, to serve God, and walk in his Commandments?

2. What must you have to make you able?

3. By what Means must it be obtained?

4. When are you to call upon God for it?

5. How are you at all Times to call for it?

— *After what Pattern must you pray?*

R 2

6. How

6. How call you that Prayer which you are taught to say to God daily?

— *Why is it so called?*

— *Where bath Christ taught us this Prayer?*

Which do you call the Preface in this Prayer?

7. Who do you here pray to!

8. What Relation doth God bear to us?

— *In what Respect may we claim a particular Interest in God?*

— *Why do you say, Our Father, and not my Father?*

9. Where is he in a more especial Manner present?

How many Petitions are in the Lord's Prayer?

10. What is the first Petition?

11. What is it you pray may be *hallowed*?

U. * What do you mean by its being hallowed?

— *By whom is God to be honoured?*

— *How are we to promote the Honour of his Name?*

12. What is the second Petition?

13. What do you pray may come?

— *What do you mean by the Kingdom of God?*

— *Where do you pray that God would rule?*

— *What do you pray he would enlarge?*

— *What*

—*What Power must be destroy to do so?*

—*What kingdom is it you pray he would ha-
sien?*

14. What is the third Petition?

15. What is it you desire may be *done*?

16. Where do you pray it may be done?

—*What is God's Will on Earth, besides what
he hath promised and commanded in his Word?*

17. How should God's Will be done on
Earth?

—*By whom is it done in Heaven?*

—*How are we to serve him if we would do
his Will as it is done in Heaven?*

18. What is the fourth Petition?

19. How much Bread do we pray for every
Day?

W. * What do you mean by *daily Bread*?

—*At what Times must we depend upon God
for a Supply of what we want?*

—*Is this the Reason why we should every Day
pray, Give us this Day?*

20. What is the fifth Petition?

21. What do you here pray to God to for-
give?

X. * What do you mean by *Trespases*?

22. Whose Trespases do you desire God to
forgive?

—How many of our trespasses do we desire to be forgiven?

—What Argument do we use to God to forgive us?

23. How do we desire God would forgive us?

24. Whom are we to forgive, if we would be forgiven of God?

—What doth this Petition shew us the Necessity of?

25. What is the sixth and last Petition?

26. What do you here pray, not to be led into?

—What Temptation do we here desire God, not to lead us into?

—Doth God ever tempt any Man?

—Are all Temptations by his Permission?

—In what Sense may he truly grant this Petition, when he suffers us to be tempted?

27. What do you here pray to be delivered from?

28. What is the Conclusion of this Prayer?

29. What do you in this Conclusion acknowledge to belong to God?

30. And how long shall these Things belong to him?

31. Tell

31. Tell me again, what do you ask in the first Petition, concerning God's Name?

32. What do you ask in the second Petition concerning his Kingdom?

33. What do you ask in the third Petition, concerning God's Will?

34. What do you ask in the fourth Petition, concerning daily Bread?

35. What do you ask in the fifth Petition concerning your sins?

36. What do you desire of God, with respect to Temptations?

37. What would you have him to do for you, with respect to evil?

38. Say then, in general, what is the Substance of this Prayer; what desire you of God in it?

39. Who is the giver of Goodness?

40. What Goodness is he the Giver of?

41. What do we first pray God to send?

42. To whom do ye pray God to send it?

43. To what End do you pray God to send it?

44. That you may *worship him*, How is this expressed in the first Petition?

45. That you may *serve him*: How is this expressed in the second Petition?

46. That you may *obey him*: How is this expressed in the third Petition?

47. What are the next Things we pray God to send us

48. What needful Things are those we pray him to send us!

49. How many of such needful Things?

50. How is this expressed in the Lord's Prayer in the fourth Petition?

51. You pray that God would be merciful unto us: Wherein?

52. How is this expressed in the fifth Petition?

53. What do you pray to be saved and defended in?

Z. * What do you mean by ghostly Dangers?

54. What do you pray that God will keep you from?

55. And from what besides?

Z. * Who is our ghostly Enemy?

56. From what do you desire to be kept, besides Sin and the Devil?

57. How are all these Desires expressed in the last Petition?

58. Whence do you expect all these good Things?

59. Through

59. Through whom do you hope to attain them?

60. And therefore what do you say in the Conclusion?

61. What signifies *Amen*?

PART V.

Of the SACRAMENTS.

CATECHIST.

1. **H**OW many Sacraments are there of Christ's ordaining?

2. Where hath he ordained them to be used and observed?

3. Which are these two?

4. Are these Sacraments necessary?

5. To what End are they necessary?

6. Are they necessary to some particular Christians only, or generally to all?

—*What Persons alone may be supposed to be excepted, from the Obligation of observing them?*

7. Are

7. Are there no more such Sacraments but these two?

8. What doth this Word Sacrament signify?

9. What kind of Signs is required in a Sacrament?

10. And what must it be a Sign of?

11. Is it a Sign of spiritual Grace bestowed upon any Person?

12. Upon whom?

13. By whom must this outward Sign of Grace be ordained to make it a Sacrament?

14. By Christ's Authority left with his Church; or by Christ himself?

15. To what Use or End was the outward Sign in the Sacrament ordained by Christ?

16. What doth it convey to us? What is it a Means of our receiving?

17. What doth it as a Pledge or Token?

18. What doth it assure us of?

19. Say then, of how many Parts doth a Sacrament consist?

20. Which is the first Part?

21. Which is the second?

22. Which is the first Sacrament?

—*What Command did our Saviour give his Apostles concerning this Sacrament?*

23. What

23. What is the outward and visible Sign, in this Sacrament?

24. What is the Person baptized in?

25. In whose Name is the Person baptized?

What is the Form of Baptism?

26. What is the inward Part or Thing signified in this Sacrament?

27. Say again, of how many Parts doth this inward and spiritual Grace consist?

28. What is the first Part?

29. What is the second Part?

30. What are baptized Persons, say you, to die unto?

31. And what are they new born unto?

32. In what Condition were we all born by Nature?

33. And what were we Children of, or liable to thereby?

34. But what are we made now?

35. By what Means are we made so?

—*Whose adopted Child are you, as a Child of Grace?*

—*Into what are you taken as a Child of Grace?*

—*What, belonging to that Covenant, have you a Title to?*

—*What*

—What is the Means and Pledge thereof?

—Is Baptism alone sufficient in grown Persons to Salvation?

—What must they do to render it sufficient?

—What do you mean by dying unto Sin?

—What do you mean by living unto Righteousness?

—By what Means is this happy Change wrought in the Soul?

36. What is required of Persons before they be admitted to Baptism?

37. How many Things say you are required?

38. What is the first of them?

—What is Repentance?

39. What do Men do when they repent, or by their Repentance?

40. What is the other Thing required?

41. What do Men do by Faith?

42. How do they believe the Promises of God?

43. What Promises must they believe in particular?

44. Can Children, during their Infancy, perform those two Things, that are required of Persons to be baptized?

45. Why cannot they perform them?

46. Why

46. Why then are Infants baptized?

—*What Sort of Title to the Blessings of Baptism, are Infants capable of, on God's Part?*

—*And what are they capable of, being obliged by, on their own Parts?*

47. What do Infants promise at their Baptism?

48. By whom do they promise them both? How do you otherwise call these Sureties that promised for you at your Baptism?

49. Who are bound to perform the Promises made for Infants by their Sureties?

50. When are they bound to perform them?

—*Can they be obliged to do, what they did not actually consent to?*

—*What Right have Children of Christian Parents to be admitted into Covenant with God?*

51. What is the second Sacrament?

—*Why is the Sacrament called the Lord's Supper?*

—*When did he ordain it?*

52. Why was it ordained?

53. How many Things are to be remembered in this Sacrament?

54. Say then, what is the first Thing that we are to remember?

55. What

55. What is the Death of Christ here called?

— *Why is Christ's Death called a Sacrifice?*
By whom was this Sacrifice offered?

56. How long must this Death of Christ be thus remembered?

— *What do we shew forth as often as we eat this Bread, and drink this Cup?*

57. What else besides the Sacrifice of Christ's Death, do we remember in this Sacrament?

58. By what do we receive Benefits?

59. What is the visible Part in this Sacrament?

60. What do Men outwardly receive in the Lord's Supper?

61. By whose Command must they be received?

Why are we obliged to receive both?

62. What is the inward and spiritual Grace in this Sacrament?

Which of the outward Signs, Bread, or Wine, signifies Christ's Body?

Which of them signifies his Blood?

63. By whom are the Body and Blood of Christ taken and received in the Lord's Supper?

64. How

64. How are they taken and received by the Faithful?

—*What do they who rightly receive this Sacrament actually partake of?*

—*To what End, did Christ, by his Death, merit Benefits for Mankind?*

65. What are the Advantages we partake of, in receiving the Lord's Supper?

66. What Part of us, is strengthened and refreshed in the Lord's Supper?

67. By what are our souls strengthened and refreshed?

68. In what Manner are our Souls strengthened and refreshed?

—*What are we assured of by being made Partakers of the Sacramental Bread and Wine?*

69. What is it that Persons ought to do before they come to the Lord's Supper?

70. What is the first Particular to be examined?

—*Why, without Repentance, can we have no Hopes of Benefits from this Sacrament?*

71. What are Men to repent of before they come?

How are they to repent of them?

73. What is further required as a Part of true Repentance?

74. What

74. What are they to purpose ?

75. How are they to purpose it ?

76. What is the second Particular to be examined ?

— *For what Sort of Believers was this Sacrament appointed ?*

— *With whom have they a near Communion in this Sacrament ?*

— *How do they feed on him ?*

77. What kind of Faith must they have ?

78. In what must they have this Faith ?

79. Through whom doth this Faith expect Mercy ?

80. What must be remembered concerning Christ in the Lord's Supper ?

81. What kind of Remembrance must we have of his Death ?

— *What kind of Sacrifice to God is the Lord's Supper ?*

— *For what is it offered ?*

82. What is the last Particular to be examined ?

83. With whom must they be in Charity when they come to this Sacrament ?

— *What kind of Feast is the Lord's Supper ?*

— *What doth this Communion of Christians one with another, signify, or represent ?*

Some

Some few Words and Expressions in the CATECHISM explained; to which Explanations, Reference is made in the foregoing Table, by a Star, and some Letter of the Alphabet set before certain Questions.

- A. * Everlasting Glory and Happiness in Heaven.
- B. * To cast off, to abhor, and have nothing to do with.
- C. * Sinful Greatness, and the Pride of Life.
- D. * Sinful Pleasures, and evil Desires of our corrupted Nature.
- E. * A firm and stedfast Belief.
- F. * Delivering, or saving us, by paying a Ransom to God for us.
- G. * To purify and make holy.
- H. * Such as God hath called and chosen to be Members of his Church.
- I. * Nailed Hands and Feet to a Cross of Wood.
- K. * The holy Church, throughout all the World.

L. * Holy Men and Women in God's Church.

M. * Rising again from the Grave?

N. * One that will not bear we should honour any other besides him; but will severely revenge himself upon us if we do.

O. * Using it profanely, or idly, either in Swearing or otherwise.

P. * He will not look upon as innocent, but will punish.

Q. * Set apart, or made holy.

R. * Wilful killing of our Neighbour.

S. * Defiling our Neighbour's Wife?

T. * The Ministers of God's Word.

U. * Treated as holy; that is, revered in our Thoughts, praised in our Words, and glorified in our Actions.

W. * All Things necessary for our Souls and Bodies.

X. * All Sins and Offences.

Y. * All Dangers to our Souls.

Z. * The Devil, who is the great Enemy to our Souls.

LETTERS

LETTERS between the Rev.
Dr THOMAS SHARP, Arch-
deacon of *Northumberland*, and
Prebendary of *Durham*, and Mrs
COCKBURN.

*Dr Sharp to the Rev. Mr Cockburn, when
he returned Mrs Cockburn's MSS Papers.*

Whitton Tower, Aug. 8, 1743.

REV. SIR,

THE discourses you were pleased to
give me the perusal of, were so en-
tertaining and instructive, that I could scarce
stop till I got through them; though, I as-
sure you, I have not read them negligently,
but with the attention which they require and
deserve. I doubt not but they will be well
received in print; and I am so desirous of
their publication, that I think no time should
be lost, and therefore I return them sooner,
that I may not in the least deprive the public
of them, especially as I do not see reason to

advise the least alteration either in matter or expression.

I do not mean by this to say, that I am absolutely and wholly in the sentiments of the ingenious author. As for the subjects of her cursory Thoughts, they are so abstruse and nice, that I can hardly say, what sentiment I am of: for I am apt to hearken and incline to every fine reasoner upon them; and it is perhaps for this reason, (perhaps for a better) that if I were at this very time to declare which of the writers on these subjects I most approve of, I should answer, *Mrs Cockburn*.

But as to the other and principal Subject of these papers, (which I now thankfully return) concerning the foundation of moral virtue and moral obligation, I am not yet so satisfied with any of the accounts I have met with as I could wish to be; and am still apt to think, there are some distinctions yet wanting to be hit of, which would reconcile the advocates of *Dr Clarke*, and *Dr Waterland*, with each other.

I am, indeed, altogether with the learned lady in what she says, and opposes to those, who would lay this foundation in such low and ungenerous principles as self-love, and self-

self-interest. And I am also ready to admit, that the reason, nature, and fitness of things, as they now appear to a moral agent, would be a foundation of obligation. So would the moral sense likewise, if they were not both of them resolvable into a nobler principle still, which can be no other than the will of God. Perhaps in this I come the closest to Mr *W*——, though I think our present author has fairly caught him tripping in one position. Nor do I see how he can be able to answer her last query put to him.

The things wanting yet to be settled in this controversy, are, I conceive,

1st, What is meant by the word foundation, as it is commonly used by the writers in it?

2dly, Whether moral virtue, and moral obligation, must needs have the same foundation, and in the same sense?

3dly, Whether the reason, nature, and fitness of things, considered as antecedent to the divine will, do appear under that consideration to be obligatory to morality? Or thus:

Whether rules of action, and obligation to action, be not quite distinct, and may not have distinct foundations, in like manner as

the reason and fitness of a law are distinct from the authority of a law ?

I must confess, for my own part, I have such an undistinguishing head, that I could never tell how to separate the essential differences of things (as they now appear to moral agents) from the will of God. All created nature is an expression of his will, in these very essential differences, and relations, and fitnesses flowing from them. And therefore I like, and I adhere to that expression of Mrs Cockburn's ; *Thy perfect will in the essential differences of good and evil.*

Why may not morality, considered in the mind of God before creation, like metaphysical truths, be *ultimately resolved* (as your learned lady is pleased to word it) into the divine understanding ? And morality, considered in its obligations on rational creatures, be ultimately resolved into the divine will ? Is there any inconsistency in this distinction ?

Though morality, as a rule, was eternally in the mind of God, like mathematical proportions, yet there could be no obligation to conform to this rule, till it became practicable by the actual subsistence of things, expressing those relations and fitnesses ; that is, till God
had

had expressed his own will, as well as his wisdom, in a system of works, exhibiting all those eternal ratios, &c. Therefore, I am inclined to conceive, that the foundation of obligation to conform to these fitnesses could not be antecedent to the divine will, whatever the ratios themselves were.

Mrs Cockburn's Answer to Dr Sharp.

‘ I AM much encouraged in the design of
‘ printing my papers, by the favourable
‘ opinion of so good a judge as *Dr Sharp*;
‘ who, no doubt, upon a thorough considera-
‘ tion, would be much better able than I am,
‘ to clear up the difficulties he finds in *Dr*
‘ *Clarke*’s scheme. But since he is so conde-
‘ scending to my weak attempts, I shall freely
‘ give my Thoughts upon them. It is, I
‘ think, a good step towards removing them,
‘ that he is intirely against those, who would
‘ lay the foundation of moral obligation on
‘ such low principles, as *self-love* and *self-in-*
‘ *terest*; for, I believe, upon a farther reflec-
‘ tion it will appear, that we must either lay

‘ it there, or upon the nature, relations, and
‘ fitness of things.

‘ As to the word *foundation*, though me-
‘ taphorically applied to these subjects, I do
‘ not find, that there is any ambiguity in the
‘ use of it, or that any misunderstanding has
‘ happened for want of explaining it. When
‘ it is spoke of *moral virtue*, it is commonly,
‘ I suppose, understood (at least I have always
‘ taken it) to mean the ground on which mo-
‘ ral virtue *solely* arises, or that, without
‘ which there could be no such Thing as vir-
‘ tue. And such a foundation, I think, can
‘ be no other than the necessary relations and
‘ essential differences of things; for upon these
‘ even the virtue of obeying the will of God
‘ must be founded; since, on a supposition
‘ that there were no essential differences, or
‘ fitnesses resulting from them, there could be
‘ no more *goodness* in obedience, than in the
‘ contrary.

‘ As to the second question, whether moral
‘ virtue and moral obligation must have the
‘ same foundation, and in the same sense? it
‘ seems clear to me, that if the *nature and*
‘ *reason* of things is the foundation of *moral*
‘ *virtue*, it must be the foundation of *moral*
‘ *obligation*

obligation likewise to *reasonable* beings. Yet not in such a sense as that there can be no other foundation of it. The *moral sense*, and the *will of God*, are both grounds of obligation to moral agents; though perhaps their being so may be ultimately resolvable into the *eternal reason and truth* of things, which I take to be the most noble of all principles, as that, to which the divine will itself is always conformed.

On the third question, whether the reason, nature, and fitness of things, when considered as *antecedent* to the divine will, do appear under *that* consideration to be obligatory to morality? I have largely expressed my sentiments in the papers, but not, it seems, to the judicious Doctor's satisfaction; who apprehends, that *rules* of action, and *obligation* to action, may be quite distinct, &c. For my part, I know not how to conceive *reasons* or rules of action, (I mean eternal and immutable reasons) distinct from *obligation* to action. The reasons of a law are indeed distinct from the *authority* of the law; and those laws, that are founded on *temporary and mutable* reasons: oblige solely by the authority of the legislator; but those, that
are

‘ are founded on the *necessary* relations and
 ‘ *essential differences* of things, have, from
 ‘ those eternal reasons, a *right* of obliging
 ‘ moral agents *prior* to the authority that en-
 ‘ forces them. The reasons and authority,
 ‘ though distinct, are, as I conceive, both
 ‘ proper foundations of obligation ; for what
 ‘ are reasons and rules of action, if they do not
 ‘ oblige reasonable beings to act conformably
 ‘ to them ?

‘ I would ask, for what end was man en-
 ‘ dued with a faculty of perceiving the *essen-*
 ‘ *tial differences* of things ? It is said by Mr
 ‘ *Warburton* and others, that they are
 ‘ rule, which God has given us, to
 ‘ *bring them to a knowledge of his will,*
 ‘ good ; it is certainly a rational deduction
 ‘ from those *perceptions*, that it must be
 ‘ will of the author of our nature,
 ‘ should act suitably to them ; and this con-
 ‘ vey lays us under an *additional* obligation.
 ‘ But by what means do those perceptions
 ‘ bring us to this knowledge ? Is it not by first
 ‘ shewing us our duty, shewing us what
 ‘ course of action our nature requires us to
 ‘ follow, and forcing us to stand self-con-
 ‘ demned, if we counteract them ? And must
 ‘ not

‘ not then the essential differences be the *pri-*
 ‘ *mary* foundation of moral obligation ? What
 ‘ then can hinder them from continuing to
 ‘ have a *right* of obliging reasonable beings,
 ‘ even though such beings should stop short of
 ‘ considering them as *a rule by which to know*
 ‘ *the will of God*, either from having false no-
 ‘ tions, or no notions at all of a Deity ? Since,
 ‘ notwithstanding this, they will unavoidably
 ‘ *approve or condemn* their own, and other
 ‘ mens actions, according to the *immutable na-*
 ‘ *ture* of things. And that this brings them
 ‘ under *obligation*, I the rather insist on, be-
 ‘ cause I see not otherwise, how it is possible
 ‘ to solve the difficulty proposed to Mr *War-*
 ‘ *burton*.

‘ The Doctor inquires, if there is any in-
 ‘ consistency in resolving morality, as consider-
 ‘ ed to be in the mind of God *before creation*,
 ‘ into the divine *understanding* ; and morality,
 ‘ considered in its *obligations on rational crea-*
 ‘ *tures*, into the *divine will* ? I should think
 ‘ this a very proper distinction, if applied to
 ‘ *positive* precepts : but if by morality is under-
 ‘ stood that law, which *necessarily* results from
 ‘ the nature of such a system as mankind ;
 ‘ and which God eternally saw, would be fit
 ‘ and

' and right for them to practise, whenever he
 ' pleased to determine their existence; I do
 ' not apprehend, how the *obligations* to mo-
 ' rality thus understood can, any more than
 ' the eternal reasons of them, be *ultimately* re-
 ' solved into the *divine will*. It is very true,
 ' as the Doctor finely reasons, that obligation
 ' to morality could not *take place*, till God had
 ' expressed his *will* as well as his wisdom in a
 ' a system of works, exhibiting those relations
 ' and fitnesses that were eternally in the divine
 ' mind. But I see not how it follows from
 ' thence, that the *foundation* of obligation to
 ' conform to those fitnesses *could not be antece-*
 ' *dent to the divine will*; since the ratios them-
 ' selves are allowed to be so, according to
 ' which the divine will determined to create
 ' such a system; for it is those *eternal ratios*,
 ' that are maintained to be the ultimate *founda-*
 ' *tion* of moral obligation. The *obligation itself*,
 ' indeed, being *subsequent* to the creation,
 ' though founded on the eternal reason and na-
 ' ture of things, may perhaps be more properly
 ' said to be antecedent to all *consideration* of the
 ' divine will, and to any *prospect* of reward or
 ' punishment. Whether this *distinction* might,
 ' in any measure, contribute to reconcile the

' advocates

‘ advocates of Dr *Clarke* and Dr *Waterland*,
‘ I much doubt, since the last seem resolute
‘ to admit of no obligation but what arises from
‘ a superior will.

‘ But I would ask, if the will of God is sup-
‘ posed to be the *only* foundation of moral ob-
‘ ligation, upon what grounds we are obliged
‘ to obey his will? I can conceive no other,
‘ but either his absolute power to *punish and re-*
‘ *ward*; or the *fitness* of obedience from a
‘ creature to his creator. The first of these
‘ would bring us down, I fear, to those low
‘ principles the Doctor disapproves; and if
‘ that is rejected, the other returns us to that
‘ reason, nature, and essential differences of
‘ things, into which, I apprehend, all obliga-
‘ tion must at last be resolved.

‘ The Doctor is pleased to impute to an *un-*
‘ *distinguishing* head, that he could never tell
‘ how to separate the essential differences of
‘ things (as they now appear to moral agents)
‘ from the will of God. But though he can-
‘ not *separate*, no doubt he does *distinguish*
‘ them. “ All *created* nature (as he justly
‘ says) is an expression of the will of God
‘ in these very essential differences and fit-
‘ *nesses*

“nesses flowing from them.” They are in-
 ‘ deed expressions of his will, that all his
 ‘ own works, and the free actions of mo-
 ‘ ral agents, should be conformable to them;
 ‘ But he did not *create* those necessary and
 ‘ eternal truths, according to which the
 ‘ perfect rectitude of his will determined
 ‘ him to act. His will may therefore be
 ‘ *distinguished* from those essential truths,
 ‘ to which it conformed, though, as they
 ‘ intirely *coincide*, I think they ought not to
 ‘ be *separated*.

‘ I do not know, whether there is any
 ‘ thing in these reflections, that may deserve
 ‘ the attention of Dr *Sharp*; but I hope
 ‘ he will receive them as instances of my
 ‘ respect, and a desire of approving my
 ‘ sentiments to his judgment, being, with
 ‘ the greatest esteem,

His most humble servant,

C. COCKBURN.

Dr Sharp

Dr Sharp to the Rev. Mr Cockburn.

Sept. 12, 1743.

REV. SIR,

THE paper you put into my hands, when you was last here, was too great a favour not to be acknowledged in a more particular manner than by a letter of thanks. I have spent some hours in comparing and adjusting, as far as I could, her sentiments with mine, and in giving her the reasons of my three questions, rather than defending them. Whether I am right or wrong in what I suggest, it matters not much. My aim is to get at the bottom, or near it, of such variety of conclusions made by very learned and ingenious persons. No one writer among them all treats more distinctly than *Mrs Cockburn*. And I apprehend, what she has said in her papers designed for the press, will meet with very good acceptance from all, as it did from me; though I am not altogether with her in every part of

Dr Clarke's

Dr Clarke's reasonings. Pray make my respects acceptable to her.

I am, Sir,

Your affectionate brother,

THO. SHARP.

Some further Thoughts offered to the ingenious and judicious Mrs COCKBURN, after perusal of her solutions given to three questions proposed to her, upon the subject of moral virtue and moral obligation.

MADAM,

AFTER returning you many thanks for your kind assistance in clearing up my notions upon a subject, that you are better acquainted with than I am, and that you have studied more, and to more purpose than I have; I shall presume to repeat a liberty I took once before, and acquaint you freely, how things appear to me upon perusing your very ingenious *Remarks*, which I have read with all the attention I was capable of.

By

By the word FOUNDATION, you apprehend the writers on this subject *commonly understand the ground, on which moral virtue solely arises*. But are they agreed, whether *this ground* be any one simple principle, or compounded of more principles than one? If *ground* in your definition may be explained by *principle*, then you are clear, that virtue arises upon one principle only. But a skilful writer among you, as I remember, makes the *ground* to consist of three principles, and is bold to say, that the making any one single principle the sole ground of virtue, is itself a fundamental error in this controversy, and has been the occasion of much perplexity in it. I do not undertake to say, whether he is right or wrong in this charge against the rest; but I bring it as one instance of a disagreement among the writers about the word foundation; which ought to be adjusted by an unanimous admission or exclusion of the term *solely* in the definition.

Again, among those, who admit of *one principle only* for the purpose, (as I think most of you do) may we not discover some different conceptions of the word *foundation*? One seems to consider it as *the ground*, from

whence virtue is directly produced, or to which it owes its birth. Another considers it as a more remote cause, as the fountain head, from whence virtue derives its origin.

They may both perhaps abide by your definition ; but then it is not precisely in the same sense of it. One will say it is *the ground, from which* (meaning without the intervention of other mediums) *it arises* (meaning from whence it immediately springs ;) another will say, it is *the ground, on which* (mediums supposed) *it arises* (but meaning indeed, into which it must be ultimately and finally resolved.) Now he, who puts it upon any principle, that immediately operates, cannot have the very same idea of *foundation* with him, who puts it upon a remote and distant bottom. I am not now determining to which of these the word *foundation* may be most properly applied, but only observing, that even those writers, who agree in placing virtue on some one foundation, do not yet agree exactly in their sense of foundation.

Once more ; you explain your *ground* further in these words ; or, *that, without which there could be no such thing as virtue*. But yet this seems not to enter into *their* notion of *foundation*, who place it in self-love and self-interest.

interest. For virtue, call it a conformity to the reasons of things, or to the will of God, in either sense, it will be the same thing it was, though this foundation of theirs should be destroyed, or out of sight. For virtue, even according to them, may be considered as disinterested, that is, independently on the sanctions of rewards and punishments. They will disown indeed any obligation, or any motive to practise it in this case; but virtue will still be what it was; whereas, without the foundation, which you give it, there can be no such thing. When you are pleased therefore to observe, that the *foundation of moral virtue, upon further reflection, will be found to lie either in the essential differences, &c. or in self-love and self-interest*; I would remark, *but not in the same sense of foundation*, which means, when understood of the one, *that, without which there could be no such thing as virtue*; but does not mean this, when understood of, or applied to the other.

It was upon these, and the like reflections, that I ventured to say, that settling the term foundation seemed to me previously necessary in this controversy about moral virtue. For so long as there is any ambiguity in terms, it is likely there will be misusing of arguments. Your explanation of what you yourself

mean, when you use the word, is ingenuous, and I thank you for it; and I shall understand all your reasonings and conclusions on this subject the better for this light. But still I have doubts, whether you can bring your foundation to answer your definition; especially in regard of that important word *SOLELY*; which excludes every thing else from being in any sense foundations. Yet you seem to apprehend this to be plain enough from this single consideration, that your *foundation is that, without which there could be no such thing as moral virtue; and that on supposition there were no essential differences, there could be no more goodness in obeying God's will, than in the contrary.*

But now, in my poor apprehension, this sort of reasoning amounts to no more in strictness, than this, that moral virtue stands so necessarily related to these essential differences, &c. that it cannot be considered *even as subsisting independently*, or exclusive of them, by one who considers virtue in all its relations. The same may be said of free will, or of reason in moral agents. Supposing them away, and out of the question, there is an end of moral agency, and of all virtue and goodness. And I could not call these *foundations,*

dations, at least not *the sole* foundation, purely because they are absolutely necessary to the very being of virtue.

Space is that, *without which there could be no such thing as matter; and on supposition there were no space, there could be no more matter than there could be matter without extension.* Yet if you should conclude, or infer from hence, that space was a foundation, and the sole foundation of matter, you would not discover so fine a genius as you have already done, in what you said of space among your cursory thoughts.

Should a company of ingenious florists dispute with each other concerning the origin or foundation of a flower; and one should lay it in the plant producing the flower; another in the root feeding the plant; another in the earth nourishing the root; another in the specific plastic form of that plant; another in the general laws of vegetation, &c. each of them might justly and pertinently say for his respective principle, that it is *a ground, on which the flower arises; and without which there had been no such flower.* Yet it would be hard to prove of any of these principles singly, that it is *a ground, on which*

the

the flower solely arises, or without which there could be no flower at all.

To give another instance more apposite to our subject. Let us take some art or science; music for instance; and let the query be, what is the true proper foundation of it?

One man conceives it merely as sound, of which indeed it is a species, and so lays *the foundation* of it in the true and immediate cause of sound, or *from whence sound ariseth*, viz. the external motions or vibrations of the medium, through which, or by which, the sense of sound is raised in the ear.

Another conceives it as a sensation different from all other sensations of sound, and distinguishable from them by a certain sweetness and agreeableness, which strongly affects the mind, and sometimes enravishes the soul. Now as there seems no sort of relation or correspondence between the undulations of the air, made by strings or whistles, and this internal grateful sensation, he places the foundation of music in the proper internal structure of the organ, which receiving the external impulses, affects the mind with delight. Hence what *you call* *an Ear*, which is indeed properly

properly a *musical sense*, or taste, in some measure, common to all, but far more exquisite in some than in others. And it is to this alone, be it more or less, that we must refer and ascribe all approbation of harmony, and dislike of discord. The music therefore is in the man, and not in the natural causes of sound, which are the very same way productive of all sounds, whether musical or no.

A third comes, considers the matter more deeply and philosophically ; and after acknowledging all that is said of the origin of sound, and of the necessity and delicacy of this musical sense or taste, concludes notwithstanding, that music is of noble birth, and hath its foundation in the nature of things, in certain eternal and essential proportions and disproportions. He alledges, that from the monochord alone, harmonically divided, arise all the ratios of music ; and though the common practitioners, even the best of them, may be ignorant of this, or may not regard it ; yet mathematicians demonstrate it, and build the whole theory of music upon it.

And lastly, another comes, and says, it is very wrong to lay the foundation of music, as

a liberal science, or practical art, in any of the things above mentioned. For it is owing merely to the invention and WILL of man. *Jubal* was the father of it, and whatsoever improvements have been made in it from time to time, have been owing to human skill and industry, in contriving of instruments, and facilitating practice upon them. That whatever *Euclid*, and other mathematicians might talk in their books of harmonics, yet both the greatest composers, and the best performers in this art, quite neglected the theory, and followed their own taste, and laid down arbitrary rules of composition, whereby some entire species of music, once in vogue, are now become obsolete and impracticable. And more to the same purpose, shewing music to depend upon the will of man.

Now, there is truth in all these allegations, and each of these disputants lays a foundation properly and agreeably to that light, in which he views and considers music. Neither will their doctrine be found to interfere in any thing, but in each man's making his most beloved principle the sole foundation of the whole science. And till they all shall agree in some one notion of music, and abide by some one definition

definition of foundation, they may dispute to the world's end, and be never the nearer coming to an agreement.

Now, why may I not have leave to suspect, that something analogous to this has happened in the controversy about the foundation of moral virtue? That all the writers in it are not yet agreed upon a precise meaning of foundation, I have endeavoured to shew above. And I think they are as little agreed in the definition of virtue itself. One considers it as *a conformity of a reasonable creature to the will of its creator*. He prefers this view as the largest and most universal, and in which obligation seems the strongest, and is most apparent. This leads him to lay the foundation solely in God's will. And to secure it he labours to appropriate all obligation to his way of considering virtue.

Another considers it, and with equal truth and justice, as *the conformity of a reasonable creature to the nature and reasons of things*. He prefers this view as the noblest in his judgment, not only from its necessary connexion with eternal truths, but also from including, as he apprehends, the foundation before mentioned. This leads him to lay his foundation
solely

solely in the essential differences of things and fitnesses resulting from them. Another considers and defines virtue to be *acting agreeably to right reason*, viz. such as man is endowed with, or capable of using; which includes the boni-form faculty or instinct. This he prefers as the most easy and natural way of considering virtue, because these are man's proper and innate faculties; and, without doubt, given to him to be the immediate principles of virtue in him. He must therefore fix his foundation here in man's moral sense.

A fourth comes, and contemplates moral virtue in all these different lights and views. And this leads him to found it in three principles, all coinciding and concurring to its subsistence.

Now there is truth, and there is propriety in all these different ways of considering virtue, and in ascribing to each way of viewing it, a respective proper foundation.

But yet, without first determining in which of these views or lights moral virtue is most properly to be taken and defined, it is in vain to search for the only proper and sole foundation;

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dation ; for one common foundation will not support them all.

Surely there are words in language, that might express to the utmost, what every man means by virtue, and the foundation he ascribes to virtue, in whatever light he views it in. Would it not be better to use these, than hold up a dispute upon terms that are so liable to be taken in different senses by those who use them ?

As to the second question, *Whether moral virtue and moral obligation must have the same foundation, and in the same sense ;* it appears from your answer, that I had reason to make a question of it. For though you are clear, that the nature and reason of things must be the foundation of both ; yet you add, with respect to *obligation*, *but not in such a sense, as that there can be no other foundation of it.* So that whereas moral virtue *arises solely* upon the nature, reason, &c. yet moral obligation arises not *solely*, but *primarily* upon it : or, as I think you explain it afterwards, the obligation arising from hence is antecedent to all other obligations, that may arise from other subsequent foundations of obligation ; and therefore you apprehend, that the essential differences,

ferences, &c. are still the ultimate foundation, or *that*, into which all obligation must at last be resolved.

The truth is, the precise meaning of obligation is as little settled in this part of the enquiry, as that of the term *foundation* was in the last. And it is chiefly owing to the different notions of *obligation*, that we have different foundations assigned to it. Take it in a grammatical sense, and it implies something, that *enforces upon reluctancy*; and in this sense of it (when used in morality) it should seem most properly founded in the sanctions of rewards and punishments; or in the will of him, who has the power to reward or punish.

Take it in a *legal* sense, and it implies an obliger: and there must be two persons at least, that is, two intelligent agents, or two free wills to create obligation in either of them. And in this view obligation in morals will certainly be founded in the will of God.

Take it in a third sense, *viz.* as an unalienable right, that truth has to be preferred before falsehood, good before bad, by all rational creatures that can distinguish them; and then its foundation will be in the essential difference

ferences of things, and their eternal ratios, fitnesses, &c.

Now, I say, if men do reason upon three sorts of *obligation*, why may they not be allowed to conclude upon three sorts of foundations for them?

You yourself acknowledge a secondary obligation, or an *additional* one. But to this you are willing to assign another ground, distinct from, though coinciding with the ground of your primary foundation. This is right and just. And I am apt to think, you will all agree in your grounds, so far as you can all agree what obligation is.

I fancy myself something better prepared, by these previous considerations, to judge of your solution of my third question, *viz. Whether the reason, nature, and fitness of things, considered as antecedent to the divine will, do appear under that consideration, to be obligatory to morality? Or thus: Whether rules of action, and obligations to action, be not quite distinct, and may not have distinct foundations?*

It should seem plain here, that by *rules of action*, I mean eternal truths and fitnesses, and as considered in the mind of God only, to be *future rules of actions*, when things should exist

ist with essential differences, &c. And I ask, whether in this view they carry any thing of *obligation* in them? You reply, you cannot conceive *reasons* or *rules of action* (if they be eternal and immutable reasons) *distinct from obligation to action*. But here you speak of these reasons and rules, *as exhibited in the creation of things, and implying obligation in themselves*, and not as they were proposed to be considered, *viz.* antecedent to God's will; and patterns as it were in the divine mind of *rules*, that were to be hereafter, carrying obligation with them. You add, that laws founded on the *necessary relations and differences of things have from those eternal reasons, a right of obliging moral agents*: but not before they are *laws*, or before they are *promulged*, or before those necessary relations and essential differences do *actually exist*. Again, you say, *what are reasons and rules of action*, if they do not *oblige reasonable beings to act conformably to them*? But they cannot oblige thus, *till there are reasonable beings to conform to them*. Thus it appears, you do not in your answer consider them in that same view, in which I took them, when I asked the question. But indeed in another place afterwards, you answer

swer to my question fully and directly, *viz. It is very true, that obligation could not take place, till God had expressed his will, &c.* And again you speak of *obligation being subsequent to the creation.* But you add to the first of these concessions, that nevertheless the *foundation of obligation* might be antecedent to the divine will, as the ratios themselves were allowed to be. And you add to the second, *that obligation* itself, as founded on these ratios, might perhaps be more properly said to be antecedent to all consideration of the divine will.

You seem well aware of the drift of my question, by throwing in these observations by way of security to your foundation, and to fill up the breach made by the concessions. But I hope you will give me leave to make my inferences also from the point, that is yielded, *viz. that obligation itself could not take place, till God had expressed his will, &c. and was subsequent to the creation,*

And what I would infer from hence is this: That as the essential reasons of things may be considered to have been once a rule of action prior to any obligation to action; and as obligation itself did not arise or take place, till the discovery of God's will agreeable to that rule,

in

in the creation ; there is no impropriety in saying, that the rule of morality is most naturally resolvable into those eternal reasons of things, and the obligation to morality into the divine will.

But I must not pass over what *you* are pleased to observe, immediately after the concessions above-mentioned, *viz.* that the eternal ratios are, notwithstanding, the foundation of moral obligation, as being themselves antecedent to the divine will ; and that the *obligation* to conform to them may perhaps be properly said to be antecedent to all consideration of the divine will, or to any prospect of reward or punishment.

When in this argument from the ratios being *antecedent*, you say, *they are allowed to be so* ; I ought to explain how far *allowed*, *viz.* antecedent to the exercise or discovery of the divine will in the creation ; but not antecedent to all consideration of the divine will, which was as eternal, and as immutable, as they. I was putting a query upon your own hypothesis, not intending to grant any real or proper antecedence in the ratios to God's will ; but making a supposition of it, to see whether,

upon

upon your own principles, any obligation would follow from it.

The query was, whether the reason, nature, and fitness of things, *when considered* as antecedent to the divine will, do appear, *under that consideration*, to be obligatory to morality. Now it seems upon a discussion of this query, it appears, that they are not *obligatory themselves under this consideration*, but they are nevertheless a *foundation of obligation*. That obligation could not take place, till these ratios were exhibited in God's works, is what you allow. And that they are in some sense a foundation of obligation, I will not deny. But if you make them as you do in one place, the *primary foundation*, and in another the *ultimate foundation of obligation*, I must beg leave to doubt of this.

For, as I observed upon the second question, they can only be considered as a foundation of obligation, in one particular sense of obligation among three senses that it is taken in, *viz.* the unalienable right that truth has to be preferred before falsehood, by reasonable creatures, that can distinguish one from the other. Many there are indeed, who will by no means allow

this to be *obligation* at all. But if they will not allow the word, they will scarce deny the thing, *viz.* such a claim upon all beings, endowed with reason and free will, as is tantamount to what they call *obligation*. Therefore, I do with you give it the name of *obligation* also; and acknowledge a foundation of this species of obligation, in the eternal ratios. But then as this is neither the principal, nor the most common and proper sense of obligation; and as there are other foundations for it, (as I think you allow) in those other senses of it; you must not lay too great a stress on this foundation, which is only partial; nor extend it too far. Your argument for its being the *primary foundation of obligation* from our perceptions of duty in the essential differences, &c. previous to our discovery, that they are also the will of God, is not, I think, sufficient to entitle it to the *primacy*: which the moral sense in that view would claim before it, as being the first foundation of obligation, or the first principle, that lays men under moral obligations. And this would be resolved easier into will, than into the essential differences; though indeed they both have a necessary relation to it.

The

The sum of all that I mean to advertise you of in these reflections, however coarsely and inaccurately thrown together, is this :

That the notions of *foundations* and *obligations* are not yet sufficiently settled. That from the best judgment I can make of the issue of this controversy, from the various and different acceptations those terms appear to be taken in, it will be this : That the *principal*, not the *sole* foundation of moral virtue, are the essential differences of things, and fitnesses resulting necessarily from them ; but not considered as separate, or possibly separable from the will of God.

And that the *principal*, not the *sole foundation* of moral obligation is the will of God ; but not considered as separate, or possibly separable from the eternal and immutable ratios of things.

And that the only proper ultimate foundation of moral virtue and moral obligation, is God himself; the only true fountain both of wisdom and goodness, and every thing that is either perfect, true, or right in physics, metaphysics, or morals. He is *all* in *all*, the first cause, and sole origin of *all*.

Accept these hints with candor from him who is an admirer of your reasonings and writings.

Sept. 1743.

T. SHARP.

*Mrs Cockburn's second Letter to the Rev. Dr
Thomas Sharp.*

October 14, 1743.

REV. SIR,

‘ I. **T**HOUGH I fear I am but ill
‘ qualified to continue a debate
‘ with you, who appear to have been more
‘ conversant than I with the writers on the
‘ subjects we are enquiring about; and to have
‘ gone into nicer distinctions, and more re-
‘ mote views of them, than I have had occa-
‘ sion to consider: yet I beg leave once more
‘ to lay before you my plain apprehensions up-
‘ on those *farther thoughts* you have conde-
‘ scended to favour me with.

‘ 2. After setting down what I apprehend
‘ the writers on the subject of moral virtue
‘ understand by the word *foundation*, viz.

‘ *The*

‘ *The ground on which virtue solely arises ; you*
‘ *are pleased to ask, but are they agreed, whe-*
‘ *ther this ground be any one simple principle, or*
‘ *compounded of more principles than one ? To*
‘ *which I answer, no certainly. They are far*
‘ *from agreeing, whether this ground is the*
‘ *reason and nature of things, the will of God,*
‘ *the moral sense, or all three united ; for*
‘ *that is the very matter in dispute. But then,*
‘ *Sir, I do not take these to be different senses of*
‘ *the word foundation : all these writers seem*
‘ *to me to agree in their general idea of a foun-*
‘ *dation, and each of them to apply that word*
‘ *in the very same sense to his own principle,*
‘ *as the ground upon which he thinks virtue*
‘ *solely arises. Even your skilful writer, I*
‘ *doubt not, would adhere to this definition,*
‘ *and apply it to his three principles, without*
‘ *excluding the term solely. So that I cannot*
‘ *yet see, that there is the least ambiguity in*
‘ *the word foundation, or that any explication*
‘ *of it could at all contribute to adjust the dif-*
‘ *ferent opinions on this subject. But if you*
‘ *could persuade the maintainers of them to*
‘ *agree in applying the word foundation to*
‘ *some one or more of the principles contend-*

‘ ed for, that would indeed effectually end
 ‘ the dispute ; for there the disagreement lies,
 ‘ which does not, as I conceive, at all affect
 ‘ the sense or meaning of the word *founda-*
 ‘ *tion*.

‘ 3. As to those, whom you suppose to have
 ‘ different conceptions of that word, because
 ‘ one considers it as the ground, from which
 ‘ virtue *immediately* arises, and another con-
 ‘ siders it as a more *remote* ground, on which
 ‘ it arises, by the *intervention of some medi-*
 ‘ *ums* : I confess I do not well apprehend the
 ‘ use of mediums for the production of vir-
 ‘ tue, if a sufficient ground of it is allowed,
 ‘ into which it is most ultimately resolved.
 ‘ But as I have had no occasion to consider
 ‘ these nice distinctions, which have not come
 ‘ in my way, I may be in danger of blunder-
 ‘ ing about them, and therefore shall only
 ‘ say, that I imagine these authors may agree
 ‘ in their idea of foundation, as *a real ground*
 ‘ *on which virtue arises*, though one excludes,
 ‘ and another admits the intervention of me-
 ‘ diums, which do not hinder the ground
 ‘ from remaining immoveably the same.

‘ 4. You

‘ 4. You next object to the *explanation* of
‘ my ground, viz. *that, without which, there could*
‘ *be no such thing as virtue*; that this seems
‘ not to enter into *their* notion of foundation,
‘ who place it in self-love, and self-interest;
‘ for virtue, you say, even according to them,
‘ may be considered as *disinterested*.

‘ 5. Now here again, Sir, you are got
‘ among authors that I am a stranger to;
‘ for though I have met with several, who
‘ make *self-interest* the foundation of *moral ob-*
‘ *ligation*, I know of none who make it the
‘ foundation of *virtue*. This those writers
‘ commonly deduce from the will of God.
‘ But if those you speak of, *found virtue on*
‘ *self-interest*, and yet allow, that it may be con-
‘ sidered as *disinterested*; there must be such
‘ inconsistencies in their schemes, and such
‘ confusion in their ideas, both of *virtue* and
‘ *foundation*, that I will not pretend to answer
‘ for what they may mean by either.

‘ 6. But on this occasion, Sir, I am obli-
‘ ged to take notice of a mistake you have
‘ made in setting down as my words, that the
‘ foundation of *moral virtue*, upon further
‘ reflection, will be found to lie, either in the

' essential differences, &c. or in self-love and
 ' self-interest; upon which you remark, *but*
 ' *not in the same sense of foundation.* Now,
 ' Sir, if you please to look once more into my
 ' last paper, you will find, that those words
 ' were spoke of *moral obligation*, not of *mo-*
 ' *ral virtue*; for I had no notion of any one's
 ' founding *virtue* on self-love and self-interest.
 ' And as to your remark, there was no occa-
 ' sion to consider, in what sense foundation
 ' might be applied to those principles, since
 ' my only intention was to engage you on the
 ' side of the essential differences, by observing,
 ' that *obligation* must either be founded on
 ' them, or on those *low principles* which you
 ' had before agreed with me in rejecting.

' 7. Again, you object to my explaining the
 ' word foundation, by calling it *that, without*
 ' *which there could be no such thing as virtue,*
 ' that the same may be said of free will, or
 ' of reason in moral agents: supposing them
 ' away, there is an end of moral agency, an
 ' end of all virtue. And yet you conclude, I
 ' would not call these foundations, at least
 ' not the *sole* foundation, *purely because they*
 ' *are absolutely necessary to the very being of vir-*
 ' *tue.*

‘ *tue*. Reason and free-will I acknowledge,
‘ Sir, to be absolutely necessary to *moral agen-*
‘ *cy*: they are qualifications, without which
‘ there could be no such thing as *the practice*
‘ of *virtue*, and may, if you please, be called
‘ *foundations of virtuous practice*. But that is
‘ quite another idea, than *the general abstract*
‘ *nature of virtue*, the foundation of which
‘ we are enquiring about; and to the consti-
‘ tuting or production of virtue in this sense,
‘ I see not that any thing can be necessary, or
‘ at all contribute, but the immutable rela-
‘ tions and essential differences of things,
‘ from which virtue, considered in its *abstract*
‘ *nature*, directly and solely arises. If this
‘ idea were strictly kept to, as it ought to be
‘ in the question concerning the origin of vir-
‘ tue, there would perhaps have been less dis-
‘ agreement about it; for I apprehend there
‘ has been much ambiguity in the use of the
‘ term *virtue*, though I cannot perceive any in
‘ that of the word *foundation*.

‘ 8. But to go on with your objections, *space*,
‘ you say, is that *without which there could be no*
‘ *such thing as matter*: yet you suppose I would
‘ not infer from hence, that *space was a foun-*
‘ *dation*,

‘ *dation, and the sole foundation of matter.* So
 ‘ far from it, Sir, that I cannot consider space as
 ‘ having any thing at all to do with the *pro-*
 ‘ *duction* of matter; and therefore I should
 ‘ rather chuse to say with respect to them,
 ‘ that *the existence of matter supposed*, the exi-
 ‘ stence of space must be likewise admitted.
 ‘ But the dependance of virtue on the essen-
 ‘ tial differences, &c, is of quite another na-
 ‘ ture, since it entirely derives its being from
 ‘ them.

‘ 9. If your ingenious florists, who dispute
 ‘ about the origin of a flower, or the admirers
 ‘ of music, whose inquiry into the true *foun-*
 ‘ *dation* of it you so elegantly describe, are
 ‘ agreed, that the thing they seek for is, *the*
 ‘ *ground on which the flower, or the music solely*
 ‘ *arises*, or, *that to which either owes its being*:
 ‘ then it should seem plain, that they are all a-
 ‘ greed in the sense of the word *foundation*,
 ‘ and only differ about the thing to which it
 ‘ may be most properly applied. And if their
 ‘ error lies in each man’s making his beloved
 ‘ principle the *sole foundation* of the flower,
 ‘ or of the music; when various principles
 ‘ contribute to their respective beings; then
 ‘ this

‘ this controversy is not to be decided by the
‘ definition of a foundation, the general idea
‘ of which will agree indifferently to one or
‘ more principles ; but till they can convince
‘ each other, either that some one, or more,
‘ or all the principles together, go to the pro-
‘ duction of the flower, or the music ; they
‘ may indeed *dispute to the world's end*, not-
‘ withstanding the exactest agreement in their
‘ idea of *foundation*. A company of archi-
‘ tects might dispute for ever, whether stone,
‘ or brick, or wood, or all together, were
‘ the properest foundation for a house ; and
‘ yet have all the very same idea of foun-
‘ dation, as *that on which a house is solely erect-*
‘ *ed*. And this, Sir, I apprehend to be pret-
‘ ty nearly a parallel case with that of the con-
‘ tenders about the *foundation of moral vir-*
‘ *tue*, who, I cannot but think, are gene-
‘ rally agreed in the precise meaning of that
‘ word.

‘ 10. But now, Sir, it is not the same as to
‘ the term *virtue*, which you next consider ;
‘ for I am apt to think there is a great deal of
‘ ambiguity in the use of *that*, as I hinted
‘ before. Not but I am persuaded, that most
‘ people

‘ people are agreed in their general notion of
‘ the *nature* of virtue ; but when writers come
‘ to contend about the foundation of it, they
‘ are apt to substitute in place of the *nature*
‘ of virtue, either our *idea* of it, or the *prac-*
‘ *tice* of it by moral agents. And this per-
‘ haps may have been some occasion of their
‘ assigning different foundations to virtue ;
‘ for our *idea* of virtue, or our *practice* of it,
‘ may arise from other *grounds* than that on
‘ which the *abstract nature* of virtue is found-
‘ ed. And these different senses of the term
‘ *virtue* may occasion likewise various *definiti-*
‘ *ons* of it, every one defining it according to
‘ the light he has viewed it in, and to the
‘ foundation he has given it in that view. For
‘ you may be pleased to observe, that the se-
‘ veral definitions you have instanced in, are
‘ rather *determinations of the foundation* of
‘ virtue, than *explications of its nature*. For
‘ instance, to say that virtue is *a conformity of*
‘ *a reasonable creature to the will of its creator*,
‘ is the same as to say, that the will of the
‘ creator is the foundation of virtue : but this
‘ gives us no manner of light into the *nature*
‘ of virtue, till we are informed by other
‘ means

means what the will of the creator is, and
and therefore is no proper definition of it.
The same may be said of the rest, except-
ing only that, which considers virtue as *the*
conformity of a reasonable creature to the na-
ture and reason of things; for that directly
acquaints us with the nature of virtue. It
is true, this definition determines likewise
the foundation of virtue, which in this con-
troversy is a kind of *begging the question*: but
then it may be said in excuse of this, (what
cannot be said for any of the others) that it
is scarce possible to give a just and proper de-
finition of virtue, without expressing its re-
lation to the nature and essential differences
of things. And this too may serve as a
proof, that virtue owes its origin solely to
them, since the consideration of them enters
necessarily into the just idea of its essence.
And give me leave to say, that even in the
different views, according to which the seve-
ral writers have defined virtue, the reasons
and immutable nature of things might be
(what you think it is in vain to search for) a
common foundation to support them all: all
may

' may easily be resolved into them, and se-
' curely rest upon them.

' 11. I agree with you, Sir, that the pre-
' cise meaning of *obligation* is as little settled,
' as you suppose that of the term foundation
' to be : and yet I cannot think with you, that
' it is chiefly owing to the different notions of
' obligation, that we have different foundati-
' ons assigned to it ; for I have all along allow-
' ed, that there are several *grounds* of obliga-
' tion, though I have constantly kept to one
' precise meaning of that term. And accord-
' ing to my apprehensions of this matter, there
' can be but *one sort of obligation*, if there were
' fifty different foundations of it. What you
' call three sorts of obligation seems to me
' three sorts of foundations, upon which obli-
' gation in *one and the same sense* may, and
' does arise. Obligation surely is, or ought
' to be the same idea, whatever is supposed to
' be the foundation of it. I acknowledge,
' that the precise meaning of it has not been
' scientifically settled, and that some have ob-
' scured, and others begged the question by
' defining it ; but I do not find, that any mis-
' understandings have happened in the contro-

' verly

‘ verify from these defects. I believe, Sir, you
‘ will allow, that people in common discourse
‘ understand one another well enough, when
‘ they say they are *under an obligation* to do
‘ such or such a thing, though perhaps they
‘ could not define the word. And so writers
‘ on the subject may be sufficiently agreed in
‘ the general meaning of the word, to talk
‘ to the purpose about it without explaining it;
‘ which some of the best of those on Dr
‘ Clarke’s side of the question seem to have
‘ thought unnecessary, by their neglecting to
‘ do it. And this has been complained of by
‘ one of their adversaries, who himself defines
‘ obligation to be *such a necessity of action, as*
‘ *is consistent with liberty*: which I think does
‘ not make the term more intelligible than it
‘ was. Others of them tell us, they mean by
‘ it *a necessity of action arising from a*
‘ *prospect of obtaining happiness, or avoid-*
‘ *ing misery*. And this I take to be beg-
‘ ging the question in favour of their belo-
‘ ved principle. But the most accurate and
‘ judicious writer on Dr Clarke’s side, that I
‘ have met with, defines obligation to be *a state*
‘ *of the mind, into which it is brought by the per-*
‘ *ception*

‘ception of a plain reason for acting or forbear-
‘ing to act, arising from the nature, circumstan-
‘ces, or relations of persons or things. Yet I
‘think this defective, as not explaining what
‘that state of mind is, in which he places ob-
‘ligation ; besides that it is a kind of determi-
‘ning the foundation he assigns to it, which is
‘the subject of debate, and the fault I obser-
‘ved in their adversaries. After so many great
‘names as have engaged in this controversy,
‘I have not ventured upon any definition of
‘obligation in my *remarks*, nor did any occa-
‘sion for it offer. But since we are now up-
‘on the unsettled meaning of that term, I
‘take the liberty, Sir, to lay before you the
‘explanation I would chuse to give it, and
‘leave to your judgment, whether it is less
‘exceptionable than those I have objected a-
‘gainst. By obligation then I understand,
‘*such a perception of an inducement to act,*
‘*or to forbear acting, as forces an agent to*
‘*stand self-condemned, if he does not conform to*
‘*it.* This I think expresses that *state of mind,*
‘which my admired author hints at ; and it
‘determines no particular foundation, though
‘it may suit with them all ; and therefore it
‘ might

‘ might be equally received by the maintainers
‘ of each. But I much doubt whether their
‘ agreement in this meaning of *obligation*
‘ would bring them all to agree in the *grounds*
‘ from which it arises.

‘ 12. We are now come, Sir, to the last
‘ and most important question between us,
‘ whether the reason, nature, and fitness of
‘ things, considered as antecedent to the di-
‘ vine will, do appear under *that consideration*,
‘ to be obligatory to morality? or whether
‘ rules of action, &c. In my answer to this,
‘ it seems, I have not considered eternal rules
‘ in the same view in which you took them,
‘ when you asked the question. I confess,
‘ Sir, I did not consider them in the view you
‘ have now explained them; for I did not ap-
‘ prehend, that you intended to enquire, whe-
‘ ther the eternal reasons of things were *obli-*
‘ *gatory* before there were any creatures capa-
‘ ble of obligation; or, that you meant by
‘ *antecedent to the will*, antecedent to his will
‘ *as expressed in the creation*. These are remote
‘ views, in which I had never before occasion
‘ to consider things, except with respect to the
‘ Deity himself, who is said to be eternally obli-

‘ged by the eternal ratios : but in that I do
 ‘not see, that the present controversy is direct-
 ‘ly concerned.

‘That, which Dr *Clarke* and his followers
 ‘maintain, is, that the immutable nature and
 ‘truth of things have, in themselves, an ob-
 ‘ligatory power, to which all reasonable be-
 ‘ings ought to conform ; and that this right
 ‘of theirs is antecedent to the divine will,
 ‘that is, to any *declaration* of it, by an *expli-*
 ‘*cite* command to practice moral duties ; ante-
 ‘cedent to all *consideration* of the will of God
 ‘in them, or of reward and punishment an-
 ‘nexed to the observance or neglect of them.
 ‘This is plainly their meaning. But when
 ‘their adversaries support the contrary doctrine
 ‘by arguing, that the relations and fitnesses of
 ‘things, and the obligation to conform to
 ‘them, are *consequences of the determination of*
 ‘*the will of God in the creation*, and therefore
 ‘cannot be antecedent to his will ; they put a
 ‘manifest fallacy upon their readers (which
 ‘perhaps they themselves are not aware of)
 ‘by substituting a quite different consideration
 ‘of things, in the room of that, which they
 ‘pretend to oppose, *viz.* particular existences,
 ‘for

' for general *abstract* ideas ; and the will of God,
 ' as exprest in the creation, for the will of
 ' God *explicitly discovered* by the command of
 ' moral duties. The question surely is not,
 ' whether the eternal reasons of things were
 ' obligatory to reasonable creatures, before the
 ' will of God had brought any such into exist-
 ' ence ; for who ever supposed this ? But if
 ' God created a system of beings, conforma-
 ' bly to certain relations and fitnesses eternally
 ' perceived by the divine understanding ; and
 ' he gave them no other law but what result-
 ' ed from their nature, discoverable by their
 ' natural faculties : Then the query is, whe-
 ' ther that law of nature does not *in itself* o-
 ' blige them to conform to it, before any disco-
 ' very *either by reason* or revelation of the will
 ' of God concerning it ? To urge, in answer
 ' to this, that *the will of God is expressed in the*
 ' *creation, exhibiting those relations and fitnesses,*
 ' &c. is a plain fallacy (though it has passed
 ' unobserved) for the will of God, *as expressed*
 ' *in the creation*, is the very same with that
 ' reason and truth of things, which are said
 ' to be obligatory *as such*, without *considering*
 ' them as the will of God. They are indeed

‘ perfectly conformable to the will of God,
 ‘ but not *explicitly discovered* to be so, or con-
 ‘ sidered under that formality ; yet have a right
 ‘ *in themselves* of obliging moral agents, when-
 ‘ ever any such exist, independently of any con-
 ‘ sideration of the will of God in them : So,
 ‘ that, though obligation could not take place,
 ‘ as I observed, till God had exhibited those
 ‘ eternal ratios in a system of beings con-
 ‘ formable to them ; still the rule of their
 ‘ duty, and their obligation to conform to it,
 ‘ must, as I apprehend, be ultimately resol-
 ‘ ved into those eternal truths, according to
 ‘ which they were formed, and by which
 ‘ they were left to discover what course of
 ‘ action their nature required of them to fol-
 ‘ low. And all I think, that can be justly
 ‘ *inferred* from obligation’s being *subsequent to*
 ‘ *the creation*, is, that the *existence* of creatures,
 ‘ *capable of obligation*, is solely resolvable into
 ‘ the divine will.

‘ What I have said, Sir, will, I hope, set
 ‘ me right in your thoughts as to any mistake I
 ‘ may have been in of your meaning, or any
 ‘ misapprehension you may have had of mine ;
 ‘ though I do not minutely go through every
 ‘ particular

‘ particular relating to them, for fear of being
‘ tedious, and giving you too much trouble.
‘ But I beg leave to take notice of a *distinction*
‘ you have supposed for me, where I intended
‘ none. You are pleased to say, that on the
‘ discussion of this last query, *it appears, that*
‘ *they, viz. the reason, nature, and fitness of*
‘ *things, when considered as antecedent to the*
‘ *divine will, are not obligatory themselves, but*
‘ *they are nevertheless a foundation of obligation.*
‘ Now, Sir, as I have all along maintained,
‘ that those eternal ratios are absolutely *obliga-*
‘ *tory* under every consideration ; when I said
‘ they were *foundations of obligation*, I took
‘ that to be an equivalent expression with the
‘ other, and therefore used them indifferently,
‘ designing no distinction ; and wherever I
‘ have affirmed, that any principle is a *founda-*
‘ *tion of moral obligation*, I beg to be under-
‘ stood, that it is *obligatory to morality*.

‘ You tell me, Sir, that you will not deny,
‘ that the eternal ratios are, in *some sense*, a
‘ foundation of obligation ; but if I make
‘ them the *primary* and the *ultimate* founda-
‘ tion, of this you must doubt. Now if they
‘ are neither the one nor the other of these, I
‘ cannot

' cannot guess in *what sense* you allow them to
 ' be a foundation at all. You add, that as
 ' you observed upon the second question, they
 ' can only be considered as a foundation of ob-
 ' ligation in one particular sense of obligation,
 ' among three senses that it is taken in. But
 ' here the difference between us is, that what
 ' you call three *senses of obligation*, I look up-
 ' on as three *distinct foundations* of it, and al-
 ' low them all to be properly such. *The right*
 ' *that truth has to be preferred before falsehood,*
 ' is according to my apprehension, not obliga-
 ' tion, but a *ground from whence obligation a-*
 ' *rises*; and this I must have leave to call the
 ' *ultimate foundation* of it, or that into which
 ' all obligation must be resolved, since the mo-
 ' ral sense, and even the will of God, can on-
 ' ly oblige, in virtue of reason, and truth, and
 ' the fitness of things.

' 14. What you say of the claim the *moral*
 ' *sense* would have to the *primary* by my ar-
 ' gument, as the first principle, that lays men
 ' under moral obligation, I think, may ad-
 ' mit of a doubt: It seems to depend so much on
 ' custom, education, &c. that I apprehended
 ' it rather to be a *consequence* of the perception,
 ' which

‘ which every rational mind has, in some de-
‘ gree, of the essential difference of good and
‘ evil. However, I was only taking no-
‘ tice, that our knowledge of duty, by those
‘ essential differences, was previous to our dis-
‘ covery of *the will of God* in them, and that
‘ therefore they were a foundation of obliga-
‘ tion prior to it.

‘ 15. And now, Sir, however we may differ
‘ about the use of terms in this controversy ;
‘ and though I must still maintain, that the es-
‘ sential differences of things are the *sole* foun-
‘ dation of moral virtue (the nature of which
‘ I cannot apprehend to depend on *will*, being
‘ eternally what it is in the divine understand-
‘ ing) and that I must likewise consider them
‘ as the *ultimate*, though not the *sole* foundati-
‘ on of moral obligation ; yet I intirely agree
‘ with you in your conclusion, *that the only*
‘ *proper ultimate foundation of moral virtue,*
‘ *and moral obligation, is God himself, the foun-*
‘ *tain of every thing that is perfect, true, or*
‘ *right, &c.* All essential truths are but the
‘ necessary perceptions of the *eternal mind* ;
‘ and acting agreeably to them is acting in con-
‘ formity with the most *perfect will*. So that

‘ I hope, Sir, you will allow, that virtue and
 ‘ obligation cannot have a more sacred or di-
 ‘ vine origin, than that, which the followers
 ‘ of Dr *Clarke* assign them; and if you cannot
 ‘ altogether agree with them, you will at least
 ‘ excuse the short sighted views of one, who
 ‘ would gladly see things in the same light
 ‘ with you, of whose judgment and candor
 ‘ I have the highest esteem, and am,

S I R,

Your most humble servant,

C. COCKBURN.

*Reply to Mrs Cockburn's second Paper about
 the foundation of moral virtue and moral ob-
 ligation.*

MADAM,

I AM greatly indebted to you for explain-
 ing to me some points in your own writ-
 ings, which I had mistaken; and for defi-
 ning some of your terms to prevent my fur-
 ther mistakes; and for the candid and inge-
 nious

nious manner, in which you have replied to every thing, that I had put queries upon in my late letter to you.

The benefit arising from these effects of your communicative disposition is, that I understand your writings on this subject, and the drift of them, better than I did before.

You have given me no small satisfaction by explaining what you mean by moral fitnesses being *antecedent to the divine will*; for I conceived, that Dr *Clarke* and his followers had spoke of *their antecedency to God's will*, in such a manner as implied their being some way independent on God himself. But your agreeing with me intirely in this point, *that the only proper ultimate foundation of moral virtue, and moral obligation is God himself, &c.* has eased me of the only painful thought I had in the controversy. For, so long as this divine origin is assigned to them, I am little solicitous about the events of any disputes concerning things, that men are pleased to call *foundations* in some more qualified, or limited sense.

In your appendix to your *Remarks* in the *Works of the Learned*, (which was added to them after I had the favour of perusing them
in

in MS. and which was occasioned, as I apprehend, at least that part, which explains *antecedency*, by what I had said in that letter to Mr Cockburn, which accompanied your MS. when I returned it) you are pleased to say, that the *antecedency Dr Clarke and his followers speak of, respects only the explicate declarations of God's will by the command of moral virtues: And that the will of God, as exprest, or rather implied in the creation, is the very same with that reason and truth of things, which are said to be obligatory as such*, p. 159. And to the same effect you speak in your letter to me. I gladly lay hold of your authority for Dr Clarke's sense of *antecedency*, and I heartily approve your remark, that follows, that *God's will as expressed, &c.* Now as I had no apprehension till I read this appendix, and your late letter to me, that this was your sense of *antecedent, &c.* you will the more readily excuse, what I needlessly said upon another supposition.

Another thing you have informed me of, in which I was greatly mistaken, *viz.* that in this enquiry into the true ground of virtue, you do not consider it as *in practice*, but *in its general abstract*

abstract nature. This distinction very much alters the question from what I conceived it to be. And had I been aware of this before, it would have prevented much of what I said, on presumption, that *practical virtue* (by which I mean *virtue in practice*) was the thing of which the proper foundation was sought.

All that I have further to wish, is, that every body, who engages in this dispute, would explain as freely and as fully as you have done, what they precisely mean by their terms, and in what particular light they consider the subject, *viz.* what they include in, or exclude from their consideration of it. By this means, we should not only come sooner to every writer's true meaning, but probably find a way opened to bring them to an agreement. For, as each person might perhaps be found to argue justly from his own principles, and upon his own conceptions; so each person's principles and reasonings upon them might perhaps stand allowed in that sense he maintains them, without overturning, or even clashing with the principles and conclusions of others, who consider the same subject in a
different

different light, and use terms in a different sense.

It was upon this conjecture, that I suggested to you in my first paper, the usefulness of setting out with an enquiry into the meaning of the first term in the question, *foundation*, as it is used by the several writers in this controversy; and when that was determined, I proposed to proceed to another question, the solution of which would become more easy after the sense of the first term was ascertained. And so on to a third point. This occasioned the agreeable correspondence I have had with you, wherein you have given me great light into your own refined and just sentiments upon the subjects in the particular view you hold it in. But I have not yet received all the satisfaction I wished for in my enquiry after the sense of *foundation* in this dispute. You are pleased indeed to give me your own sense of it, which I thank you for, nor have I any right to ask more of you: And you also apply it justly and properly to your own sense of the term virtue, viz. *considered in its general abstract nature*. But when you suppose, that all other writers use *foundation* in the very same sense

sense that you do, and would abide by your definition of it; when you say, that there is no ambiguity in it; that no misapprehension has arisen from it; that no explanation of it could at all contribute to adjust the different opinions on this subject; you do indeed almost silence me from the deference I pay to your opinion, as such; but as you have given it me hitherto only as your opinion, without any reasons to support it, I am yet at liberty to elicit them, for my own further satisfaction, if I can.

If the words of writers on morality are not always to be taken in the common acceptance, (as Mr E. L. and yourself agree *, P. 102, *Works of the Learned*, 1743) but in the sense most agreeable to the apparent scope of their writings; and if a word, metaphorically used, may be applied to different things, and yet not just in the same sense: Why may it not happen, that in the metaphorical use of the word *foundation*, different writers shall not have the same precise idea of the term? What any of them mean by it, may be best collected, if they do not otherwise explain

* Vol. i. p. 402 of the present edition.

themselves, from the things they apply it to. And it is my observation of their different applications of it, which creates my suspicion, that they do not agree, as they should, in the idea of it. And if I were penetrating enough to discern where this disagreement lay, I should hope to contribute not a little towards adjusting their different opinions about the main subject.

I had offered at a distinction of *foundations*, even upon your own definition of that term, into *immediate* or *proximate*, and *remote* or *original*. You seem to think this can do no service. My not explaining it by instances has left it under the appearance of a nice, perhaps an arbitrary and useless distinction.

Is not *foundation*, when applied to *faith*, altogether as intelligible and determinate, as when it is applied to *virtue*? Yet if I should say there is *no ambiguity* in it, or difference about it, Mr *Hooker* would admonish me; who, in a dispute about the *foundation* of *faith*, has these words.

“ Let us see (says he) what the *foundation*
 “ of *faith* is. If it does import the general
 “ ground, whereupon we rest, when we do
 “ believe;

“ believe ; the writings of the Evangelists and
“ the Apostles are the foundation of the
“ *Christian* faith. But if the name of *founda-*
“ *tion* do note the principle thing, which is
“ believed, then is the foundation of our
“ faith, God made manifest in the flesh.”

p. 499.

Here are two senses of *foundation* very judiciously distinguished ; and the more so, because, as I imagine, he grounds this distinction upon the words of a much greater writer than himself, who, comparing the *Christian* church, or the congregation of believers to an edifice, uses the word *foundation*, in a sense as near the primary and literal, as it is capable of in a figure. “ As a wise master-builder, I
“ have laid the *foundation* : and *other founda-*
“ *tion* can no man lay, but what is laid, which
“ is *Jesus Christ*.” And yet he speaks in another place of *another foundation* for this same edifice ; which, he says, “ is built on *the founda-*
“ *dation* of the apostles and prophets, *Jesus*
“ *Christ* himself being the chief corner stone,” viz. which unites both *Old* and *New-Testament* into a strong foundation, and cements the whole building both of believing *Jews* and
Gentiles.

Gentiles. Here is *foundation* and *foundation*. Both real ones, though not the same; yet justly applied to the same subject; the one as *principal*, the other as *subordinate*: or, to use a distinction I made before, upon your definition of *foundation*; the one, “as a ground “*from which* the thing said to be founded “immediately and directly arises; and the “other, as a ground on which it stands, by the “intervention of mediums, as upon its original *foundation*.”

Is there no room for any distinction of this kind in the dispute about the foundations of virtue?

Once more: I find your admired writer obliged to have recourse to another distinction of *foundation*, when his opponent had mistaken his use of that word, in an application of it to a *Thesis*. “*Foundation*, says he, when “it is applied figuratively to a *Thesis*, signifies “either the support of it, or the orderly introduction to it.” It seems his antagonist not attending to this distinction, had imagined, that *foundation of the Thesis* (as it stood undefined in the *Divine Legation*) meant the support of the *Thesis*. Whereas the author meant

meant no more than the *orderly introduction* to it.

May we not from hence reasonably presume, that the writers in morality do not *all*, much less *always*, use the same term *foundation* in their *figurative applications* of it, in the very same signification; though they do not intimate any distinction or difference, than what may be collected from the application itself?

There is an admired writer of the last mentioned author, for whom I have also an equal esteem, that uses *foundation*, as I think, in two different senses: In one, when applied to the abstract nature of virtue, and means *the ground, on which virtue solely arises; or, that, without which there could be no such thing as virtue.* And in another, when applied to obligation, of which she supposes there may be *many foundations*; and consequently it cannot be said of any *one* of them, that it is *the ground, on which obligation solely arises, or that, without which there could be no such thing as obligation.* Therefore, till this other sense of foundation be also explained to us, we must gather it as well as we can from the application itself, in

which view I conceive, she means no more by it than *sufficient motive*, or *reasonable inducement*, in which sense it is very often taken.

It is not my intention to uphold any dispute with you, Madam, not even on the main subject, much less upon the signification of terms, which would not have been worth my mentioning to you at first, but for a conceit, that something more material depended thereon. And as my only aim in what I have submitted, and do now submit to your better judgment, is to discover, if I can, whether too careless and lax an use of terms has not been one occasion, perhaps a principal one, of disagreement among writers; and consequently, whether the fixing their import with greater exactness and precision, than the several writers have commonly done, may not help very much towards finding out where the truth lies among various sentiments, which yet perhaps are not so various, if each were rightly understood: as this I say, is my only scope, I persuade myself you will bear with my giving you my own sense of the matter more fully.

Foundation, although, in its first proper and literal sense, *as a ground or bottom, whereon a build-*

a building is erected, or any heavy body stands or rests, as upon its proper basis, it conveys always the same idea ; yet *the figurative* use of it will be found to be of two sorts ; one more proper, the other less proper.

The more proper is, when it is figuratively applied to kingdom, empire, city, &c. and signifies the first establishment of such civil constitution : Or to hospital, college, school, or lecture, &c. and signifies the settlement of a revenue to support such particular community or institution ; or to history, poem, drama, &c. and signifies the subject, matter, groundwork, or plot ; or to reasoning and argument, and signifies postulatum, or first principles laid down to be argued from, &c. In all which instances, something is conceived to be raised as a superstructure, upon what is called the foundation. And thus authorities, and proofs, upon which any thing can be figuratively said to be built, become figuratively foundations.

The less proper is when, it is put for the root, or source, from which any thing has its rise and beginning, or springs, or is deduced. And in this sense it is applied to *first occasions*

and *introductions*, &c. considered as the origins of some things, and to *motives*, *inducements*, &c. considered as the springs of action; and to *designs* and *ends*, considered either as the *occasions* of, or the *motives* to the doing of such things, as are ascribed to such views.

And we are so far reconciled by use to these applications of foundation, though they are the less proper, as to prefer them sometimes before the former, or more proper. When we speak of the ground or foundation of a quarrel or a dispute, we chuse to understand it rather of the first occasion, that brought it on, than of subject-matter of it, or the difference of sentiments in the contending parties.

And here I cannot help remarking, that the words, which literally signify *rise*, or *beginning* in the *Latin* and *Greek* Tongues; (viz. *principium* and ἀρχή) are figuratively used for *foundation*. So that to lay a *beginning* in *Greek*, is to lay a *foundation*. And both in *Latin* and in *English* we hear as much (at least among philosophers) of *building* upon *principles*, as *deducing* from them.

In a word, I take both *principle* and *foundation* in its metaphorical usage, to be terms
of

of much the same latitude with *cause*, and to admit of as great a variety of distinctions; because there is scarce any thing that can be called *a cause*, which may not be called in some sense or other a *principle*, or a *foundation*; having as near a relation, and the same kind of relation, to that, which is built upon it, or is deducible from it, as *cause* hath to its *effect*.

It is true, the logicians have found it necessary, in order to determine certain precise meanings of the general term *cause*, and to prevent confusion in the various uses of it, to distinguish and sub-distinguish to a very great nicety: Which they have not done, that I know of, with respect to the term *foundation*. Yet I conceive the same distinctions may be made to serve both, and thereby to serve a better purpose, *viz.* to account in some measure for mens various opinions about the *foundation* of morality.

Give me leave on this occasion to talk a little in the language of the schools, for so much I remember of it, that if a man were to ask me, what was the *cause of virtue and moral obligation* (as I think some of the writers will use that expression, and chuse it rather than

foundation) I should first demand what it was he meant by *cause*, whether the *material*, the *formal*, the *efficient*, or the *final*; for in every one of these senses (to omit the several subdivisions) *cause* is taken, and in every one of them it may be applied to virtue, as being a *cause* of it.

The nature, truth, and relations of things, with their consequent fitnesses of application, are the *material cause* of virtue. They are of the essence of moral rectitude, speculative, or practical. They are the *subject-matter*, in which we conceive moral virtue ought to be exercised, and in which, when it is practised, it really is exercised. If one shall chuse to call them the *rule*, another the *foundation* of morals, I think there is nothing amiss, provided that their proper place or share in morals be assigned them, and no more, and no less. So that he, who calls them the *rule* of practice, allows them also to be the subject of it; or he, who lays the *foundation* in them, means it in no other sense, than as a *material cause* may be considered as a *foundation* of its effect.

The formal cause of virtue is *right reason with liberty*. These constitute moral agency,
and

and are likewise of the essence of virtue ; which, as Mr *Warburton* justly observes, consists in *acting agreeably to those relations*, in which we stand to all beings whatsoever. These give moral acts their *quiddity*, (if you will bear with that school term used in the definition of *forms*) that is, not only distinguishes them from the acts of brutes, but gives them their proper rank and dignity among human actions, or that peculiar character, from which they are denominated virtue. For the actions even of reasonable creatures, however consonant (of themselves) to the nature, truth, and relations of things, if done through necessity, through ignorance, or, in one word, *without moral intention*, cannot be accounted virtue. However they may be said to come within the *matter* of it, yet they have not the *form* of virtue. Reason and liberty alone can constitute *that*. Some indeed will chuse to call these the *necessary qualifications to the practice of virtue* ; perhaps also, *foundations of virtuous practices*. Yet surely they are a *constituent* part of virtue in every idea of it, and are to it, in the division of causes, most properly what the *formal* cause is to the effect.

Nor am I making any new distinctions on virtue, when I thus consider it *materially* and *formally*: For moralists have so considered it long ago, making both this *matter* and this *form* requisite to its being. They may not use indeed the very terms *cause*, or *foundation*, but (which comes to the same thing) they speak of *internal principles* of virtue, which they divide into *material* and *formal*, as the essential constituent parts of it, by which it is conceived, and understood as it were, *a priori*.

Chauvin, who gives us the sentiments of the generality of the philosophers, says, that the *material principle of virtue is the nature of things so far as it is a rule of conformity, or a subject of moral practice. And upon this all virtue stands*, says he, *as it were upon its foundation* (this expression will not displease you.) *The formal principle is right reason; for, adds he, when every thing is considered and treated, as right reason teaches it should be considered and treated, then virtue comes forth in its perfection.* Then he proceeds to other principles of virtue, which he styles the complex necessary indeed to the practice of virtue, but not necessary to the knowledge of its nature.

Will

Will you now bear with me, if I return for a little time to my school logic again.

The efficient cause of virtue in this division is the intelligent free agent himself, conforming his will and actions, by the dictates of his reason, to the nature and relations of things. Perhaps you may look upon him in no other light, than as a subject capable of virtue, or as an instrument in the production of it. But you will scarce find among all the instances of *efficient causes* given by the logicians any one more proper, or that comes more closely up to their definitions, than that of *an intelligent free agent*, considered as *efficient*, in regard to *virtue*, considered as *effect*.

And lastly the *reasonable motive*, or the *ultimate end* (whatever it be) by which his will is so determined, is the *final cause* in this question. And so properly the *final*, that it not only fully answers the usual definition, *viz. of an external cause, for the sake of which, or upon account of which the efficient acts*, but agrees perfectly with another observation of the logicians, *viz. that the causality of final causes is chiefly to be considered in created intelligent agents*. It also answers perfectly to their distinction of *finis*
cujus,

cujus, and *finis cui*; the end of whom, and the end to whom. For such motives and inducements to virtuous actions, as *respect one's self*, are as properly *final causes* of our acting, as *gain or wealth* is that of a merchant's in trade; which they give as a right instance of *finis cuius*. And such motives and inducements to good actions, as *respect other beings*, are as properly the *final causes* of our studying and doing good, as the health of others is the final cause of physicians in studying and practising physic, which they give us as a right instance of *finis cui*.

I have had indeed hither a particular eye to your own definition of virtue, if I mistake you not, *as the conformity of a reasonable creature to the nature and reasons of things*. But still the division of its *foundation or cause* into four causes will be equally clear and certain, though we should with others substitute *the will of God* in the definition in the place of the *nature and reasons of things*. For as in my way of considering your definition, the *nature and reason of things*, so far as they are a rule of conformity, or the subject of moral practice, may be considered as *the material principle, or subject-*

subject-matter of virtue ; so the *will of God* in the definition of others, (if they mean by it his will as expressed, or rather implied in the creation) is the very same material principle, or *subject-matter with your reason and truth of things*. A difference indeed will be found in the *form*, but none in the *matter*. Or if they mean by the *will of God*, a *positive appointment*, or *explicit command*, then the thing so appointed or commanded will be also the *subject-matter of virtue* ; as coming within their rule or law of virtue.

Thus again as to the *form*. In your own definition it must be *reason*, including *liberty*. For when you say, a *reasonable creature*, you must mean not only *a creature*, that can understand, and judge of the nature and reasons of things, but who has power likewise to *conform* to them. But according to those, who espouse the other definition, the *formal cause* will be the *knowledge and discernment* of God's will, however attained, whether by reason or otherwise ; or the power and capacity of discerning it, by whatever means it be imparted.

And

And this I take to be Mr *Warburton's* peculiar notion of *moral*, as distinguished from *rational*. From whence he collects, that an Atheist, though a reasonable creature, with respect to the nature and reasons of things, cannot nevertheless be a *moral* creature, so long as he is absolutely a stranger to God's will.

The term *conformity* in either of the definitions implies not only a determination of the reasonable and moral creature's will, to conform to the nature and reason of things, or to the will of God, but also his *acting* agreeably thereto. And this makes him in either case the *efficient cause* properly so called.

And as some kind of motive, or other, must be supposed to determine his will to conform to the *one* or to the *other*, because in either definition, he is considered as a *reasonable* creature, (which he could not be, if he had not some reason to induce him to action) this motive or reason, whatever it be in either consideration of the question, will be the proper *final cause*, which, I must confess, is rather implied than expressed in either of the definitions.

I might

I might proceed to consider and distinguish in the same manner the *foundations* or *causes* of *obligation*; either from your own definition of it, or from that of others. But before I trouble you with any more logic, I think it is fitting I should first explain to you what use I would make of these kind of dry distinctions, that I have borrowed from the schools; hoping you will not censure them, or me, if that shall appear to be to my purpose.

Suppose then any person, instead of asking me *the cause* of virtue, should ask me, what is the *foundation* of it; might I not justly demand of him, in the first place, what it was he meant by *foundation*? And if he should reply, that all do agree in that term, and that there is no sort of ambiguity in it, might I not very justly and pertinently answer, that I have good reason to put this query, because I observe, that some very worthy writers do call *that the foundation* and *the sole foundation* of virtue, which, when it comes to be logically considered, amounts to no more than some *one* of the four species, into which *cause* is distinguished? And if one of them manifestly lays his *foundation* in the *material cause*, another
lays

lays his as evidently in the *formal*, and another as *plainly*, though perhaps not so directly, in the *final*. Can I think otherwise, than that they have not the same meaning, when they use the term foundation? Or must not their meanings be at least as different, as material, formal, and final causes are different from each other?

To give examples. Most of the old philosophers reduced the whole of virtue to one source or head, when they defined it *by living according to the dictates of reason*, or *living agreeably to right reason*, or more fully expressed, *reason from the nature of things, which enjoineth the things, which ought to be done, and forbiddeth the contrary*. This with some of them was the sole principle of moral virtue, or, in our modern language, the true and proper *foundation*: and yet is truly and properly no more than the *formal cause* of it, according to Chauvin's account.

Again there are other very learned and judicious persons, who lay the foundation of virtue, wholly and solely, in the nature, truth, and eternal *reasons of things*; whereas, upon enquiry, this may perhaps be found only a
partial

partial *foundation*, and to be equivalent to nothing more than what the logicians term the *material cause*.

We have got then a twofold ground for virtue (in the abstract idea) to stand upon, *viz.* the *reasons of things*, or fitnesses arising from the mutual relations of things to each other; and *reason of agents*, or the faculty of discerning those fitnesses and reasons of things. But virtue or practical morality cannot properly be said to be *founded* on either of these *solely* and *wholly*, but must arise from the voluntary and actual exercise of the reason of the agent in the great law of morals, which is of nature's institution. Which exercise of the faculty towards the producing virtue, being an act of the *will* of the agent, makes a third principle, or cause of the *practice of virtue*; (from whence the moral agent is denominated the *efficient cause*) and has as good a right to be called a *foundation*, at least of *virtuous practice*, as either of the other two.

And lastly, when we come to consider the *final causes*, or the various inducements, by which the will of the agent is moved, and determined to virtuous practice, a new scene
of

of *foundations* is opened, under the article of *obligation*. For whatever doth oblige to virtue, is in some sense a foundation of it. And there are as many causes or foundations of obligation, as there are just motives or sufficient inducements to virtuous actions. And we find some writers, who do not affect the term *foundation*, talking of *cause* of duty, *cause of moral obligation*, *true cause* of our obligation to virtue, *proper and natural cause*, which obliges to the practice of it, &c. And as man is considered in his rational, social, or sensitive nature, so the *final* causes differ. To the rational nature it is said to be rectitude ; in which sense I suppose it is said, that virtue itself is the ultimate end of a moral agent. To the social nature it is the good of others, but yet neither of these exclusive of the *final* cause to the sensitive nature, which is happiness present or future : pleasure in the act itself, or expectation of it in consequence.

Now as virtue is conceived to arise from so many *causes*, or to have so many *foundations* in the lax manner of using that term, who can wonder at the difficulties, that must attend every attempt to reduce it to *one foundation*, till

we come at the supreme *cause* and *foundation* of all things, in whom a proper ultimate will be found ?

And I humbly conceive, that this controversy would be better understood, and carried on to better effect, if the word *foundation* were either intirely dropped, or the precise meaning of it in the several applications of it to different parts of the subject, fully adjusted. That is, let every principle, that goes to the production of virtue in any sense, *as a cause logically defined*, be taken into the question, and allowed its due weight, *viz.* its proper effect. And for the better judging of this, let the virtue, of which the cause or causes are sought, be so explained, that the writer's idea of it may be fully understood, and also whether he considers it in its abstract nature, or in the practice of it by mankind ; and whether it is spoke of exclusive of the consideration of God's will, as implied in the creation, or expressed in the moral sense ; or in conjunction with the consideration of his will in both these respects, and only exclusive of positive appointments and commands ; or whether God's will at large, however revealed to mankind be

taken into the question. And lastly, when any cause of virtue, or of obligation, is affirmed or denied, whether it is so affirmed or denied, with regard to man's reasonable, or social, or sensitive nature, and withal his corrupt nature: in a word, let every part of this complicated and entangled subject be unravelled and sorted, so as that one part, which is, and may be considered as distinct, shall not mix with, and run into another, which is, and may be likewise considered as distinct, to the confusion of ideas in both; and then something, I apprehend may come out, in which all parties shall either agree, or be forced to maintain such inconsistencies, as will prove their confutation in the judgment of all discerning people.

And now, Madam, from what has been said, you will the better perceive my reasons for putting my first queries, and of the methods I took, and expressions I used, in my reply to your first paper. Give me leave now to take the several paragraphs of your last letter into consideration.

The following passages since collected. The first *root* and *foundation* of virtue is the sincere
desire

desire of knowing the *will* of God, and impartially searching after the truth. Dr *Clarke's Sermons*, vol. I. fol. p. 464.

Freedom of will, which according as it is determined in different circumstances by the reasonableness of what is good, or incitements of what is evil, *renders the agent* morally good or evil. *Ibid.* and also p. 60.

Liberty or moral agency must ever be the *foundation* of *morality* in man, and is the *sole ground* of the accountableness of intelligent creatures for all their actions. Bishop *Hoadley's Life of Dr Clarke*.

The existence of one only God he (Dr *Clarke*) justly esteemed as the *foundation* of all, *viz.* all true religion. *Ibid.*

His (Dr *Clarke's*) first principle was the unity of God, which he esteemed as the *basis* of all moral obedience. *Ibid.*

The state as well as glory of human nature is free-agency. And from the nature of free-agency man being capable of chusing good, he must be also capable of chusing evil. It is *this power*, and a *wise enjoyment* of it, that *constitutes virtue*. *Kennicott's 1st Dissertat.* p. 33.

I. **T**HE compliment you are pleased to make me in the beginning of your condescending answer to my *Remarks*, viz. *of my having been more conversant than yourself, with the writers on these subjects, and having gone into nicer distinctions, and more remote views of them, than you have had occasion to consider*, I am bound to acknowledge as a mark of your respect and civility. But really, Madam, I am so little deserving of it, that nothing could have justified it but your great address, through which you have ascribed to me what was more peculiarly applicable to yourself, and taken to yourself what seemed most properly to belong to me. For had not the *nice distinctions* been yours, and the *plain apprehensions* mine, I should not so easily have fallen into the mistake of supposing, that you were establishing the foundation of *practical morality*, or *virtue* in moral agents, when (as I now find by your *Reply*) you meant only *the foundation of virtue in its general abstract nature*; which, as you tell me, *is quite another idea than the practice of virtue*. And you admit, that *the practice of it* (as likewise

some

some writers ideas of it) *may arise from other grounds than that, on which the abstract nature of virtue is founded.* So little conversant was I with the writers on these subjects, and so little aware of this distinction, that I troubled you with several impertinent queries (as they must now appear) on a mistaken supposition, that you had given me a definition of foundation, that might be applied to *virtue in practice*, as well as to an abstracted notion of it. For this unnecessary trouble I must therefore ask your pardon; which I am the better intitled to, because, to the best of my remembrance, you had not explained yourself to this purpose before. You had mentioned indeed (*Works of the Learned*, 1743, p. 139.) *an ambiguity in applying the term fit in itself indifferently to the foundation of virtue in the abstract, and to the practice of it by moral agents.* But that your *sole foundation* was to be understood of *virtue in the abstract only*, is what, I think, you never declared either in that printed tract, or in the letter you first obliged me with, on this subject.

Neither have you thought fit to make use of this distinction in replying to my queries,

till you come to your 7th paragraph, where you answer to what I had objected to your definition from the reason and free-will of moral agents.

Therefore till I come to that paragraph, I am a little at a loss how to carry on my discourse. For what I had advanced on mistake, should seem best intirely dropped. Yet as you have been pleased to reply to my questions, such as they are, without admonishing me of their impropriety; and to defend *your sense* of foundation, as *the sense* of most or all other writers, you have obliged me in decency to return you some answer or other.

2. "After setting down, say you, what I apprehend the writers on the subject of moral virtue understand by the word foundation, viz. the ground, on which virtue solely arises, you are pleased to ask, but are they agreed, whether this ground be any one simple principle, or compounded of more principles than one?" This was my query, and I thought at that time pertinent to the enquiry after *sole ground*. But now I ought to ask another question previous to it, which I did not know before that there was occasion for, viz. is *virtue*, in these words

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("the ground on which virtue solely arises") to be understood in its *general abstract* nature *only*, or in its practice *also*? If in its general abstract nature *only*, as you afterwards consider it, then I have no dispute at all *with you*, either about *more principles than one concurring* to a foundation, or about *sole foundation*. For you have so explained *the virtue*, of which you assign the foundation (in the 7th paragraph) that no other foundation, than what you assign, can be thought of for it. For you exclude all *other* grounds, either of obligation or of virtuous practice, which some people have called foundations of moral virtue. So that neither *benevolent affections*, *moral sense*, nor even the faculties of human *reason* and *free will* come within your *idea* of the general abstracted nature of virtue: (for these are no more than "*grounds of obligation to virtue, or foundations of virtuous practice*"); nor is the will of God further included in it, than as it is *expressed, or rather implied in the creation, and is the very same with that reason and truth of things*, from which your abstract idea of virtue arises. It follows, that you have left no assignable foundation of virtue, but what

you give it ; and which consequently must be acknowledged the *sole foundation* of it ; and that so certainly, that I suppose no body will controvert the point with you ; unless it be in this captious way, that your abstract nature of virtue *arises solely* from an art in thinking, and is no more than a conception of virtue formed by abstraction in a studious and distinguishing mind. I say no body will seriously dispute this point with you ; for the general abstract nature of virtue being the idea of it, which is taken *from its subject-matter* (the fitnesses of things in their several relations, &c. in which all that is, or can be called virtue, must be exercised) *exclusive of all other considerations*, must have the *nature of things*, from whence the idea directly arises, and *that only*, for its foundation ; and this is the proper *material cause* (as I before explained it) *of virtue* in all the views of it. But do you suppose, that other writers, whose sense of the term *foundation* we are enquiring into, consider virtue *only in this abstracted light as you do* ?

If they do not, but include *virtuous practice* under the term moral virtue ; then I may without impropriety repeat my query about

one or more principles concurring to a foundation. For the practice of virtue, as you tell me yourself, may arise from other grounds than that, on which the abstract nature of virtue is founded. The drift of the query was to discover, whether they, who admitted more principles than one into their foundation, understood by foundation what you do, *the ground on which virtue solely arises*. To this, which is the very purpose of my query, you reply very honestly, that you do not doubt but that same skilful writer, whom I had mentioned as remarkable for founding virtue on three principles, would adhere to this definition, and apply it to his three principles, without excluding the term solely.

Now till his mind be known, I cannot say positively what he would do. But till he shall think fit to declare himself upon it, I may have leave to presume, that he would not adhere to your definition with *solely* in it; because he can neither say (consistently with what he has said) of any one of his principles, that it is *the ground, on which virtue solely arises*, nor of all three principles in conjunction, that virtue *solely arises* from all three in conjunction;

tion; or that there can be no such thing as virtue, where all the three principles do not unite to the production of it. All that I apprehend he would say, would be this, that “*on these three principles the whole edifice of practical morality is built.*” D. L. p. 37. And that there is no virtue among mankind, but is to be accounted for from some one, or more of these three principles. He says, indeed, they are never to be *untwisted* or separated. No more they are, when we speak in general of the practice of virtue in the world. But I cannot conceive he should mean by this expression, that there could be *no virtue, no instance of it*, where they did not all concur and conspire to the immediate production of it. He speaks likewise of *the great purposes, to which they will serve while in conjunction*, p. 38. Yet in another place they are considered “*as different excitements to the practice of virtue, that men of all ranks, constitutions, or educations might find their account in one or other of them; something, that would hit their palate, satisfy their reason, or subdue their will.*” p. 37.

He

He says, that one of these three principles, viz. the moral sense, is the *most extensive*, whereas another of them, the *essential difference*, &c. is only for *reflecting men*, and will have its weight with the *speculative, the abstracted and profound reasoners*, &c. And after all, neither of these are the true principle of morality, for that must be compliance with the will of God.

Would it now be consonant to this account of the grounds of virtue for the same writer to say, that *this is the ground, on which virtue solely arises*? Or that whatever is virtue, must have these three principles for its foundation?

But supposing he should adhere to your definition, doth he use *foundation*, when he applies it to each of these principles, in the *very same sense*, that you use it, when you apply it to yours?

He accounts the moral sense (how *extensive* a principle soever it be) to be no more than the first inlet into the adequate idea of morality; (that is, *an orderly introduction*, which you know is a *foundation* in one of the senses, in which he metaphorically uses the word)

p. 36. He accounts the essential differences to be no more than *a medium*, to bring us to the only sound foundation, p. 53. And he accounts the will of God to be the only true or sound foundation, p. 41. and 53.

Yet if *on these three principles the whole edifice of practical morality is built*, p. 37. then each of them is in some sense *a foundation* of that edifice; but not in the *very same sense*, or in the same respects; for then they must all be equally *true*, and equally *sound foundations*. This distinction, that he makes between them, shews a difference in his application of the figure: so doth his whole discourse. Moral sense is a foundation in one respect, as an *inlet*, &c. Essential difference, &c. in another as a *medium*. The will of God in another, more remarkable and more eminent respect; and yet not in your sense of *foundation*, as the ground, on which virtue *solely arises*.

It must be owned indeed, that Mr W. is considering *practical morality*, when he talks of these three principles, that it is built upon; and therefore you might have answered me very justly, that I had cited him improperly to the point you was considering, *viz. virtue in its abstract nature*. But as you were pleased

to hold to your sentiment, that all the writers in this controversy would subscribe to your definition, I have taken the liberty to give my reasons, why I presume Mr *W.* would not.

3. I had observed further, that writers seemed to have different conceptions of foundation; because one considers it as the ground, from which virtue immediately arises, and another considers it as a more remote ground, on which it arises by the intervention of mediums. To which you reply, "*that you do not well apprehend the use of mediums for the production of virtue, if a sufficient ground of it is allowed, into which it must be ultimately resolved.*" But supposing that mediums have no use in this enquiry; and supposing them likewise improperly called *foundations*; yet if any writers will allow them to be so, and call them so, my remark is true, that those writers cannot be thought to have the same conceptions of the term *foundation* that you have. For if you both had the same conceptions of it, what should hinder your agreement in applying it to *mediums*? "But you imagine *these authors may agree in their idea of foundation, as a real ground, on which virtue*
"*arises,*

“ arises, though one excludes, and another admits
 “ the intervention of mediums.”

But still he, who admits the intervention of mediums, looks upon those mediums as *foundations* too, which is the case I put.

He may indeed agree in the sense of the term, as applied to the remote and ultimate ground, but will have a something different meaning in it, when applied to the more immediate or proximate ground ; as different as the meaning of *second causes*, when distinguished from *the primary*. *Essential differences*, &c. pass under the common term *foundation*, both with Mr Warburton, yourself, and another good author, cited by Mr Balguy in his last tract (Wisdom the first spring, &c.) But then, whereas you understand by it *the true and ultimate foundation*, Mr W. means it only as a *medium to bring us to the true foundation* ; and the other author refers it to an *ulterior foundation*, viz. happiness, which he calls the *remote foundation of all moral fitness*. (Balguy's Tracts, p. 420.) I hope you will excuse my having used such expressions as *medium*, and *remote bottoms* in this argument, since these eminent writers introduced them into this controversy

before

before me. And especially, as I can find no apter words for expressing the difference, which I conceive there is between the sense, in which they sometimes occasionally use *foundation*, and the sense, which you are pleased to fix upon it as invariable, and the very same, in all the writers on this subject.

4. I must own myself careless and inaccurate in my expression, when I spoke of virtue being considered as *disinterested* by those, who found it in *self-love* or *self-interest*; though, if the whole passage be attended to, I fancy no real inconsistency will be found in it.

All that I meant was this, that as men do commonly agree in their notions of virtuous practice, *viz.* what is, or is not so, (for I then thought you had included practice in your idea of virtue) though many of them disagree in their notions of the legitimate rule or true cause of this practice, so I imagined any of them might be willing to own *virtuous practice* to be, what it is, *virtue*; although it were evidently practised upon other principles, than what he himself esteemed to be the legitimate rule of virtue. And consequently, though he might call his own legitimate principle the
true

true foundation of virtue, yet he could not mean it in the sense you have defined *foundation*, viz. *as that without which there could be no such thing as virtue.*

5. But you except against the instance I gave to illustrate this, viz. those, who place the foundation of virtue in self-love and self-interest. I am got, here, you say, “amongst authors, that you are a stranger to. For though you have met with several, who make self-interest the foundation of moral obligation, you know of none, who make it the foundation of virtue: that those writers commonly deduce from the will of God.” I know all the late ones do; and I suppose that all Theists, who lay the foundation of obligation in interest, will deduce that of virtue from God’s will. But you are not in Mr W——’s sentiment, that Atheists are incapable of morality. They may practise virtue, and some of them on no other principle, than that of present convenience, private happiness, or self-interest. The old Epicureans could see into no other cause of virtue in the world, than what I have mentioned.

Ease of body, and pleasure of mind, was all they aimed at in it, or thought it good for.

Felicity,

Felicity, or private happiness, was, they said, (*initium et finis*) the beginning and the end of it, &c. And whereas the *Stoics* esteemed and practised it for *its own sake*, these men esteemed and practised it only for *their own sake*. Now, may not these men be properly said to have placed the foundation of virtue in self-love and self-interest?

And yet they did not deny the virtuous practice of the *Stoics* to be virtue, though attended with pain in the performance.

They only looked upon it as virtue, without reason, or any sufficient inducement; virtue without any *proper foundation*. Therefore, with an eye to these men (and all such as are of their principles) I might say consistently enough, that *virtue, even according to them, might be considered as disinterested*, especially as I added immediately, *they will disown indeed any obligation, or any motive to practise it in this case, viz. where private interest does no way appear to be concerned in it.*

But you observe, that “*if they, who found virtue on self-interest, can yet allow, that it may be considered as disinterested, there must be such inconsistency in their schemes,*” &c.

But where is the inconsistency of holding (with the *Epicurean*) that private happiness is the only true and proper foundation of virtue, and yet allowing (with Archdeacon *Law's Prelim. Dissert.*) “ that it is a matter of fact, “ that there are a great variety of instances of “ men’s practising virtue, without knowing, “ that it tends to their own private happiness; “ nay, even when it appears destructive of it.” If foundation, indeed, were constantly taken in your sense of it, then it would be inconsistent in any one, who made private happiness *that foundation*, to allow any thing to be virtue, which was not directly built upon private happiness.

But if you will please to recollect, the business we were upon in this part of the enquiry, was to try your definition of foundation by the idea, that others seem to have of that term, and not to expound their notions of it by your definition. And this was all I intended in mentioning these self-interested moralists, or their principles.

6. I did you wrong in setting down as your words, that the *foundation of moral virtue, upon further reflection, will be found to lie either in self-*

self-love, &c. For your words were not *moral virtue*, but *moral obligation*, as I observed upon looking again into your paper. It was plainly *my mistake*, as you apprehended: and *one*, no doubt, among many I have been guilty of. But I shall acknowledge them all, as soon as I shall discover them.

7. Next comes that passage in your letter, that has so much altered the state of the question, that I apprehended we were upon. I, still presuming that the *practice of virtue* was not out of the question, and observing, that you had explained foundation by *that, without which there could be no such thing as virtue*, and that you had added further, that *such a foundation can be no other than the necessary relations, &c. of things*; took occasion from hence to mention *the reason and free-will of agents*, as being alike necessary to virtue with your essential differences, &c. And yet I supposed, you would scarce call them for this reason foundations, at least not the sole foundation; which remark has proved of much greater consequence than I expected, by being the occasion of your explaining yourself to me by this distinction, that in your definition of foundation,

you do not consider *virtue in practice*, but in *its abstract nature*.

I should perhaps have been too positive, that the generality of writers in this subject did always, in their enquiries after the foundation of virtue, mean the practice of virtue in the world, had not my over-sight, with regard to yourself, taught me to be cautious how I venture to affirm this. I shall not therefore dispute with you, what other writers mean in this article, because, as you expressly exclude practice from that idea of virtue, to which you have adapted your definition of foundation, I am bound to consider it as excluded *by you*; and have, and do allow, your sole foundation, and your definition of it upon that footing, as you would observe from what I said in the beginning of this letter, though I have endeavoured in following the course of your reply, where you made no use of this distinction, to vindicate what I had advanced upon a mistake, as right upon the supposition from whence I argued.

8. There was no great matter indeed in my next remark about space. I could not imagine any more than you do, that *space had any thing*

thing at all to do with the production of matter :
Yet it is nevertheless true, that as extension is of the essence of matter, *there could be no such thing as matter without space ;* which was all I said ; and I think you allow the same, when you say, that *the existence of matter supposed, the existence of space must be likewise admitted.* But, as neither you, nor any body else, would for this reason, call space a foundation of matter, I concluded (and it was all I concluded) that your explanation of a foundation, *by that without which there could be no such thing as virtue,* was not full enough and sufficient to give the proper idea of that term, because this amounts to no more than a *requisite.* You do indeed, in your answer now before me, fully supply this deficiency, by dropping the former expression, against which I had excepted, and substituting another more defensible in the room of it, *viz. that virtue intirely derives its being from the essential differences, &c.* Had you given this at first, as your second explanation of the term foundation, instead of what you offered as above, you had prevented many of my objections, which, you cannot but observe, were levelled

purely at your words, *without which there can be no such thing.*

9. Again, when you come to the florists in the next paragraph, you say, if they are agreed, that the thing they seek for is *the ground*, on which the flower or the music *solely arises*; or that to which either owes its being, &c. here you change your terms again. You should have said, agreeably to your definition, (to which you may observe I strictly kept) *or, that without which, there could be no such flower or music.* Now these differ from each other, just as widely as a *cause* does from a condition or a *requisite*. I would only observe, that this change of your expressions gives you an advantage in your reply, which you was not strictly intitled to, considering, that our dispute here, was merely about the propriety of a definition, which you yourself had given; and which you think more proper to amend than to defend. All the use I would make of this observation is, that it is not quite so easy, as you seemed to imagine, to give the true idea of *foundation* in the metaphorical use of it in these subjects.

But

But, notwithstanding this amendment, I do not see, that you have set aside, or even impaired, the relation and similitude, that my illustrations, taken from supposed disputes about the foundation of a flower, or of music, bear to the disputes about the foundation of moral virtue. In the first place, you are pleased to say of my florists, *that if they are agreed, that the thing they seek for, is the ground, on which the flower or the music solely arises; or (to take your definition, as it stands amended) that to which either owes its being; then it should seem plain, that they are all agreed in the sense of the word foundation.* To be sure, if they are already agreed to understand the word as you do, they will have no disputes about the sense of it, but only differ, if they differ at all, about the application of it.

But is not this something like begging of the question, that is at present between us? I am endeavouring to shew you, from their way of applying the word foundation, that they are not agreed rightly in the sense of it; because the word in your sense is not applicable to the foundations they fix upon; though yet each of their foundations are properly such in another sense, though not in your sense.

For each of my disputants finds *a ground, on which the flower or the music arises* ; which, I think, is the most obvious and common notion of a foundation. But none of them finds a foundation, of which it may be said, that it is *the ground, on which the flower or music solely arises, or that to which either owes its being* ; or, in your other phrase, *from which it entirely derives its being*.

Which now is most likely, that they should all agree in your sense of the word, and all agree to misapply the word ; or, that they should all use the word in an obvious figurative sense, though in a sense something different from yours ?

You proceed : *if their error lies in each man's making his beloved principle the sole foundation of the flower or music ; when various principles contribute to their respective beings* (let us allow their error to lie here, *viz.* in applying *sole* to a foundation or principle, where it is not applicable) *then this controversy is not to be decided by the definition of a foundation*.

I cannot say the controversy *will be decided* by such definition ; but I conceive, it will not be decided without it ; because the error just

now

now supposed will not be seen into without it. The most likely way to shew these disputants their mistake, is to enquire of them, what it is they mean by foundation, when they use it in this dispute about flowers and music, viz. whether they understand by it *a ground on which the flower or music arises*; which is the more obvious and general explanation of it, or *the ground on which they solely arise, and from which they entirely derive their being*. What each of them calls a *foundation*, will answer to one of these explanations, but not to the other. If, they say, they take foundation in the latter sense (which you suppose the sense of most writers) let but each disputant join the definition of foundation, instead of the term to his beloved principle, and he will soon discover his mistake, at least his error will be detected, whether he cares to own it or not. One florist affirms, that the stalk is the proper foundation of the flower (in a tulip suppose,) let him only give the sense instead of the word thus, the stalk of the tulip is *the ground on which the flower solely arises, and to which it entirely owes its being*; and then let him say whether he will abide by this assertion.

But

But on the other hand, if the said disputants do really mean no more by foundation (and by their application of it they seem to intend no more) than a *ground on which the flower or music arises*; then what each disputant says is true (as will be found by inserting the definition in like manner in the proposition) and the controversy among them will be so far cleared up, and understood by them all.

You observe justly, and I grant it, that *the general idea of foundation will agree indifferently to one or more principles*. And I beg your leave further to observe, that it will agree to any common ground of those principles themselves, as an ulterior principle still, till it be carried up to the first cause of all things, or ultimate foundation of all beings; of which observation I would make this use, that when we consider two or more principles, on which any thing arises, or stands, without taking in the common ground or support of those principles, we may more properly call them foundations in the plural, than foundation. But when we apply *sole* to a complex foundation of two or more principles, then we ought

to take in the common ground of those principles ; and this makes it, in many cases, difficult to know where to stop, for the idea of foundation is ever enlarging itself to some ulterior principle still, till we come to a proper ultimate.

You conceive lastly of the aforesaid florists and musicians, that, *till they can convince each other, that some one, or more, or all the principles together, go to the production of the flower or the music, they may indeed dispute to the world's end, notwithstanding the exactest agreement in their idea of foundation.* But this is still presupposing their exact agreement in the term, without offering at a solution of their disagreement in the application of it to different things. Whereas, I would pre-suppose nothing either way ; but I only collect, I think rationally, from the manifestly different applications they make of the term, that they do not rightly agree in the meaning of it. Because, if they all understood it (as you do for instance) it must end their controversy, since each man's error would then be discovered to be an undue application of *sole ground* to a principle, that apparently is not so. Let us suppose again,
that

that they agree exactly in the other more general idea *of a ground on which any thing arises*: this should, in all reason, end their dispute too; for foundation in this sense being applicable to each of their beloved principles, they must all go to the production of the flower or music. And nothing would be left to them to dispute upon, unless it were, which of their principles had the greatest share in the production; which is another question from that we are now upon.

You conclude this paragraph with obliging me with an illustration on your part, from a company of *architects*, who might *dispute for ever, whether stone or brick, or wood, or altogether, were the properest foundation for an house, and yet have all the same idea of foundation*. This I must readily grant; and also, that the comparison is exceedingly well adapted to your sentiment, as expressed throughout this paragraph. But when you *apprehend this to be pretty nearly a parallel case with that of the contenders about the foundation of moral virtue*, it looks as if you thought it as well adapted to their case, as it is to your own sentiment. But as to the parallel, I have two exceptions.

First,

First, that you here pre-suppose these architects agreed in the precise meaning of foundation ; which, you know, I apprehend the moralists are not. Secondly, you are here speaking of foundation in its primary and literal sense, which must be one and the same in all architects minds, and indeed in all people's minds whatsoever. Whereas, to make the case parallel, you should have instanced, (as I did in the case of florists and musicians) in some *figurative application* of the term, which is the way, in which the contenders about the foundation of moral virtue always use it. Ask your architects, for instance, after the foundation of their own art or science, and they probably may differ as much in their sentiments about it, as the moralists do, when it is applied to virtue : not for want of knowing of all, that is requisite to be known by masters of the science, all that ordinarily goes to the perfection of it as an *art* ; but for want of agreeing in some certain sense of that general and vague term foundation, in the metaphorical use of it. If one of them should assign the *elements* of geometry, as the first principles of architecture ; another invention, the common
parent

parent of arts and sciences ; another utility or necessity, the mother of invention ; another looking back for its original, should fix upon the tower of *Babel*, or *Noah's ark*, or *Seth's* pillars, as the first instances of building in the world, we could not wonder, because it was not previously agreed and settled among them, what it was, that foundation, when *figuratively* applied to architecture, meant. Whereas, if they can be supposed to agree exactly in their idea of it, when it is thus metaphorically used, as they do in the idea of a foundation, on which an house is erected, there can be no reason to believe, but that they would all likewise agree in their answer to the question.

10. You are pleased to own with me *a great deal of ambiguity in the use of the term virtue*. But how comes this ambiguity to be so readily acknowledged, while none is supposed in the other term foundation ? I presume this is the reason, *viz.* because the several writers having commonly defined what they meant by virtue, it hath evidently appeared from thence, that they do not agree exactly in the same meaning of the word. Perhaps therefore, when they shall in like manner define each of them

his

his meaning of the other word foundation, the like ambiguity may be found and acknowledged in that term too; though, for the present, as they have not defined it, you may presume (nor can I so easily obviate such presumption) on the exactest agreement of their ideas of it.

Admitting this presumption, you have given as rational and as probable an account (in this paragraph) of their different ways of defining virtue, as can possibly be thought of. Yet if this *postulatum*, that *they are all agreed in the same precise meaning of foundation*, be not allowed you, then this account of yours, ingenious as it is, will seem to stand upon a very precarious foundation itself.

You are *persuaded, that most people are agreed in their general notion of the nature of virtue*. I am persuaded so too, if you mean by this *no more, than* that most people seem to make the same distinction between actions, that are virtuous, and those that are otherwise. But if you mean by nature of virtue, *that abstract idea of its nature, which is quite another idea than the practice of virtue*, and excludes *reason and free will* from having any share in its production; then

then I imagine there are but *few* people, *viz.* the refined reasoners only, that have the idea; and even *they* have it more or less perfect, according to their capacities of distinguishing, and of abstracting.

The writers however upon virtue, (for to those only your next observation relates,) may be allowed to be all agreed in the abstract idea of its nature. But when they *come*, as you observe, to contend about the foundation of it, *they are apt to substitute in place of the nature of virtue, either our idea of it, or the practice of it by moral agents.* Such change of the idea will, I confess, occasion their contention about the *foundation*, be they never so well agreed in the meaning of that term. But still we want something to account for this change of ideas, especially in persons, whose success in their reasoning upon virtue depends so much on their retaining the same idea of it in their minds. Is there no room to suspect, that the want of an exact agreement in the notion of a foundation (though, as they have not defined it, they are not aware of it) may be the true reason of their disagreeing about what virtue itself is? For, by your own account, till *these*
writers

writers began to contend about the foundation, they were mostly agreed in their notion of the nature of virtue. And had they been mostly agreed in their notion of *foundation* too, it is very unaccountable, how the consideration of it, or enquiry after it, should have administered such a variety of speculations about virtue itself.

And this (substitution of our idea or virtue, or the practice of it, in the place of the nature of it,) *may perhaps*, you say, *have been* some occasion (I make no doubt a great occasion) *of their assigning different foundations to virtue.* So that this attempt to discover, and fix the true foundation, has proved doubly unfortunate: First, in setting them at variance about virtue itself, in the nature of which they were mostly agreed before; and next, in setting them at variance about the ground, on which it arises, or stands; though, according to you, *they are all agreed in what they mean by a foundation.* I dare not say you are mistaken in this: it becomes me not to say so. But you will give me leave in the first place to wish they had not meddled with this unlucky term foundation, which has been of bad conse-

quence to them, by your own account ; and secondly, to suggest to you, with all deference, my account of this consequence as the more probable, *viz.* that a real, though unperceived disagreement in their ideas of foundation, when figuratively applied to virtue, has had its full share in introducing the variety of sentiments among them, especially as to the assignment of proper grounds for *foundations*.

For, you say, in your very next words, *our idea of virtue, or our practice of it, may arise from other grounds, than that on which the abstract nature of virtue is founded*. Here you admit of several real and true foundations of *virtue*, as that term stands *undefined*. We are indeed both of us agreed, that these foundations are applied to virtue ; only in some particular light or view, in which it is considered ; and that they are real and true foundations of it in that particular light only, and in no other. But then here we differ : you apprehend the notion, as well as name of foundation is the same in all these several applications of it to virtue in different lights and views ; whereas, I apprehend, that though the same term indeed is indifferently used, yet the notion of it

varies

varies in all or most of these several applications of it. And therefore, that it ought to be as carefully defined in each of these applications of it, that we may know in what sense it is taken, as the virtue, to which it is applied, ought to be defined, that we may know in what particular light it is viewed. For as the general term virtue, till it be made more particular or special, will stand for distinct and different ideas of virtue; so the general term foundation, till it be more particular and special, will stand for distinct and different ideas of foundation. Some of which shall be justly applicable to virtue in some lights and views of it, but not so in other lights or views of it. None of the writers, except yourself, have hitherto, so far as I know, offered their definitions of foundation; but so far as may be collected from some occasional explanations, that they have given of their meaning, as Mr *Warburton* and Mr *Hutchinson* have done, there are at least two or three different senses of foundation in this controversy. And I desire no better proof of writers not exactly agreeing with each other in the use of that term, than their disagreeing in their accounts

of it, so far as they have thought fit to explain themselves. In some lights, in which virtue is considered, the moral sense is said to be the foundation. But how? As the discernment of good and evil with approbation and dislike seems *the first and most universal spring of virtuous actions, or the earliest and most immediate motive to them, or as the first inlet into the adequate ideas of morality.* You cannot justly say these things of any other principle, that is called a foundation of virtue; neither can you deny this to be a foundation in the common general acceptance of the word, seeing that it is *a ground, on which virtue ariseth.* But this no way excludes a more remote ground, from which virtue arises also, but not in the same sense; for if you ask in what the moral sense is founded, whether the answer be from Mr Warburton, viz. *the real essential differences of human actions established by nature;* or from others, *the will of God, who gave mankind this faculty or discernment, &c.* it is a *foundation*, as it is *a ground, from which virtue arises*, and yet it is neither a *spring*, nor a *motive*, nor an *inlet* into the moral sense, but must be expounded by a *necessary antecedent* in the first answer.

answer, and by a *cause freely producing* in the other answer. Now if these explanations of the same term in different applications of it are not to the same sense, although the term undefined, or defined loofely and generally, will indifferently suit with them all; then we must not take for granted, that writers, when they do not define the term, have always the same invariable meaning in it.

You observe, that the *different senses of the term virtue may occasion likewise various definitions of it; every one defining it according to the light he has viewed it in.* Now thus far there is no harm. Definitions, that are far from being perfect, may yet be true, as far as they go; in which case they may all stand. And consequently, disputes arising from such definitions, or rather the partial and private explanations of the several writers, may be accommodated (if they will but retain their candors and attention) because truth is always consistent with itself. But you further observe, and I think justly too, that they are apt, every one, to define virtue, not only according to the light he has viewed it in, but also according to *the foundation he has given it in that*

view. From whence it appears, that some of their definitions of virtue are *rather determinations of the foundation of it, than explications of its nature.* I do not say, but you may have reason enough for this remark: all I would infer from it is this; that if they make the idea of virtue itself to depend any way on the ground, which they assign for its foundation, (and in many cases the idea will unavoidably follow the ground) the greater reason have we still to complain of their not defining foundation, and precisely fixing their meaning in it. Because if they apply it improperly, (as by making that a *principle* of virtue, which is more properly a consequence of it) the idea of virtue itself may be impaired or suffer thereby. Nor will it be easy, while all are supposed to have just and true notions of *foundation*, and to agree perfectly in them, to shew how, or wherein the term is unduly applied. But surely the true way to bring this controversy to some good issue, is to postpone the dispute about *foundation* of virtue, till it be first agreed, what that virtue is, the foundation of which is sought after. And then when foundations come to be enquired into, to
admit

admit of as many foundations, as can justly and properly be called so, though in different senses of the word, as being applied to virtue in all the different lights and views, in which it may justly and properly be considered, and to give each of them its due weight and no more. Virtue in every true light will be amiable, and will have a proper ground in that view, sufficient to support it under that particular consideration. But in some lights it may appear far more excellent than in others; and the grounds, on which it will be discovered to stand in those views, will be in proportion more noble, as well as more steadfast and unmoveable.

Here you take an opportunity of remarking the peculiar propriety of *that definition, which considers virtue as the conformity of a reasonable creature to the nature and reasons of things, because this directly acquaints us with the nature of virtue.* But here by the nature of virtue, you must be understood to mean no more, than *its nature according to their idea of it, who give this definition.* For certainly, that other definition, which you quote from me, and which considers virtue as a *conformity of a*

reasonable creature to the will of the creator, doth as directly acquaint us with the nature of virtue, according to their idea of its nature, who give this definition. And the same may be said of the third definition I mentioned, which is the old one, most common among the Ancients, which considers virtue to be acting agreeably to right reason, viz. such as man is endowed with, and is capable of using. For this does also as directly acquaint us with the nature of virtue, according to their idea of its nature, who gave this definition.

Still please to remember, that I am not endeavouring here to establish one definition more than another, but only shewing, that I fear your remark will not answer the purpose you here intend to serve by it. The truth and propriety of either definition, which you have been pleased to compare with each other on this occasion, entirely depends upon what the *true nature* of virtue is. If it arises solely from the nature and reason of things, then the definition you espouse is the only true one, and the only one, that can with truth be said to acquaint us directly with the nature of virtue. *But if it arises solely from the will of the creator,*
the

the very same thing may be said of that too, with respect to determining virtue's nature. For, according to this definition, the very *essence* of virtue is *the will of the creator*, and not the fitness of things considered in itself. For nothing, according to this, is good or evil in its own nature, till made so by his appointment.

When therefore you object against this last definition, *that it gives us no manner of light into the nature of virtue, till we are informed by other means what the will of the creator is, and therefore* is no proper definition of it, will not they, who adhere to this definition, reply, that till such information of the creator's will is obtained, by some means or other, virtue hath no nature, properly speaking; every thing is indifferent in itself? And will not Mr *W*—— himself reply, that till the law of a superior appear, there is no obligation ariseth, nor any thing that can constitute morality in actions? The first of these may say of the definition you recommend, *that it gives no light into the nature of virtue, till we are informed, that the will of the creator is consonant to the nature and reasons of things.* And Mr *W*—— him-

himself may say, *that it gives no light into the morality properly so called of actions, till we are informed, that virtue is the injunction of a superior will; which will could not be found, till the being and attributes of God were discovered.*

I do not apprehend, that any excuse need be made for either definition, *because they both determine likewise the foundation of virtue, which in this controversy is a kind of begging the question.* For definitions of things ought to take in whatsoever necessarily enters into a just idea of their essence; and consequently must determine their foundation in many cases unavoidably. But when you plead further in excuse for the definition you approve, *that it is scarce possible to give a just and proper definition of virtue, without expressing its relation to the nature and essential differences of things;* the advocates for the propriety of the other definition will give *that*, as an instance of one, wherein the nature and essential differences of things are not expressed. And if you should reply, that although they are not expressed, they are nevertheless implied; they will answer, that the creator's will is just as much implied

implied in that definition, which *expresses only the nature and reasons of things*; and further, that it is scarce possible to give a just and proper definition of virtue, without expressing its relation to the creator's will. And they will also think, that they have as good a right as you have to say further in your words, that this may serve as a proof, that virtue owes its origin solely to the creator's will, since the consideration of that enters necessarily into the just idea of its essence; and they will also beg leave to say further, that even in the different views, according to which the several writers have defined virtue, the will of God, might be a common foundation to support them all. All may easily be resolved into that, and securely rest upon it.

But though you greatly prefer one of these definitions before the other, yet I do not find, that you have given it, or allowed it as *your own*, as the definition, that you take to be the most just and proper. My only reason for making a doubt, whether you will warrant it or not, is, because it will not well suit with that *abstract idea of the nature of virtue*, which you speak of in your 7th paragraph as a quite
diff-

different idea from that of the practice of virtue; and doth not include the reason and free-will of moral agents. But now this definition, viz. a conformity of a reasonable creature to the nature and reason of things, doth include the reason and free-will of moral agents. For the reason of the creature is as absolutely necessary to the idea as the reason of things; and conformity relates as closely and indispensably to that, which conforms to, as to that, which is conformed to. Perhaps this may be thought a proper definition of moral agency, or the practice of virtue; for you own, that free-will and reason are absolutely necessary to moral agency. And in another place you say, where there is no choice or free-agency, no morality can arise. But where these are, morality doth arise from the effects of an action made the object of choice. (Works of the Learned, 1743, p. 154.) From comparing all these passages together it seems to me, that you will readily admit the definition above mentioned, as a just and proper one of moral agency; but cannot admit it as a just definition of virtue in its abstract nature, stripped of every thing but its necessary relation to
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the nature of things, which how you will express in a definition I know not.

Continuation of the answer to Mrs Cockburn's Letter, viz. on obligation, &c.

11. **Y**OU will be pleased to remember what it was, that gave occasion to the favour you did me in communicating your thoughts on obligation: it was this query, which I had put, *viz. whether moral virtue and moral obligation must needs have the same foundation, and in the same sense?*

It appeared to me from your first reflection on this query in your former paper, to which I refer you, that you allowed to moral obligation (what you had denied to moral virtue) more foundations than one; and also that you spake of obligation as a term, that had no ambiguity in it.

Therefore in hopes I might tempt you to clear up the notion of obligation, and at the same time, that I might shew you I had some reason for my query, I proposed to you three notions of obligation, arising, as I conceived, from

from three different grounds, or built on three different foundations.

I had called these *three sorts of obligations*, as well as *three sorts of foundations*. To which your answer in the 11th paragraph of your last letter is, that you have constantly kept to one precise meaning of obligation, and you apprehend *there can be but one sort of it*, though *there were fifty different foundations of it*: and that what I call three sorts of obligation, seem to you *three sorts of foundations, upon which obligation, in one and the same sense, may, and does arise*.

And as you are so good as to define likewise this *one* sense of obligation, to which you constantly adhere, you have done all, that can be desired of you, and have enabled me to see more clearly, wherein the difference lies between your sentiments and mine on this branch of the subject.

You have considered obligation *only*, as it is in the mind of the moral agent, who is under it: as appears from your definition of it, *viz. such a perception of an inducement to act, or to forbear acting, as forces an agent to stand self-condemned, if he does not conform to it*. Whereas

I con-

I considered it, as others have done before me, more at large, as being obligation in an external as well as internal sense. When I said, for instance, that it was (in one sense of it) *the unalienable right, that truth has to be preferred before falsehood, good before bad, by all reasonable creatures that can distinguish between them*, I meant by this, that every creature, who is capable of making these distinctions, is *under obligation*, to prefer the one before the other, whether he hath that *perception*, which you define obligation by, or not. For his neglecting to make use of his faculties, or his undue use of them, will not release him from the obligation he lies under from the nature and truth of things. No matter how they are forgotten, denied, mistaken by careless, sensual, positive persons: they nevertheless stand in their full force of *obligation*, as that signifies their universal and unalienable right to be a rule of action to moral agents.

Now your definition does not take in obligation in this light, at least only partially, and so far as it is actually perceived by particular agents; and it takes in another kind of obligation, (*viz.* that of a mistaken judgment) which

which shall bind a particular agent, to act even contrary to obligation in the sense just now mentioned. I am not objecting to your definition on this account. So far from it, that I think it the fullest, the clearest, the most unexceptionable definition of *a sense* of obligation, that I have ever met with. It best describes an agent's state of mind under this *sense*, determines no particular foundation, yet suits with all, even mistaken and fancied foundations, from which nevertheless real obligations do sometimes arise; and it has an immediate and close connexion with practice; for our judgment or persuasion of the goodness or evil of actions, however gained, must be our present guide in all our conduct.

Now let it be observed here, before we go any further, 1st, that in your enquiry after the foundation of virtue, you considered virtue, not as it was practised by particular agents, but in its general abstract nature; in which view you give it *one only foundation*. When you come now to enquire into the foundations of obligation, you do not consider it as a general abstracted notion (as others have done, whose definitions you give me) but as a practical

tical principle in each particular moral agent, which makes him accountable for his conduct, and which forces him to condemn himself for his misconduct. And to obligation in this sense you allow several foundations. So far then granted to the purpose of my query, first proposed to you; that moral virtue and moral obligation *may not* have the *same foundation*, and in *the same sense*.

2dly, Your definition of obligation is different from all others, that I have heard of. It is not indeed the worse for that, nor do I esteem it the less. But however, it is a further proof to me, that *the precise meaning of it is as little settled in this part of the enquiry, as that of the term foundation and virtue were in the last*. This I had ventured to say in my *Reply* to you. And your *Answer* to it is, that “you acknowledge the precise meaning of it
“has not been scientifically settled, and that
“some have obscured, and others begged the
“question by defining it; but you do not
“find any misunderstandings have happened
“in the controversy from these defects,” &c. It is a marvel to me, that misunderstandings should not have happened in the controversy,

where the principal term was differently understood by different controvertists, as appears by their different definitions of it, now that they have at length thought fit to explain themselves. You are pleased to mention three of these definitions besides your own. So that you produce two on Dr Clarke's side of the question, and two on the side of his adversaries in the question. Those on the same side differ something from each other, but more considerably from those of the opposite side. And what you observe of *one* of these definitions on one side of the question, *that it is begging the question in favour of the author's beloved principle*, which he makes the foundation of virtue and obligation, I observe also of another definition, *viz.* Mr Balguy's on the other side of the question, who defines in favour of his beloved principle. Is not this a strong presumption of the truth of what I told you before, though you are not willing to allow it, *that it is chiefly owing to the different notions of obligation, that we have different foundations assigned to it?*

3dly, One thing more I would observe to you here, that your most accurate and judicious

cious writer on Dr Clarke's side agrees with me in distinguishing obligation into external and internal. By the *internal* he means, I think, much the same, that you do, *i. e.* the obligation of conscience. But the *external*, which arises from just authority, he says, he has no occasion to speak of on the subject of morality. But his discarding one sense of obligation in this manner is no answer to those, who plead a just authority to be at any time a sufficient obligation to action; especially those, who acknowledge no obligation without an obliger, *i. e.* a superior person having right of command. You observe, that "people in common discourse understand one another well enough, when they say they are under an obligation to do such and such a thing, though perhaps they could not define the word." Very true, they understand, that the persons, who say so, are thoroughly convinced by some strong and plain reason for acting, and purpose within themselves for such plain reason to do so and so. But this is all they understand, or perhaps enquire after; and is all that is necessary to know, in order to discover what such persons design to do.

But how doth it follow, that because people commonly agree in the general meaning of this expression, *being under obligation*, which is of the greatest latitude, and made use of in all sorts of subjects, and on all occasions ; therefore, writers on morality are agreed sufficiently in a meaning of the term, when used only in a moral sense? They may perhaps agree, that it is the moral reason of action. But when they come to distinguish *the moral reason* of action from all other reasons of it, then they are divided in their sentiments, or at least in their way of expressing themselves.

But you “ *have constantly kept to the same precise meaning of the term ;*” and so you may, as you consider it as in the mind of the agent only, *viz.* as a *perception of an inducement*, &c. which will always appear to be one and the same idea, though there be *fifty* different inducements, that may be thus perceived, and thereby become obligation in one and the same sense, all of them forcing the agent in the same manner, though not perhaps in the same degree, to stand self-condemned, if he do not comply with them. But though all of them have the nature of obligation thus
con-

considered, as perceptions of the agent, yet all of them have not an obligatory power inherent in them, or inseparable from them. For several things may be perceived to be inducements, that *shall force the agent*, &c. and be consequently obligations to the person so perceiving them, which, in reality, are things not obligatory, but are only, through error in judgment, thought to be so: while other things, that really have an obligatory power inseparable from them, through inattentiveness, or other criminal defect, may not come under his perception. Here then is room for a distinction of obligations under your own definitions of the term: One sort is real, the other is only imaginary. One is so in its own nature; the other is so only *in perception*, or in the *sense* of the agent.

You will say, that in treating on the subject of obligation, you have no concern with dis-tempered minds or erroneous consciences, but with persons capable of just and sound reasoning; that you are speaking of such obligations, as are *real*, and not such as are *only apparent*. Be it so: yet even among these, I apprehend, there are such evident distinctions, as denote

a difference in kind. *ex. gr.* Is it not one thing to be obliged by the natural equity of things, without looking for any further authority; and another thing to be obliged by the will of a superior, having right to command obedience, without looking for any further reason; and another still to be obliged by a prospect of the consequences, that will follow, upon acting or not acting, in such or such a manner?

I know you look upon the two last of these, only as *additional obligations*, or re-enforcements of the first original obligation: And that nothing in strictness can oblige, but the internal reasons of things duly perceived by the moral agent. And what I have “called
“ three sorts of obligation, seem to you three
“ sorts of foundations, upon which, obligation
“ tion in one, and the same sense, may, and
“ does arise: for there can be but one sort
“ of obligation you say, though there were
“ fifty different foundations of it.”

Madam, if I understand you right, you have but one invariable idea of *foundation*; and that so certain and adequate, so little liable to be misconceived, that you apprehend all writers
agree

agree in that one sense of the term. For the same reasons therefore, that you can allow, and speak of three sorts of *foundations*, you may admit of three sorts of obligations, without hurting your definition, which answers equally to them all, and indeed brings them all into the agent's mind, under one denomination. Your way of considering obligation to arise, in one and the same sense, from different and distinct grounds, doth not destroy my distinction of three sorts of obligation, any more than your using the term foundation in one and the same sense, when applied to these different grounds, hinders you from saying, as you do very properly, that they are three sorts of foundations. Whereby you cannot mean consistently with yourself, that these three several grounds are to be taken in three different senses of foundation (for you allow of no such different senses) but only, that these three several grounds, though diverse things in themselves, and of different signification, are nevertheless foundations of obligation, in one and the same sense and signification of the term foundation.

Give me leave likewise, to support my *expression* as well as *distinction*, by the authority of others. In *Chambers's Dictionary* you will meet with this *expression*: “ *There are three kinds of obligation, natural, civil, and mixed.*”

“ Natural obligations are founded on the mere bonds of natural equity, without any civil necessity, and without producing any action of constraint.”

It was this kind of obligation in our subject, that I intended to express by the unalienable rights, that truth has to be preferred before falsehood, good before bad, by all rational creatures, that can distinguish them; and its foundation, as I said, will be in the essential differences of things, and fitnesses of action flowing from them.

“ Civil obligation is that, which is supported by civil authority alone; which induces a constraint, without any principle or foundation in natural equity.”

It was this kind of obligation, so far as it could be considered in morals, that I intended, when I spoke of obligation, as being taken by some in *legal sense*, as implying an obliger or superior having authority to command obedience.

And

And in this view I said, that obligation in morals must certainly be founded in the will of God.

Not that I understand, as perhaps some do, that his will obliges, without any principle or foundation in natural equity; but that the will of such a being as God is, must, whenever it is made known to his creatures, oblige, without their having any other perception of the equity of it, than what they infer from his nature.

But indeed, the obligation, that is founded in God's will, doth answer better to *Chamber's* third division, *viz.* "mixed obligation is both
" natural and civil, being founded on natural
" equity, and further confirmed and enforced
" by civil authority." For the obligation arising from God's will is ever presumed to be founded equally in natural equity or the reason of things.

And lastly, by obligation in the grammatical sense, as implying constraint upon reluctance, I intended to express that kind of obligation in morals, which is enforced by sanctions of rewards and punishments. Which kind is proper for those, who neither will be
restrained

restrained by reason, nor by the will of God, on the legitimate motives of compliance with it, and who therefore must be *constrained* (as far as free will is capable of *constraint*) by some powerful inticements of reward, or dread of threatned punishments.

Upon this view of the matter, I shall leave you to judge and determine, whether these be properly *three sorts* (as I had called them) of obligation, or whether they be only one sort; or, obligation in one and the same sense of the word. But at the same time, I must approve your definition of obligation as the best (I repeat it) that I have met with for expressing the state of mind, that a moral agent is under from obligation of any sort, or in any sense.

Before we leave this point of obligation, I should take notice of what you say towards the end of your letter upon it, *viz.* “ the
“ right, say you, that truth has to be pre-
“ ferred before falsehood, is, according to your
“ apprehensions, not obligation, but a ground,
“ from whence obligation arises.”

Now I own *this right*, &c. is not obligation in your only way of considering that term, because you mean no more by it, than the
sense,

sense, that an agent has of obligation. You speak of it as a *personal* quality, or perception; and not as it is in things themselves, the object of such perception.

And here again, our difference is only in *words* or *expressions*, which, when explained, shew we are both in a sentiment as to the *thing*. When people speak of the obligation of the law of nature, or of civil laws, they do not speak improperly, though they intend no more by this obligation, than the authority and influence of those laws, which ought to bind moral agents and subjects universally, whether they do acknowledge them or not; because men, by the constitution of their nature, and subjects by their condition and situation in society, are capable of acknowledging them, and obeying them. But if you chuse, instead of ascribing obligation to these laws, or to the will of God itself, to say, that they only have an obligatory power, and are foundations of obligation in moral agents; I shall not oppose you in such way of speaking: only I think, the other is as justifiable, and more, according to common usage; and stands equally well with your own definition. For, according

cording to that, the obligation lies in the *inducement* to *act*, or to *forbear acting*; the perception of which *inducement* is the agent's *sense* of the obligation. Before perception, it was obligation in general to all creatures capable of it. But the perception makes it special. It is then obligation to the particular agent, that perceives it. The standing self-condemned is only a consequence upon the sense of obligation. But yet it is a consequence, that distinguishes it from all other perceptions of inducements, that do not infer obligation, and therefore was very properly put in to make out your definition, and render it complete.

12. To your next paragraph, in which you enter upon the last question, *viz.* "whether
 " the reason, nature, and fitness of things,
 " considered as antecedent to the divine will,
 " do appear under that consideration to be
 " obligatory to morality," &c. I need make no other answer than this, that it plainly appears, and is confessed by us both, that we mistook each other's meaning on that article. I had mistaken your meaning of antecedency to the divine will, when I put the query.
 And

And consequently, it was easy for you to mistake my intent in putting it. However, I am not sorry for the mistake I made, because it hath put you, in explaining yourself, to set me right, upon obliging me with a clear account of what Dr *Clarke* and his followers maintain, concerning the said antecedency, and the fallacy, whereby their adversaries maintain a contrary doctrine. I have already made my acknowledgments to you for this favour, in the beginning of this letter. I am likewise to thank you for shewing me, before you finish this article, that I have also wrongfully supposed you had made a distinction where you had made none. For as much as you use *obligatory*, and *foundation of obligation*, as equivalent expressions, and that wherever you affirm any principle to be a *foundation of obligation*, you beg to be understood, that it is *obligatory to morality*, I shall take care to remember this for the future.

13. I had allowed *the eternal ratios in some sense a foundation*; and, in what sense I meant it, I afterwards explained: But I said, if you either made them the *primary* or the *ultimate*
foun-

foundation of it (for both those words you had used) I must beg leave to doubt of it.

Upon this you tell me, that *if they are neither the one nor the other, you cannot guess in what sense I allow them to be a foundation at all.* I wonder a little at your being at a difficulty here, because your own there may be several foundations of obligation, of which one can only be the *primary*, and one the *ultimate*. So that you must acknowledge the rest to be foundations in *some other sense*, than as *primary* or *ultimate*.

But if you will please to look into that part of my letter, where this doubt occurs, you will see, that I objected against your making these ratios the *primary* foundation of obligation, only because they did not appear to me to be the foundation of the first motives or inducements to virtuous actions in mankind; in which light you had represented them to prove their obligation antecedent to that founded on God's will. To which I replied " your
 " argument for their being the primary foun-
 " dation of obligation from our perceptions
 " of duty in the essential differences, &c.
 " previous to our discovery, that they are
 " also

“ also the will of God, is not, I think, sufficient to intitle them to the *primacy*, which the moral sense, in that view, would claim before them, as being the *first* foundation of obligation, or the *first* principle, that lays men under moral obligations.”

14. This indeed, you think, may admit of a doubt, but nevertheless you are willing to exchange *primary* for *prior* to the discovery of the will of God, in which sense, I readily come into your sentiment.

15. Then as for ultimate, you know I acknowledge no ultimate in this subject, but God himself. In which, I think, you at length agree with me, *viz. that the only proper ultimate foundation of moral virtue, and moral obligation, is God himself.* In which conclusion whosoever concurs, may inoffensively retain any particular notions of his own, concerning foundations of them in a subordinate or secondary sense.

And now, Madam, I have gone through every part of your last obliging letter, not out of any humour of raising objections against what you have wrote, but with a desire to see, how far the three queries, which I first of all
put

put to you, deserve to be attended to on this subject. But as I have hitherto given no particular account of my own sentiments, further than they may be guessed at, or gathered from the queries themselves; and what I have since said, to justify my putting them to you, and more particularly in the conclusion of my last letter, where I hinted three points, which I apprehended might prove the issue of the controversy; you may possibly think, I am not so fair and ingenuous with you, as you have been with me; and expect, that I should give you, with the same unreservedness and freedom that you have used with me, my whole sense of the matter in dispute. Now I acknowledge, it is but reasonable and just, that I should do so. The extraordinary length of this letter will be my sufficient excuse for not offering to do it at present; but if I get leisure for it hereafter, and have your permission to trouble you again with another letter on this subject, I will lay before you my whole sense of the controversy, as far as it hath come to my knowledge from the writers in it, which it hath been my hap to look into.

In

In the mean time I remain, with the greatest
esteem,

*Your most obliged,
humble Servant,*

THO. SHARP.

*Mrs Cockburn's last letter to Dr Sharp on the
subject of moral virtue.*

October 2, 1747.

REV. SIR,

‘ I Hope you will excuse my keeping the
‘ MS. so long, which you favoured me
‘ with. I was desirous to accompany it with
‘ some thoughts of mine upon it, which I
‘ have not been able to do sooner.

‘ I make no doubt, Sir, that the term
‘ *foundation*, as it is figuratively used, may
‘ have different significations, when applied
‘ to different things; but you will think me
‘ very tenacious of my opinion, when I say,
‘ that I still think most writers mean by it
‘ the ground, on which that, which they
‘ apply it to, stands, or from which it arises;
‘ nor do I think, that their different applica-

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‘ tions

' tions of it is any just ground of suspicion,
 ' that they do not agree in their idea of it.
 ' For my own case in particular, I am pretty
 ' sure I have the same idea of it, and use it in
 ' the same sense, when I apply it to *virtue*
 ' and *obligation*; and though I say of one,
 ' that it arises *solely* from the nature of things,
 ' and of the other, that it may arise from *se-*
 ' *veral grounds*, this I apprehend to make no
 ' difference in the sense of the term *founda-*
 ' *tion*, when applied to both; but only to ex-
 ' press a difference in the nature of the things,
 ' to which I apply it, to express my opinion,
 ' that it is of the nature of virtue in the ab-
 ' stract, to arise from no other foundation
 ' than that which I have assigned it; but that
 ' obligation, though arising from the same
 ' foundation, may, by the nature of it, arise
 ' likewise from several other grounds, all
 ' equally foundations in the very same sense,
 ' as *grounds on which it arises*; for I cannot
 ' see, that assigning one or more foundations
 ' to a thing makes any difference in the sense
 ' of the term. And indeed, Sir, it seems to
 ' me, that those other instances you have
 ' given for different senses of foundation,
 ' are

are not really such, except that from Mr Warburton. The orderly introduction to a Thesis is, I believe, a very different sense from what is commonly understood by the term *foundation*, and I think, I should not have chose it on that occasion; but no doubt, he is a much better judge of the propriety of it than I can be. Mr Hooker's manner of expression looks, I own, like two senses of foundation; but, perhaps, if his sense is attended to, distinct from his expression, he will appear to be enquiring after two senses of *faith*, rather than of foundation. This is, I think, his sense. If by *faith* is meant our belief in general of the Christian religion, then the writings of the Evangelists, &c. are the foundation of it: but, if by *faith* is meant the principal thing which is believed, then God, manifest in the flesh, is that principal point, the foundation of all the rest. Here are plainly two different senses of faith; but the term foundation seems to me to be applied to both, in the sense of a ground on which something is built, the idea I have always affixed to it. And surely the apostle gives us the same idea, when he says, no

‘ other foundation of the Christian church can
 ‘ be laid, but Jesus Christ; and yet afterwards
 ‘ says, it is built on the foundation of the apostles
 ‘ and prophets. They are both foundations in
 ‘ the sense I understand that term, the one
 ‘ principal indeed, and the other subordinate;
 ‘ and if you please to call these different senses,
 ‘ I shall not dispute it, but I think such a dif-
 ‘ ference can cause no confusion or mistakes.
 ‘ The passages collected at the end of your
 ‘ papers all relate to the practice of virtue,
 ‘ which may, as well as obligation, have se-
 ‘ veral foundations; and, I think, that term,
 ‘ does in all of them signify a ground, from
 ‘ which the thing they apply it to arises.

‘ However, supposing all the foregoing to
 ‘ be different senses, you are pleased to ask
 ‘ me, “ if there is no room for any distinc-
 ‘ tions of this kind in the dispute about the
 ‘ foundations of virtue.” I cannot say, Sir,
 ‘ what room there may be for it, but have
 ‘ expressed my opinion, (perhaps a little too
 ‘ positively) that no misapprehension has arisen
 ‘ on this subject, on account of such distinc-
 ‘ tions, or could be removed by any expla-
 ‘ nation of that term. And I now beg leave
 ‘ to

‘ to give you my reason for this opinion. I
‘ have endeavoured to find out some different
‘ sense of foundation, which might alter the
‘ state of the question between the writers on
‘ that subject, or set it in a different light, but
‘ have not been able, to discover any; and,
‘ what is much more considerable, Dr *Sharp*
‘ himself (as much as he is inclined to suspect,
‘ that those writers do not agree in their idea
‘ of the term *foundation*) has not discovered
‘ where their disagreement lies; who, I make
‘ no doubt, is penetrating enough to discern
‘ it, if there was really any such thing. And
‘ therefore, when he can point out such a
‘ disagreement, as, when explained, would
‘ help to adjust the matters in debate, I shall
‘ readily give up my opinion. Till then, he
‘ will excuse me for thinking, that the term
‘ *foundation* is *not* capable of the same distinc-
‘ tions and divisions, as the term *cause*, and
‘ therefore fitter to be retained in this con-
‘ troversy.

‘ Will you forgive me, Sir, if I tell you,
‘ that I have always thought those logical
‘ distinctions fit only for the schools; and
‘ that they rather puzzle and perplex, than

' clear up an argument to readers, who are
 ' not used to their language? Nay, that the
 ' intention of their divisions may be rather
 ' more intelligibly expressed, without taking
 ' notice of them, Dr *Rutherford* having used
 ' the term *cause*, gave me the fittest occasion
 ' to put him in mind, that in the logical di-
 ' vision of causes, he had considered only the
 ' *final cause*: But what would my argument
 ' have gained by this? He asserts, that no
 ' *essential differences*, no *perception of the rela-*
 ' *tions of things*, no *moral sense*, &c. can be a
 ' cause of obligation to practise virtue; no-
 ' thing, in short, but a view to a man's own
 ' happiness; and this as effectually excludes a
 ' *material and formal cause*, as if he had ex-
 ' pressed them. On the other side, when I
 ' affirm, that those principles direct us to vir-
 ' tue, make us stand self-condemned, if we
 ' counteract them, &c. and that therefore they
 ' are true and proper causes or grounds of
 ' obligations; I believe the reasoning is as
 ' good, and at least as intelligible, as if I had
 ' called them *material and formal causes*.

' Then, Sir, as to the difference between Mr
 ' *Warburton* and me, you know he allows, that
 ' virtue

‘ virtue is founded on the essential difference,
‘ nature, &c. of things ; and yet he main-
‘ tains, that nothing but *will*, or the law of a
‘ superior, can constitute the morality of ac-
‘ tions. I on the other hand assert, that act-
‘ ing agreeably to the essential difference, na-
‘ ture, and fitness of things, is *moral virtue* ;
‘ and that the free choice of an agent, judg-
‘ ing his action to be right or wrong, though
‘ without reference to any will, *properly con-*
‘ *stitutes the morality of it.* Here are, I think,
‘ included three of the logical divisions of
‘ causes, *viz. the material, the formal, and the*
‘ *efficient* : But how the use of those terms,
‘ or any explanation of foundation can help to
‘ adjust this difference of sentiments, I confess
‘ I do not see.

‘ Or, in the case of those, who differ from
‘ us both, by maintaining, that the will of
‘ God is the sole foundation or cause of vir-
‘ tue ; that nothing is good or evil in its own
‘ nature, till made so by his appointment :
‘ What distinctions or explanations can possi-
‘ bly be found out to reconcile this difference?

‘ You say, Sir, that the nature and eternal
‘ reasons of things may perhaps be found

' only a *partial* foundation, equivalent to no-
 ' thing more, than what the logicians term a
 ' *material cause*. But what shall we gain by
 ' this discovery, if the truth is, as I think it
 ' is, that the *abstract nature* of virtue cannot
 ' possibly arise from any other cause or foun-
 ' dation? The reason, and the free will of
 ' agents, may indeed, be considered as the
 ' formal and efficient causes of *the practice* of
 ' virtue; and these I have not neglected to
 ' take notice of, though I have not made use
 ' of those terms.

' However, Sir, I perfectly agree with you,
 ' that it would be much to the advantage of
 ' this controversy, if all the writers in it
 ' would explain their terms, particularly in
 ' what sense they speak of virtue, and in what
 ' they place the nature of it; and if they
 ' would declare themselves on all those dis-
 ' tinctions you have pointed at towards the
 ' end of your papers. It were to be wished
 ' too, that they would affirm or deny no point
 ' in debate with regard to man, considered
 ' *solely* as a rational, a social, or a sensible na-
 ' ture, but, as he truly is, a compound of all
 ' together. The error of such a partial con-
 ' sideration

‘ fideration of man I took notice of in my
‘ former remarks; and I had thoughts, on
‘ occasion of Mr *Seed’s* Sermons, to say some-
‘ thing of the *indeterminate use of terms*; for
‘ he has given us two or three different defi-
‘ nitions of virtue in the same discourse: But
‘ my ill health did not allow me to do this
‘ time enough for an appendix to the *Remarks*
‘ on *Dr Rutherford*, so it was dropped. There
‘ seems likewise some explanation wanted of
‘ the terms used by *Dr Clarke’s* followers,
‘ *eternal truths, immutable nature, and relations*
‘ of things, &c. These have been much
‘ mistaken, or misrepresented by their oppo-
‘ sers. But I think I have done my part on
‘ these subjects, and need not trouble the
‘ world or you any more with the reflections
‘ of,



S I R,

Your obliged humble servant,

C. COCKBURN.

Oct. 2, 1747.

‘ I am much disappointed, Sir, in not
‘ having the satisfaction of seeing you on your
‘ return, as we expected. I designed then to
‘ have

‘ have enquired after a second part of your
 ‘ MS, which it seems to promise; and to
 ‘ have expressed my sincere thanks for your
 ‘ condescension, in bestowing so much pains
 ‘ on mine. When I am able to revise it, I
 ‘ shall make the best use I can of your judi-
 ‘ cious observations.

‘ If you have done with *Wisdom the first*
 ‘ *spring of action in the Deity*, be pleased to
 ‘ send it when you have an opportunity, and
 ‘ I should be glad to know whether it answer-
 ‘ ed your expectation. My respects to your
 ‘ Lady.’

Dr Sharp's Answer to Mrs Cockburn's Letter
of October 2. 1747.

MADAM,

I Thank you for the favour of your late
 letter; and assure you, that I have perused
 it attentively; and that every thing, that you
 write, makes an impression upon me, and puts
 me upon review of my own sentiments. I am
 quite ashamed to harp so long upon the first
 string in the dispute *foundation*. I shall now
 make

make my dying speech upon it, resolving never to trouble you with it more.

No doubt, Madam, "*most writers mean by foundation the ground on which that, which they apply it to, stands, or from which it arises.*" Because what will not answer to one or other of these explanations can be in no sense *any foundation* at all. For the idea taken from the first and literal meaning must in course be carried through all the metaphorical uses of it, more or less distinctly. But then *most writers* do likewise leave it ambiguous, in which of these two senses it must be taken : for though you seem indeed to represent it as *one sense*, or *one idea*, of which you give it two explanations, yet in truth each of your explanations conveys a distinct idea, *viz.* the one not precisely the same with the other, but varying from the other sufficiently to make a perceptible difference, and to cause confusion in a dispute depending upon clearness of ideas.

You may remember I had observed to you in my enquiry after the various usages of the term, that the figurative uses of it, established by custom, were of two sorts, or might be
thrown

thrown into two classes; one *more proper*, being the first remove from the primary or literal sense, viz. *a ground on which any thing stands*, rests, is supported or established; and the other *less proper*, being a further translation of the term to stand for the idea of a *source*, or *beginning* from whence any thing takes its *rise*, or *springs*, or is *deduced*. This is the metaphor in a further remove; and comes to the same sense with those other metaphors, *root* and *fountain*, which give not the same idea, that is carried through the former class.

Now then I grant there is no one of the writers, but assigns a foundation for virtue, and for obligation in one or other of these general metaphorical senses: nor can the term in this large and extensive acceptance of it, be said to be misused by any of them in their applications of it. Yet how can they be said to be *agreed in the idea of it*, when they apply it, in this question about virtue, sometimes in one of these senses, and sometimes in the other? Making it stand indiscriminately (for so it must stand, till it is explained and defined) not only for essential, necessary, and immu-

immutable principles, but for motives, inducements, ends, &c. and when they apply it to the subject, of which the foundation is sought in one of these senses, by inquiring upon what *bottom virtue stands*, or is established, and then proceed to assign that foundation in the other sense; by resolving that enquiry into something, from whence virtue confessedly *arises* or *springs*, but doth not stand, or is not established upon it.

The controversy is, as I take it, what is *the foundation* of moral virtue? Now there are many assignments made of grounds, which are all of them foundations of it, in the general idea of *grounds on which it stands, or from which it ariseth*. Either therefore, *they are all foundations* of virtue, (and if this idea be one and the same, as you say, in all writers minds, they are *all equally foundations*;) or if they be not, we must have a more determinate idea of what ought to be reputed, and called *the foundation*, in the application of that term to this subject, before the question can be resolved. For since *the term hath different significations, when applied to different things*, (which you also acknowledge) and is of more than ordinary impor-

importance, to be rightly understood, when it is applied to virtue and obligation, especially when so great a stress seems to be laid upon it in this debate; I should apprehend the true meaning of the enquiry to be, which among all the different significations of foundation, in the figurative use of the word, is *that*, which suits best with so complex an idea, as that of moral virtue is: and consequently, whether this, or that, assignment of a foundation be the most proper in this case. Perhaps it were better to let so uncertain and vague a word be wholly dropp'd in these disputes: but if the controversy must be carried on upon the shoulders of this term, I know of no method so effectual in prosecuting it, as examining carefully the whole metaphorical usage of the word, and judging from thence, of the propriety or impropriety, of the several applications of it, to this subject, without resting on that general meaning, which it necessarily carries through all the figurative uses of it. For though that meaning be all that necessarily goes to the idea of *a foundation in general*; yet it is not all, that goes to the notion of *the foundations* in this special application of the term.

term. Which had it been better attended to, we should scarce have seen principal motives, or the first apparent springs of actions, represented as the grounds, on which virtue stands established, nor subordinate foundations substituted in the room of the principal, nor adventitious taken in the place of original.

Though therefore, I would not be thought tenacious, any more than yourself, (having less reason, I am sure, to be so than you have) yet I cannot give up my suspicions, that most of the writers in this controversy, though they have agreed to use the term indefinitely, are not agreed in any one precise meaning of it, but use it in senses *not the same*. And that it is too delusory a word, while it stands unexplained by them, to bear the stress and weight of so delicate a dispute, as hath arisen from it.

When I something more than hinted, at your taking foundation in two different senses yourself, in one, when applied to the abstract idea of virtue, and in the other, when applied to obligation; (which I perceive you have taken notice of, and are applied to) I gave you the reason of my apprehension, which was this. You had given me your sense of
foun-

foundation, in the beginning of your correspondence; viz. *the ground on which moral virtue, (viz. virtue in it's abstract nature, as you afterwards explained it) solely arises, on that, without which, there could be no such thing as virtue.* Now it appear'd to me, that you could not intend *foundation* in this sense, when you applied it to the many grounds, from which you said obligation might arise. Because *it could not be said of any one of them, that it is the ground, on which obligation solely arises, or that without which there could be no such thing as obligation.* Therefore I inferred from the manner of your applying the term to obligation, that you meant no more by it, when so applied, than *a sufficient motive or a reasonable inducement.* A sense, which the word carries, though it be different from the sense of it, when applied by you to the abstract idea of virtue.

Now you have neither shewed me, that I judged wrong in thinking these were two different senses of foundation; nor that the word in either of these senses may be indifferently applied, either to the idea of virtue in the abstract, or to obligation; but you have only apprised me, that *you have the same idea*
of

of it, and use it in the same sense, when you apply it to virtue and to obligation. This same idea, and same sense, I may presume, is that same, which most other writers have and mean, viz. the ground on which that which they apply it to, stands, or from which it arises; which you look upon as one idea, or one sense only. Be it so; you are allowed to have this sense and idea of foundations in both applications; because, if this had been wanting in either of them, they could not have been called foundations at all.

But then, although this is the most you *may mean* by the term, and though you mean always *to use it in the same sense*; doth it follow, that there is no ambiguity in the term itself, which, in one of these applications, might have signified (and so you once did expound it yourself) the ground, on which any thing so wholly arises, *as that, without it, there could be no such thing*; and in the other, may only signify simply, *a ground on which any thing arises*, but yet not essential to its production, or necessary to its being.

Surely here is a distinction between foundations (and a remarkable one too) which in

your *one idea*, and *one sense of the term* (as you now explain them) you do not reach. And, if *most writers* mean no more by it than you do (which yet will be a question, till they tell us so) I cannot possibly discover, what you are contending about, under this term *foundation*, rather than any other term; since none of you (according to your present account) mean any thing more by it, than what is equally true in every application, that every one of you makes of it.

I shall not allow this distinction between foundations, in this subject, to be called either *unnecessary* or *nice*, till they are given up for such, in the following instance. A certain author had laid the foundation of obligation in rewards and punishments; conceiving, that *obligation arose solely from a prospect of them*. He went too far indeed in saying *solely*, since there are other grounds of obligation: But, however, he uses *foundation* rightly, since that means only *a ground on which any thing ariseth*; in which *sense*, or according to which *idea*, foundation is justly applied to the prospect of rewards and punishments. Hereupon, he is advertised, by a very judicious adversary, *that*

that these cannot be the foundation of obligation, though he supposes all Obligation to arise solely from a prospect of them. They are only a new motive to the performance of duty, but no new foundation of it. [*Works of the Learned, August 1743. p. 120.*] Now would it be sufficient for the author abovementioned, to reply to these just and necessary distinctions, that *they* are all equally foundations in the very same sense, as grounds on which obligation arises; and that assigning one or more foundations to a thing makes no difference in the sense of the term? and that rewards and punishments, whether the sole foundation or not, would at least be a new foundation of obligation? and as properly so, as any other thing, since there is but one idea, one sense of the word in this dispute? I do not see how you could obviate such a reply, upon the footing on which, you have now put the whole meaning of foundation in this controversy. You would find it necessary, to have recourse to your former distinctions, between *that*, from which any thing derives, or to which it owes its being, or without which there could be no such thing; and *that*, which is no more than a superinduced motive, or

ground of an *additional obligation*, or a further enforcement of the true and genuine principle. But these are distinctions, which the term foundation in the *one idea* and *one sense*, that you are pleased to confine it to at present, can never reach; and therefore till it be more particularly and specifically defined, it cannot but have, and retain a perplexing ambiguity in these subjects.

You may indeed intend no more, by your applying foundation, as *one* to virtue in the abstract, and *as many* to obligation, than to *express a difference in the nature of the things, to which you apply it*. But you do really, at the same time, express a difference in the senses of foundation. Nay, you will find in due attention to your other writings, that you really make a difference in the senses of foundation, when applied to obligation only; tho' you may not always express this difference in direct words. When you say here, that obligation, *though arising from the same foundation*, with virtue in the abstract, *may by the nature of it arise likewise from several other grounds all equally foundations, in the very same sense, as grounds on which it arises*; you must mean

mean a sameness of sense in this respect only, that it may be equally said of them all, that they are *grounds on which it arises*; which is true indeed, but not to the purpose of my enquiry, nor sufficiently expressive of your own *whole* sense of the matter. For when you speak your opinion fully, these other grounds, from which likewise obligation, by the nature of it, arises, are only new *motives*; they are not new *foundations*. They all refer to *that true original ground of moral obligation, about which* (you say in another place, *Works of the Learned*, p. 125.) *this controversy is*; *that* being the only legitimate one in nature. They introduce no new moral obligation, in the usual sense of the word, and cannot therefore be the foundation of obligation, *viz.* in that sense of the word, about which the controversy is; and consequently, if I infer rightly, not *in the very same sense*; neither are they *all equally foundations*.

You are pleased to conjecture, that Mr *Hooker*, in the passage I cited from him, is enquiring after two senses of *faith*, rather than that of *foundation*. Give me leave to repeat and review the passage. His subject

is not the *nature* of faith, but the *foundation* of it.

“ Let us see, says he, what *the foundation*
 “ of faith is. If it does import the general
 “ *ground*, whereupon we rest, when we do
 “ believe, the writings of the Evangelists and
 “ Apostles are *the foundation* of the *Christian*
 “ faith. But if the *name* of *foundation* do note
 “ the principal thing, which is believed, then
 “ is *the foundation* of our faith *God manifest*
 “ *in the flesh*.”

You are pleased to say, “ that if his sense
 “ be attended to, distinct from his expression,”
 you apprehend it may be taken thus :

“ If by *faith* is meant our belief in general
 “ of the *Christian* religion, then the writings
 “ of the Evangelists, &c. are the foundation
 “ of it. But if by *faith* is meant the prin-
 “ cipal thing which is believed, then God
 “ manifest in the flesh is that principal point,
 “ the foundation of all the rest.”

Now, Madam, whether you and Mr *Hooker*
 say, or mean the same thing, I shall leave to
 your own review of both passages ; and shall
 only observe to you, that notwithstanding
 your substitution of *faith*, in the room of
foun-

foundation of faith, you have not avoided the necessity of admitting his distinction between *foundations*. For when you say, “ if by faith “ is meant our belief in general of the *Chriftian* religion, then the writings of the Evangelists, &c. are the *foundation* of it ;” can you mean any thing else by *foundation* here, than what Mr *Hooker* does, *the general ground, whereon we rest, when we believe?* And when you proceed, “ but if by faith is meant the “ principal thing, which is believed, then God “ manifest in the flesh is that principal point, “ the *foundation* of all the rest ;” do you mean any thing else by *foundation* here, than what Mr *Hooker* does, *viz. the principal thing which is believed?* Now Mr *Hooker* plainly thought, that *foundation* was taken in different senses, when it imported, in one case, *the ground whereon we rest when we believe*, and when it denoted in the other case *the principal thing believed*. For surely, the capital article of belief is a *foundation* of faith in another sense than that, in which the authority, truth, and certainty of scripture records are a *foundation* of it. We rest upon the one as the proof and evidence, upon which our belief is built

and established; and we refer to the other as to a first principle or fountain-head, from whence all other articles of belief are deduced; or, a root, which nourishes all the branches, that grow from it. He, that denies this proposition, *God manifest in the flesh, or Christ the son of the living God, or Christ the Saviour of the world, doth utterly erase* (says Mr Hooker) *the foundation of our faith*: Not as it is built upon testimony, but as it necessarily hangs on this capital or primary article of belief.

You observe, that in Mr Hooker's account, as you have given it, "*there are plainly two different senses of faith.*" Allowed: But, "*the term foundation, you say, seems to you applied to both in the sense of a ground, on which something is built.*" This I little doubt of, for the reason just now given. However, supposing that sense must necessarily accompany the term, yet it will not destroy Mr Hooker's real distinction. For in both the branches of your distinction, faith means *something that is believed*. And if faith, as you say, has, in that distinction, plainly two different senses, and yet in both these senses, may retain and convey the idea of *something that is believed*;

believed; why should you make a difficulty of admitting, that *foundation* hath two senses also, though it may in both those senses retain and convey the idea of a ground on which something is built?

I observe you are willing to allow St Paul's two foundations of the *Christian* church, capable of being considered under the distinction of *principal* and *subordinate*; which is an ingenuous concession in one, who can apprehend no difference in the use of the term:

But add, such distinction or "*difference can cause no confusion or mistakes*, among the writers in this controversy; neither have I yet discovered where their disagreement lies, or shewn how such disagreement, when explained, would help to adjust the matters in debate."

It would be a good thing, if any person more able than myself would try his hand in this business. I have done my part in endeavouring to shew, and I hope, to some degree of satisfaction, that the debate cannot be ended, till the sense of the several terms be better adjusted than they are. Three of the four, *viz. moral*, and *virtue*, and *obligation*, have proved of so ambiguous meaning, that con-

tests

tests have been actually raised about them. That the like have not been raised about the fourth term in the question, *viz. foundation*, I have ventured to suspect, and to propose as my conjecture, might be owing, not to any peculiar perspicuity in the term itself, or the idea it conveyed, but to its peculiar luck in having never been defined; which I apprehended would shew, whenever it was done, that this term was as susceptible of various interpretations, and as capable of bearing a contest, as any of the other three terms in the question.

And for the truth of this I appeal to all, that you your yourself have been pleased to say by way of definition, explanation, illustration, &c. of this same term.

But I have “ *not yet discovered, where the disagreement of the several writers about the sense and meaning of term lies.*” But this is impossible for any person to do, till they shall all define it in their own sense, as you have done; and then I presume the disagreement will appear of itself. However, as far as a discovery can be made by probable circumstances and reasonable inferences, I am apt to per-

persuade myself, that I have, by comparing the views, in which different authors seem to have used this term, discovered their disagreement in it. In proof of which I must appeal to all that I myself have said upon this subject; withal freely confessing, that if I have not been successful in this attempt, nor made good my undertaking, as far as is abovementioned, I cannot do it better; having said all that is of any consequence in the matter.

As to "*pointing out such a disagreement, as when explained will help to adjust the matters in debate,*" I have not been wanting in my endeavours to do this also, as often as it hath fallen in my way. I have shewn foundation to have been used in this dispute in all the usual senses, in which *cause* is taken in other subjects; and the inconveniencies of not defining and distinguishing it, as the word *cause* is commonly distinguished, to have appeared as plainly in this dispute, as they must have appeared in any other dispute about the *cause* of a thing, while *cause* was indiscriminately used, (and consequently in all appearance in the very same sense too) in every application of it to various things. From whence I have
inferred,

inferred, that if foundations were distinguished in some such manner as causes are, it would help to *adjust the matters in debate*; as the distinction of causes is found greatly subservient to the clearing up all questions, wherein that term is made use of.

But you think the term *foundation* is not capable of the same distinctions and divisions as the term *cause*. If this be really so, then for the same reason, that you think it *fit to be retained in this controversy*, I cannot but judge it not fit to be used at all in this controversy, and much less fit to have the stress of the controversy laid upon it. It would, I own, be talking too much in a new language, to speak of material, formal, efficient, and final foundations. But if, instead of this, we substitute the word *principle*, we may talk of *material and formal, &c. principles*, and do no more than what others have done before us, and I think with great propriety as well as with good effect; as I shewed you from the use of those words by Chauvin. “ *But these*
 “ *logical distinctions are only fit for the schools,*
 “ *and rather puzzle and perplex, than clear*
 “ up

“ up to readers, who are not used to their language.”

I believe you might perceive, by what I said about them, when I propos'd them as useful in this subject, that I am not fond of using them where they can be as well avoided; and am absolutely against the use of them to readers, who are not used to them. Yet I apprehend, that such readers, as either are not used to them, or that despise them, are not fit to read and judge in this controversy, which depends so much upon distinctions, and nice ones too; and all of them logical, whether people are willing to receive them under that character, or not.

But the *intention* of these (logical) “*divisions may be rather more intelligibly expressed, without taking notice of them.*” Whenever this can be done, I prefer it to logical terms. Nay, if the intention of them be but *as* intelligibly expressed in other words, I approve its being so. Nor has any body been more happy than yourself in doing this; for your distinctions are clear and satisfactory, without any parade of learning. But then, what I complain of, is, that other writers in this

con-

controversy about moral virtue, have not done so too. As to the term *foundation* in particular, I desire no logical terms to be used, in explaining what it means, in all the several applications of it in this dispute, provided you can find a way to explain it, without recourse to logical forms. Which hitherto, in my opinion, you have not done (forgive my saying so) after having tried two or three different ways, to express the precise meaning of it.

When Dr *Clarke*, in arguing against the principles of *Hobbes*, asserted and proved the truth of the old doctrine, that the ratios of good and evil were eternal and immutable, and that virtue or the goodness of actions was, by necessary consequence, immutable in its nature, and independent on will and appointment; he called this principle, which was *the foundation* of his argument for the immutable nature of virtue, *the foundation* of moral virtue, the *true foundation*, and the *only foundation*. In all which he was well enough understood, especially as he argued in the synthetic way, by deducing virtue as a necessary consequence from the ratios of things themselves. But when others afterwards, attending

tending more to the sense of *foundation*, when applied to virtue, than to the necessary relation virtue bore to the essential differences of things, began to consider, whether this was the *only and true foundation*, or whether there were not some other things, which might be properly styled *foundations* too ; and thereupon, finding a suitable application of this term, or a proper foundation of virtue, in as many different respects, as virtue could be considered in different true lights ; each of them was tempted to throw in his sentiments of foundation in that light, in which he chose to consider virtue, and so begat the late controversy about *foundations*. Whereas, had the first question been kept to, which was the eternal and immutable nature of morality (into which foundation seem'd to have flipp'd without any design of making it a part of the controversy, or laying any stress upon it) ; all the contest about foundations in moral sense, public affections, universal benevolence, private happiness, and whatever else induces moral obligation, had been superseded. And the question about *foundation*, if a question must be made about it, would have been only this,
viz.

viz. whether the essential differences of things; and fitnesses arising thereupon, be that foundation, or rather the will of the creator implied in those fitnesses? Between which, I think, Dr *Clarke* made no distinction, and which you say are one and the same thing.

And thus it is I account for the misapprehensions, that have arisen in this subject, in the use of the term *foundation*; the original question having been overlooked, and a transition made into another question, which is more about the proper use of this unnecessary term, than about the true principles of morality. And as for that further question, that arose upon Dr *Clarke's*, upon which Mr *Balguy* takes so much ingenious pains, concerning an antecedency of the reason and truth of things to the will of God, and their absolute independency upon it; or, *vice versâ*, whether it hath arisen from a conception, that the one must necessarily have a foundation in the other, or only from the difficulties, that attend giving the priority to either, I cannot tell; but I take it to be a question having so many intricacies in it, that I am apt to think it will never be clear'd up, on either side, to

satis-

satisfaction, or any otherwise determined, than by resolving it into the incomprehensible nature of God himself.

“ But if any misapprehension,” you say, “ hath arisen on account of the different applications of foundation, you do not see how they could be removed by any explanation of that term.” No ; but by an explanation of what they mean by that term, in each particular application of it. You have so discountenanced the logical distinctions, which might serve this purpose, that I must endeavour to express them intelligibly, if I can, without taking notice of them. Dr *Clarke's* foundation, as he uses it, may be explained by the reason, or proofs, or evidence of the natural immutability of moral virtue, and moral obligation. This reason, proof, &c. lies in the eternal and essential differences of things, &c. And in this way of considering virtue, this is the true and proper foundation : For it excludes all others from the pretence of being so ; unless we except the will of God ; which yet, if understood of the will implied in the creation, coincides with it, or rather is the same ; and, if taken absolutely, is another question from that, which he considers.

When another person says, that the fitnesses and relations arising from the essential differences, &c. are the foundation, and *sole foundation* of virtue in the abstract; the meaning seems to be, and so I must judge, till it be better explain'd, that the idea of virtue's nature is taken immediately and solely from thence, *i. e.* they are the objects of intellecti-
on, upon which the mind inwardly reflecting gains the idea.

When Dr *Clarke* says, liberty must be *the foundation* of morality in man, and *the sole ground* of his accountableness, &c. he is viewing the question purely as it regards the agent. Then the capacity of chusing, or the power of making elections, is the proper foundation of moral agency: Or, as he explains it himself in another place, "freedom of will, which, according as it is determined in different circumstances by the reasonableness of what is good, or incitements of what is evil, renders the agent morally good or evil." Now when liberty is made *a foundation*, I conceive nothing more is meant, than that it is a necessary antecedent, a requisite to morality, that is indispensable.

Here

Here then we are come to the idea of *practical virtue*, as distinguished from the abstracted, *viz.* the conformity of a moral agent to the reasons of things. And what is the foundation of this conformity? Why here comes in that great principle, and spring of moral actions, which we agree to call obligation, and which extends to every thing, that moves the will to moral and right action. And here foundations are multiplied, one thing being the foundation of this conformity in one instance, another in another, a third in a third, &c. according to the capacities, improvements, and infinitely various circumstances and situations of moral agents. And the question about the preference of one above another, or of the propriety of one being called a foundation rather than another, can only, in my apprehension, lie in this, *viz.* which of them is most universal or most prevalent; or to which we may most justly ascribe the virtue, that is practised in the world. And when this is the question, I further humbly apprehend, that they, who make the prospect of rewards or private happiness the *foundation*, will have the advantage, though they seem to be in the wrong, if they suppose obligation to *arise solely*

from thence. And that they, who ground obligation on the mere essential differences and fitnesses, &c. will have less proof *from fact* to support their foundation, although it really be the nobler principle, and also the first and original principle of obligation.

And now, Madam, I take my leave of you, but with very great concern, I must assure you, because I find I am not to hear from you any more, at least not on this subject. Those words in the conclusion of your letter, that *you have done your part, and need not trouble the world or me with any more of your reflexions*; what shall I say to them? However sensibly I am touched with the loss of so agreeable a correspondent, I must not forget to thank you heartily for the instructive *part you have performed* in these subjects; and for your condescensions and favours to me in particular, under a just sense of which I subscribe myself,

Your faithful, and

obedient servant,

T. SHARP

The

The SPEECH made at *Fare-well-Hall*,
to the Honourable and Right Rev.
Father in God *Richard* by Divine
Providence Lord Bishop of *Durham*,
on his Lordship's first Arrival in his
Diocese, on *Friday, July 6, 1753.*

SUFFER my Lord a short Interruption,
while your Chapter beg Leave to pay
their first Duties to your Lordship; and to
offer their Service in conducting you to your
Throne.

As it was a great Honour to me to repre-
sent your Lordship to the Dean and Chapter
at your Instalment; so it is now my Duty by
my Office to address your Lordship, as the
Dean and Chapters Representative, on this
most acceptable Occasion.

For tho' there needs no other Attestation
to your Lordship's most welcome Reception
among us, than that of the public Joy which
is expressed in so general a Concourse to your
first Appearance in Person with us; yet I am
charged in particular, my Lord, with the

Congratulations of our Capitular Body, upon your safe Arrival in your Diocese; and with the Tender of our Canonical Obedience and Respects, and with the public Repetition of our Wishes, that your Lordship may long possess, and may long be happy in possessing this eminent Station to which Providence hath called you.

It has been, and it is our Boast, that this antient *See*, with this *Palatinate* annexed, illustrious for several Ages in this Kingdom for extraordinary Dignity and Powers, hath not hitherto been destitute of Prelates corresponding thereto, but hath been filled, and properly supported in these Pre-eminences (so far at least as the Remembrance of any of our Body reacheth) by Men illustrious in themselves, great in their Abilities and Repute, if not great also by their Birth and Extraction: Whose Virtues, Learning, and other Accomplishments have given, from Time to Time, additional Lustre to our Episcopal Chair.

So singular a Regard have our *Princes* had for this Church and County, in selecting Persons of the most distinguished Characters to
sustain

sustain an Office of distinguished Prerogatives, as well as Amplitude of Jurisdiction.

And in our Recitals of these Royal Favours, we must in an especial Manner acknowledge *his* present *Majesty's* Discernment, as well as Goodness to us in all *his* Designations to this See: Whereby the Series in the Roll of this Succession hath still preserv'd its wonted Splendor, is still continued uniformly, great and venerable: Whereby we are enabled not only to commemorate past Blessings under two of *his* gracious Appointments; but also to anticipate our future Felicity from the auspicious Commencement of a *Government* of this Church and Diocese; which, as we gather from the rising Prospect of it, will be perfectly accommodated and adequate to our Desires. And we indulge our Hopes, to a Degree scarce distinguishable from Assurance, that we shall soon recognize all the Marks of Worth, and all the shining Qualities, which have been the usual Titles to this *Throne*, united in *one Personage*.

Your Lordship will make good *these Presages* with more Ease perhaps than you hear them.

But the Event shall justify the Prediction.

For we persuade ourselves your Lordship will abundantly fulfil the universal Expectations that have been conceived from your Promotion to this Dignity; both within the County *Palatine*, and throughout your whole Jurisdiction.

We of your Chapter in particular have promised to ourselves a peculiar Happiness from your Presence with us at your *Cathedral*, and in our free Access to you, as the Exigence of Cases may require, for Advice or Protection.

Had *the honourable Person* in whose Place I stand been here *himself* to have bestow'd *his* Eloquence on this Occasion, and to have clothed our Address in the Ornaments of *his* Language, more Justice had been done to his own and the Chapter's Sentiments, or at least our Compliment had been more happily discharged.

Our Wishes nevertheless of Prosperity to your Lordship in all your Undertakings are the same, and attend you with equal Ardor tho' they may not be express'd with so good a Grace. They extend, in the narrowest
Descrip-

to Richard *Lord Bishop of Durham.*

441

Description of them, to every Thing you can desire yourself, and are limited by nothing but the Will of Heaven.

And may your Lordship's Memorial in After-ages be lasting and precious as *those* of your *Predecessors* have, or as *that* of your *noble Father*, whose Memory will be for ever honoured in the highest Courts of Law in the Realm.

May you perpetuate *the Family Name* in this Northern Climate, as it is already perpetuated by the *Family Deserts* in the *Capital* of the Kingdom.

May you be *the Praise* of this Country as well as *a Blessing* to it, by wisely and steadily exerting your Power in both its Branches, *Ecclesiastical* and *Secular*; by a wholesome Administration of Discipline in your *Pastoral* and *Visitatorial* Capacity; by a noble and disinterested Use of your *Temporal Privileges*; and by a Dispensation of your *Revenues* unexceptionably laudable.

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To the Reverend the Clergy of the
Archdeaconry of *Northumberland*,
and of the Peculiar Jurisdiction of
the Dean and Chapter of *Durham*.

Rotbury, Aug. 5, 1757.

I Need not make any Apology for sending
to each of You the following *Discourses*,
of which I beg Your Acceptance.

Yet to have sent them to You without any
Reason prefixed to them, or without my
Compliments accompanying them, might
justly have been interpreted an Omission in
me.

You are not altogether Strangers to them
or their Design, having once heard them
publickly spoken. But as you are not ac-
quainted with the Reasons, *Why they were at*
first introduced into your Audience, Or, *why*
they now attend you at your own Doors, I shall
beg Leave in a few Words to apprize you of
the Motives of my Conduct in both these
Respects.

The

The *Substance*, or *principal Contents* of them were first put into Writing near ten Years ago, for the Use of One who had just enter'd into Orders, and for whose Success and Credit in the Ministry I had a more than ordinary Concern.

And to Him they were propounded and recommended under the Title of PREACHING RULES, or Directions towards the attaining to the *Best Manner* of discharging the Duties of the Pulpit, *viz. That Manner* which has been, and is generally used by the most celebrated and approved Preachers among *the English Divines*.

These Rules were XXX in Number : Comprised in II *Classes*. XX whereof were *Directions* to be observed in the *composing* of Sermons, and the other X in the *Delivery* of them.

They were in this first Draught little better than a Collection of detached or independent Remarks on the several *Modes of Preaching*, and on the Preference of some to others, which had been made at different Times, and on divers Occasions, partly by myself, and partly by such of my Acquaintance as I knew
to

to be Curious in their Observations, and Judicious in their Reflections on this Subject. These, I say, were thrown together, at that Time negligently enough, *i. e.* without much Regard to Order or Connection.

But some Years after (that I may now explain how they came to be laid before you) when I was considering of something proper to say to You at our Meeting in the *Ordinary Visitation* in 1755, *A Thought arose*, favoured perhaps by Fancy rather than by Judgment, *that you might be entertained* (for so I imagined) *with a Recital of these Pulpit Advices*, especially of those among them, which seemed less obvious to common Apprehension. And I so far indulged the Conceit, as to resolve to make a Trial how they would appear if they were somewhat better disposed and methodised, and put, if that could be done, into the Form of *One or more Charges*; not without some reasonable and pleasing Presumption also, that notwithstanding there were many of You whom I could not pretend to instruct in these Things, and from whom the most I could hope for, was, that they would take no Offence at such *Advices* being offered,—

Yet

Yet there were likewise *several* among the *Younger Clergy*, who were still closely employed in *Composition*, and had neither hitherto attained a sufficient Stock of Sermons, nor had formed, by Custom and Practice, a settled Mode or Habit of *Delivery*: To whom consequently these *Preaching Rules* might be of real Use and Benefit; at least so far as a bare Recital of them (for nothing more was thought of then) might be supposed to contribute to that good End.—Therefore under a Persuasion that I might be serviceable to *some*, without falling at the same Time under Censure from *others* who wanted no Informations of this Kind, I at length sorted and distributed the aforesaid *Rules* or *Advices* into III *Discourses*, which I ventured to deliver to You by Way of *Charge* at my three last *Visitations*.

And on this Occasion it was that I not only gave to these Rules a new Disposition and better Shew of Order and Connexion than they had before, but reduced their Number to XVIII for *Composition*, and VI for *Pronunciation*. Yet in other Respects I made little or no Alteration in them. Which last Circumstance I the rather mention, as it best accounts

accounts for my not having preserved that *Gravity of Stile* throughout, wherewith You have been usually addressed at our public Meetings: There being in these Discourses not only *several Phrases*, but *some Comparisons* also which may seem rather too light for the Solemnity of a *Charge*. Perhaps likewise *some Exemplifications* of the Rules, (as particularly those in the Article of *Stile*, which are brought to shew how much better *some Sort of Expressions* suit the Pulpit than *others* do) may appear scarce of Consequence enough to have been inserted in these *Discourses* when delivered in your Presence.—And yet, *My Brethren*, (for this is all the Excuse I have to make for them) considering how much these Kinds of Illustrations by *Similes*, *Allusions*, and *Examples of Propriety* in certain Phrases and Expressions, though they may carry at first Sight some Appearance of Levity, or too low Condescension to minute Things; nevertheless, I say, considering how much they help towards imprinting the Rules themselves in the Memory, (which in this Case would want all the Helps that could be given it) I was in Hopes they would be thought *on that Account*
the

the more pardonable, and so retained *all* or *most* of them as I found them in my first Draught which was designed for private Use.

And that these *Discourses* are now at length *presented* to You in another Dress, in which *some* of You might not expect to have seen them, *viz. under Types*, is intirely owing to a Request that *others* of Your Body at my last Visitation were pleased to make *that I would print them*. A Request to which I was unwilling to *give an absolute Denial*, and yet with which *I could not comply altogether*, or in the full Extent of it. And therefore, after some Deliberation, taking a middle Way, I have, *without publishing them*, procured from the Press *as many Copies*, as may suffice to bear my Respects to each of you at your own Lodgings; that upon a second, and closer View of them you may form a better Judgment concerning them, and by having them in your own Possession, Recourse may at any Time be more easily had to them by those who conceive any Advantage may be made of them. Or whether *any Benefit* may be expected from them or not, yet they may possibly afford *some Amusement* to You; Or if
they

they shall not afford even *that*, still I flatter myself they will be kindly received from the good Intention of the Donor, and in Testimony of the real Regards for You which are professed by

Your affectionate Brother,

And faithful Servant,

THO. SHARP.

VISITATION CHARGE, *Anno* 1755.

DISCOURSE I.

Reverend Brethren,

THAT the Meetings of the Clergy on these Occasions, when there is no extraordinary Matter to be communicated to them, may not pass for mere Forms, or useless Conventions; it has been usual to say something either of the Doctrine or Discipline of the Established Church, or of the Duties of the Parochial Clergy, or on some other Topic, relative either to our Order or Office, or to the Ecclesiastical Authority that is now exercised within this Realm.

For my own Part, instead of general Exhortations, or *Charges* strictly so called, and which, when addressed to the Clergy, must in the Nature of them principally consist in Injunctions and Monitions to Fidelity and Diligence in their Function, and which in consequence come with the best Grace from those who are invested with Episcopal Authority
and

and Dignity ; I say, instead of these solemn Kind of Admonitions I have always chosen to single out of the several Clerical Subjects some Point, of lesser Moment indeed, perhaps therefore less attended to, yet not undeserving the Attention of the Parochial Minister. And I chuse always to propound what I have to represent not in an authoritative Form, but rather in a brotherly Manner, by Way of reasonable Advice.

With this View, and under this Disposition I shall enter upon a Subject which I have never touched upon in any of my former Discourses on these Occasions, *viz. Concerning the best Manner of discharging our Office in the Pulpit* : Or concerning *that Mode of Preaching*, which, among many that are used, seems most subservient to Edification, *i. e.* most aptly suited to influence our Hearers with good Effects.

I do not mean to form any just or regular Discourse on a Subject with which you are already well acquainted, and which hath been very accurately examined into, and copiously discussed by celebrated Writers, (such as *Salignac* and *Gisbert*, though indeed *their Rules*

and *Advices* are, generally speaking, much better adapted to the *French* Taste and Mode of Preaching than to ours.) But shall content myself with giving You a few *Advertisements* (as Queen *Elizabeth* called Her *Articles* about Preaching) or certain *Items* of what seems to be the most material to be considered and observed by the *English* Preacher.

You must be very sensible, and I ought to be more so, of the Delicacy wherewith such a Point should be handled in Your Presence, and especially by One who can make but small Pretences of any Success that may have attended his own Practice in following those Rules he would recommend. Yet this should not hinder or deter me from freely communicating to You such *Advertisements*, or *Preaching Rules*, as have, either by way of private and friendly Advice been given occasionally to myself, or fallen accidentally in my Way, and been picked up at different Times in Conversation with eminent Divines, and long-practised Preachers: And which, whether they have had any good Effects upon myself or not, were yet, I confess very acceptable to me; and therefore may not perhaps
prove

prove otherwise to You. And if they shall appear to You under the same agreeable Light they did to me, I trust that on further Reflection upon them You will also judge them useful.

There are *two General Heads* under which the several particular *Advices* must be ranged.

The first is *Composition*,

Under which Term are included *Stile*, *Invention*, and *Method*.

The other is *Pronunciation*,

Or what we commonly call *Delivery*; including the whole Power, and all the Graces of *Elocution*.

Which last Branch of the Art of Preaching is not, I fear, so well studied and attended to by many of our Order, as one could wish it were. Though as to *Composition* it is commonly thought No Clergy upon Earth do *excel* our Countrymen in it, if they can be said to *equal* them.

However, that I may proceed in some Order and Method, I must begin with my *Advertisements* concerning *Composition*: And I shall at this Time briefly lay down the capital and most approved Rules for forming or

regulating the Preachers Stile, or the Language of the Pulpit.

I. The Grand Maxim by which we are to be guided in all those *Compositions* which are distinguished by the Name of *Sermons* is this, *viz.* *That they are verbal Instructions*, designed to be taken *by the Ears* of the Persons instructed, and are not originally formed to be read *by their Eyes*. Therefore like all other Addresses to an Audience, if not understood at first Hearing are good for nothing. What may well pass in a written Discourse, on which the Eye may dwell, will not do so in a Sermon *under Delivery*; because that admits not of any Stop for Reflexion. Therefore the first Character of a good Preacher, in point of *Stile*, is, that he be understood by every Body, as the Words come out of his Mouth.

For the better Attainment of which primary Qualification the second Rule comes seasonably in Aid, *viz.*

II. *Long Sentences in Sermons to be avoided* as much as possible. They are too large for the Swallow of Ordinary Capacities. But break them into three or four distinct Sentences,

tences; and they will all easily be taken down, and all will become Food.

Concise Expressions, provided they be also plain and clear, will make their Way where long and laboured Periods cannot enter.

Good Sentences are sometimes lost, because they are not heard; the unhappy Consequence of a low Voice, or of an irregular unequal Pronunciation. But good Sentences are oftner lost (at least among the Vulgar) because when heard they are not immediately understood: And this frequently proceeds from too great Copiousness and Exuberancy of Expression. Whereas *Retundity*, and every other Beauty of *Stile*, is at any Time to be given up for the Sake of *Perfpicity*.

The common People indeed are apt to call what they cannot understand *High Divinity*. But they who give Occasion to them to use this Phrase, will be placed by considerate Men among Preachers of *low Rank*.

Another Rule greatly subservient to *Perfpicity* is,

III. *Never to keep a principal Word in a Sentence at a Distance*, if it can be brought out early; or, to express it otherwise, *Never*

to leave the Hearer in Suspence to the very End of the Sentence, if you can let him into the meaning of it, as you proceed in it.

If I should now say, for Instance——*This Observation which I am making is not only consistent with, and agreeable to, but indeed results from the foregoing Rules.*—This would be justly called, *Stammering in Stile*. For the plain and unembarrassed Language, or the Sentence properly continued, would run thus.——*This Observation is consistent with the foregoing Rules, and is agreeable to them; and not only so, but indeed it results from them.*—I know such like Dislocations of principal Words are common in Writers, who use them as Ornaments of Language. But they do not suit with the Stile of the Pulpit; in which, I think, it is an universal Rule, that *the Sentiment* to be conveyed must never be hurt, impair'd, or obscured for the Sake of embellishing *the Sentence* that conveys it.

IV. A fourth Rule is, *to speak for the most Part in the Concrete rather than in the Abstract*: That is, to unite Agents with their Actions, and not to separate Habits and Qualities from the Persons that possess them.

Ex.

Ex. gr. Instead of saying, *Piety and Virtue will bring Joy and Happiness in the End, and Sin, however triumphant for a Season, will finally bring forth Misery and Sorrow*; say rather, — *A pious and good Man will rejoice and be happy in the End, and Sinners, however they may triumph for a Season, will be finally miserable and wretched.*

The Sentiments or Doctrine is the very same in both Cases; and perhaps the former Phraseology may be held more *polite*: Yet there is something in the latter, which brings the Sentiment more Home to the ordinary Man's Mind, and is therefore the more proper for the Pulpit.

And it is no small Recommendation of this Rule, that our blessed Saviour commonly spake in the *Concrete*, very rarely in the *Abstract*.

And these four Rules above-mentioned are chiefly to be attended to in the *instructive* or *didactic* Parts of a Discourse; whereas the *pathetic* or *persuasive* Parts of a Sermon not only allow, but require a greater Liberty in Language to be taken. Here *Tropes* and *Figures* may be more safely admitted, and all
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the *Arts of Oratory* displayed; And here it is, *The Talent of Eloquence*, where there is one, ought principally to be exercised. Which brings me to the 5th Rule.

V. *To make a suitable Difference between the Stile that is employed in the Pathetic, and that which is used in the Didactic.* For one and the same Form of Construction will not agree equally well with both, any more than one and the same Mode of Utterance and Delivery can be used with equal Propriety in both.

The whole Art of *Composition* in the *instructive* Part lies in putting Truths or Sentiments into such an Order, and into such Expressions, as will carry them into the *Understanding* of every attentive Person. While the Art of *Persuasion* lies rather in speaking to the *Heart*, and conveying thither the most interesting and affecting Motives by engaging and insinuating Language.

But neither the *didactic* nor the *pathetic* should be continued long at a Time. Tedious Instructions dull the Attention, and tedious Addresses cloy the Mind.

They do best when properly intermixed. But only the instructive Part must still go first:

first : For the *Head* must be properly *informed*, before the *Heart* can be properly *warmed*.

VI. The sixth Rule relates to the Decency and Modesty of Stile, *viz. To avoid with Care whatever borders upon the Pedantic*, and not to depreciate good Reasoning by enforcing it magisterially.

Preachers should not appear as *Disputants*, nor carry themselves as *Preceptors* ; they should rather put on the Character of Counsellors and friendly Advisers.

To dictate or dogmatize in an overbearing Way, though with Truth in ones Mouth, renders that Truth less acceptable.

It is also a foolish Confidence to do so at a Time, or in a Place, where Nobody may contradict one. For who so insists in the Pulpit on what he says, being unanswerable, or challenges the World, to defeat his Argument, (which yet strictly speaking, he oftentimes might justly and safely do) yet nevertheless to do so in these Circumstances, and before a silent Audience, is giving much the same Proof of his Skill in Reasoning, that the King's Champion doth of his Prowess in Arms,

Arms, when he makes his Challenge at the Coronation, before the unarmed Multitude.

To which let me add another Rule, relative also to Decency in Stile, and that is,

VII. Seventhly, *To avoid, as much as may be, Egoisms, or the speaking any Thing in the Pulpit upon ones own private Judgment or Authority.*

Monsieur Pascal wished that the Pronouns *I* and *Me*, were banished out of Conversation; intimating the Disagreeableness of drawing *Self* too often into common Subjects. And what he observed holds stronger for discarding these Terms in the Pulpit. For although in Transitions, and on some other Occasions they come in naturally, and are used inoffensively, as—*I shall discourse—Consider with me—I shall proceed next, or—Let me now conclude—and the like*; Yet in other Places and on other Occasions, they are much better dropp'd than used. As for Instance, Instead of saying, with an *Egoist*,—*I cannot come into this Exposition—I cannot say I see the Force of this Argument*,—Speak rather to the same Effect in these or the like Words:—*This Exposition is not to be admitted; It is not easy*
to

to see where the Force of this Argument lies,—
and so on, in other like Instances.

Indeed our Saviour's Discourses do abound with *Egoisms*; because he taught as one having Authority, both to correct the received Doctrines which needed Improvement, and also to teach new Doctrines of his own. And when we shall meet with another infallible Guide or Interpreter, we shall readily allow him his *Egoisms* too.

And so much for *Stile* or the *Rules of Expression*.

I have not Time to proceed now to the other Articles that fall under this Head of *Composition*, viz. *Invention* and *Method*: Two Things of very great Use in framing our Discourses for the Pulpit; and which will admit of very easy and practicable Rules, as may perhaps be shewn hereafter, if we live to meet again.

At present let the following Observation shut up what has been now said upon *Stile*, viz. that young Preachers are but too apt to be solicitous about Elegance in their Phrases, and study to be *polite* in all their Expressions, and sometimes *polish* them *so high* that vulgar
Hands

Hands can lay no hold on them, and frequently by these Means they not only overdress their Arguments, but give an unnatural Stiffness to their whole Composition; whereas old Preachers are generally so sensible of these mistaken Notions and misplaced Labours, that they commonly grow sick of their own juvenile Compositions, and scarce know how to bring them up again into the Pulpit; at least without some proper Retrenchment of the Redundancies, and such a chastening of the Luxuriances of their youthful Fancies, as a maturer Judgment, formed upon Practice, requires them to make. Which Knowledge and Judgment from Experience, (I believe an Experience generally avowed) gives great Confirmation to several of the Rules which have been now recommended:—Recommended, you will remember, to your Consideration only, and not to your Practice, further than you shall in your own Prudence think it advisable to follow them.

VISITATION CHARGE, *Anno* 1756.

DISCOURSE II.

Reverend Brethren,

THOUGH I must not flatter myself with thinking that what I say to you, on these Occasions, deserves much to be remember'd, yet the Subject I took in Hand the last Year will scarce be so soon forgotten, but that you may retain some general Idea of the *Advices* then given you concerning Compositions for the Pulpit; and particularly concerning the Rules by which a Preacher may best form his *Stile*.

There remain a few *Advices* more concerning *Invention* and *Method* in Composition, which I had not Time then to communicate; but which it is hoped you will now hear with the same Patience and Candour with which You before attended to the Rules for *Stile*.

And that they may appear less tedious to You, I shall not only use what Brevity I can in the Recital of them, but shall give you
them

them in their Original Drefs as they were first drawn up and prepared for the better helping of the Memory. On which Account alone, I persuade myself You will the more readily excuse some of the *quaint Terms* made use of, and some of the *Comparisons* which are introduced; not out of any ludicrous Turn of Fancy, but merely for the Sake of fixing in the Mind those Rules which they serve at the same Time to illustrate.

Touching Invention the Advices are these.

I. *Never to think ones self obliged on any Subject to say all that one can say, (as Lawyers do, and properly enough, when they plead in Court for Fees) but to content ones self in the Pulpit with saying what is most pertinent, most useful and instructive to the Auditors.*

And in consequence of this,

II. *Never to pursue any Subject over-curiously into its Minuteneffes, which is a Species of Wire-drawing. The Reason is, because Composers are too apt in such Pursuits to over-run and get beyond clear Ideas, and to spin their Thread so fine as to lose Sight of it themselves. Or if they think they still see it themselves, yet they should remember that*
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the major Part of their Audience have no Sight at all for fine Threads: And to talk out of Sight is the same in Effect with talking in the Dark; which, whensoever we seem to be in Danger of doing, it is best to give over; and to return to what is plain and intelligible, and suited to Edification.

III. *Never to employ Invention in explicating Things that are already plain.* For this is the Way to make those Things less plain than they were before, at least to vulgar Capacities.

As for Instance: What Conscience or Reason by its common Lights inwardly preaches to People, we have no Need to teach, but only to remind them of. For these Divine Admonitions have so far prepared our Way that we use their Dictates as so many *Axioms* from which we deduce other Truths, as *Mathematicians* do their *Theorems*.

To which may I add in the 4th Place,

IV. *The same Rule holds against Attempts to explain such Things as in their own Nature cannot be comprehended by us, or made out more clearly than they already are in the Word of God.*

And thus revealed Mysteries come under the Notion of inexplicable Maxims, to which we can no more by the Help of Invention add Light, or give Weight, than we can to Truths that are intuitive.

Therefore on all such Points, whether of Natural Religion resting principally on Conscience, or Revealed Religion resting wholly on Faith, No Good was ever done in popular Assemblies by any supposed Improvements from *Invention*. Philosophers and Scholastics will and may debate among themselves as they please upon such first Principles; but Preachers must not enter into any of their Subtleties, lest they should confound Men's common Ideas of known Truths by unnecessary Refinements.

But then although the great Truths of Religion and Morality require neither Enlargement nor Decoration from *Invention*, but need only, to be fairly stated or pointed out, because when attended to they will make their own Way by their own Weight; Yet

V. *Invention is of prime Use and Service in conducting the auxiliary Arguments, and in bring-*

bringing up the Rear of Motives and Persuatives to Practice.

When we come, for Instance, to enforce a natural Obligation, or a plain Scripture Duty with special Inducements from Reason and Experience, then we may range freely through all the Topics of Invention, and ransack the Magazines of the Orators to find proper Matter for our Purpose.

And indeed were we to go on no further than the three common logical Topics, *Cur*, *quomodo* & *quando*, for Reasons *Why* a Thing is to be done, and for Directions *How* and *When* it is to be done, they will amply furnish us with Matter on most Subjects, and especially the practical ones. Upon which I would just take Notice of how great Consequence to Edification the Topic *Quomodo* is, or the instructing People *How* any Duty is to be performed: This being a far more useful Lesson to them, and perhaps a more difficult Task for us, than the satisfying them *why* or *wherefore* a Thing *ought* to be done: And therefore of all the *Loci Communes*, to which we have recourse, there is none in which we can more profitably employ ourselves than

in this. Every serious and good Man will be apt to gather something on this Topic from his own Experience, and will be able to explain *the How* from his own Feelings, and from Reflections on his own private Conduct, more usefully to others, and more satisfactorily to himself, than by any other Method of Invention. And happy is he whose Heart and Conscience can furnish him with a *Probatum* of the *Prescription* that he gives to others.

And to these *Common-places* which are called *the Logical*, let me subjoin

VI. In the sixth Place a Sacred Topic, peculiarly useful to those who compose for the Pulpit, *viz. Scripture Examples*. Of which great Benefit may be made, when they are properly selected, and discreetly accommodated to the Business in Hand. They weigh much with the Vulgar, and are easily remember'd.

But one of the largest Funds of *Invention*, is that of

VII. *Similitudes, Comparisons, Emblems, &c.* Which are greatly recommended by our Saviour's Manner of instructing the common People,

People, by Parables, by Allusions to natural *Phænomena*, by sundry Images taken from Things of daily Use in Life, and even by Proverbs and vulgar Sayings. All which he made beautifully subservient to the Illustration of his Doctrines.

Only let it be observed on this Article of *Similes*, that there ought to be a due Share of Discernment to distinguish what are proper for a Sermon, and what are not so. For as Fancy is boundless, so are fanciful Comparisons.

As I remember we had at the University a peculiar Term for extravagant Conceits of this Kind in the Compositions of Preachers. I think we called them *White Bears*, meaning thereby such *Emblems* or *Similies* as were too bold and striking to be easily forgotten; and yet, from some strange Impropriety or Oddness in them, could not be remembered but with Discredit to the Brains that form'd them.

Nevertheless Similitudes prudently chosen and sparingly interspersed are not only great Ornaments to a Discourse, but have special Effects both in illustrating a Doctrine, and imprinting it on the Mind.

And these I apprehend are the most material Advices concerning Invention.

Indulge me now in a Word or two upon *Method*.

Every Man, you will say, must take his own. True.

True also that no one Method of Composition whatsoever can be prescribed that will suit with all Subjects and all Occasions.

Yet, on the other Hand, it is no less true that there are *some general Rules* from which we must never depart, if we would have our Compositions pass for *Methodical*.

I. As First. *To abide by the Subject, whatever it be, and not to stray or wander from it into Points that are not allied to it.*

This is commonly called *keeping close to the Text*. Of which good Rule some Preachers are so little observant that whatever Text they set out with, they will nevertheless run their Chase through the Bible, as if they thought nothing was out of Method that was but in Scripture, from *Genesis* even to the *Revelations*.

Such Ramblers from their assumed Subject are stiled, and not improperly,——*Universal*

versal Preachers: Of which Sort generally Speaking are the *extempore Men*; and for a very obvious Reason: More obvious than any that is to be given for the like Digressions in those who pen their Discourses, and have Time to weigh and sort their Materials, and to dispose them into such Form and Order that the several Parts of the Composition may be adjusted to each other, and every Part may be made to contribute to the Strength of the Whole.

II. But Secondly, It is hardly consistent with Method, never with good Method, to make Excursions into Branches even of the same Subject, if the Consideration of those Branches be not authorized by the Text itself. For as Discourses are to be confined to the Subjects that are treated of in them, so Subjects themselves are to be limited by the Texts that are taken for them: Unless perchance the Subject itself happens to be some *Modern Argument*, *State Topic*, or other *occasional Thesis*, to which no Text in Scripture hath any direct or immediate Reference: In all which extraordinary Cases, as we must never think to make any Text speak what was not ori-

ginally intended in it, we must content ourselves with such Touches upon it, or Allusions to it, as may preserve an Idea of Relation, though perhaps not a close one, between *the Sermon* and *the Text*. But

III. Of several Methods that may be used, *That* will always appear to be the best, whereby the Subject contained in the Text may be the easiest understood, and the Discourse made upon it the easiest remembered.

And it matters not whether this Disposition be made by regular and formal Divisions into Heads, or by any other artificial Disposition of the several Arguments for the better engaging the Attention at present, and the better helping the Memory afterwards.

Some Preachers too fancifully adhere to a Method of splitting into Heads, and into a certain Number of them too, on most Occasions. I do not mean hereby to blame them, for what is in *Method* and due Order is, generally speaking, well. But yet this Rule of splitting may oftentimes be changed into a better; And especially on those Occasions where the Preacher takes upon himself the Part of an Orator: Under which Character
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the Concealment of Method often proves an Advantage to the Address. For a Discourse, we know, may be full of Art and Contrivance, and even elegantly *methodical*, and yet shall seem, at least to the Unlearned, to have no Traces of Skill discoverable in it. But the Victories of Eloquence are sometimes obtained, like those of great Captains, by playing off the concealed Batteries; whereby the Audience is more successfully smitten, than when the whole Tire of Artillery is discovered beforehand.

You will still remember that I am only giving You some general Hints of Points which may be pursued at leisure by as many of You as are yet employed in *Compositions*, and are not already furnished with a Stock of Discourses sufficient for the Demands of Your Stations and Cures. To work by Rule, when we do work, is much better than following Fancy and Imagination: Nay much better than endeavouring merely to imitate Others, though they be Writers of the greatest Credit and Renown: Because unless we know, and mind, and apply to those same Rules which they followed, and which make
their

their Writings appear to such Advantage, we may indeed imitate them, but really without any Resemblance ; and seem to ourselves to follow them close, and yet without coming any Thing the nearer to them.

I have not hitherto said any Thing on a Point which the *French* Writers on *Christian Eloquence* never fail to mention. They speak of it under the highest Characters ; styling it *L'Onction*, (for which we have no Word in *English*): And as they make a distinct Article of it, it hath not fallen, so far as it relates to *Composition*, under any of the foregoing Heads.

They mean by it, as I take it, A truly religious Spirit that reigns throughout the whole *Composition*, enlivens and sanctifies it, and betokens the Composer himself to be a sincere good Man; One that has a true Sense of what he says ; who talks not merely from just Ideas, but from a season'd Heart ; evidencing by the whole Turn of his Expressions that he not only does firmly believe all that he advances, but earnestly desires his whole Audience may be also convinced of the same.

But

But indeed this *Unction* (if one may so render the *French*) is as discernible in that other Branch of the Preacher's Character, *Pronunciation*, as it is in *Composition*; nay, perhaps sometimes it may be thought more so. You will see what is meant by it, when it is spoken in Regard to *Delivery*, in my next Discourse, should it please God to give me another Opportunity of going through with my Preaching Rules, at our Meeting together on a like Occasion.

VISITATION CHARGE, *Anno* 1757.

DISCOURSE III.

Reverend Brethren,

YOU may well expect I should at length make an End of a Subject on which I have already twice addressed you. And tho' I am sensible of my own Inabilities to do it Justice, and treat it as worthily as it deserves: yet as you have been pleased to attend to my Advices, such as they be, on a Subject so extremely well suited to these Occasions, I had rather make a third Experiment of your Candour, than fail in fulfilling my Part on a Point of such Consequence to us all.

I shall therefore now proceed to give you the Remainder of those Rules for Preaching, which I thought, and I hope from what you have heard of them already, you think too, not to be undeserving your Consideration.

My first Discourse you may recollect was wholly taken up in setting forth in several
Par-

Particulars, *How our Stile may be best adjusted and accommodated to the Use of the Pulpit.*

In my last, this Time twelve Months, I treated on *Invention* and *Method*, and of *their singular Use in framing and drawing up Sermons*. And under one or other of these Heads I laid before you, as I think, all the approved Rules for *Composition*.

And the Point that comes now to be spoke to by way of Conclusion is *the Manner of discharging ourselves in the Pulpit, or, what we commonly call Delivery*: Which is the Art of happily executing with the Tongue, what is previously schemed and prepared with the Pen.

And indeed this, when you consider it well, will be found a most marterial Article in our Subject. For what is *Stile*? what is *Invention*? what is *Method*? if there be wanting that which alone can set off and give Life and Grace to them all, *viz. A proper Elocution, or a just Delivery*?

And this as I once before took the Liberty of intimating to you is that Part of the publick Service which our *English* Clergy,—
pardon

pardon the Suggestion—do not so thoroughly study as might be wished.

The late judicious Bishop of *London*, Dr *Gibson*, who understood the Laws of the Pulpit as well as any other of Ecclesiastical Denomination, was very sensible of this Defect in many of our Order : And in one of his Charges reminds his Clergy of what *Demosthenes* is reported to have said, when he was asked *what was the first Qualification of a good Orator?*—He answered, *Pronunciation.*—When asked again, what was the second?—He answer'd again, *Pronunciation.*—What the third? still *Pronunciation* : As if without *that*, no Oration could be worth attending to.

It is true that *Pronunciation* among the Ancients included the whole Action of the Speaker, or the Co-operation of all his Members with his Tongue, the more vigorously to impress his Sentiments on the Hearers. Which combined Arts of Address, in the *Greek* and *Roman Orators*, were indeed to great Purpose in their Days, considering the Arguments they had to treat upon, the Customs and Privileges of the Courts in which they

they pleaded, and the Temper and Taste of their Auditors. And it is as true that with us the Case is far different, and that our Subjects though they afford Light and Life much beyond theirs, yet would be injured by being handled with Contention and Vehemence: For they are of a more delicate Nature, and are best set off in *solemn Composure*, or what we may more properly call, in Opposition to the practised Movements of the Ancients, *A majestic Tranquillity*. For Agitations of the Body or Theatrical Gestures are a kind of *Gasconade* in the Pulpit, which we readily resign to a neighbouring Nation. Our People would not be pleased with such scenical Representations, or enthusiastic Behaviours; neither, if they would, ought we to encourage them in so false a Taste.

But then——seeing we are in a Manner obliged to lay aside the Use and Study of that Part or Mode of *Pronunciation*, which consisted in *Action*, how much greater Reason have we to cultivate and improve all the Powers of *the Tongue*, and to exercise ourselves in all the possible Graces of *Elocution*;
in

in which the whole Art of our *Pronunciation* or *Delivery* must now consist.

A few general Advices on this Head will be sufficient, and, I will presume, not unacceptable.

I. In the first Place, I believe, you will readily agree with me, that the Use of Notes, which is a very valuable Privilege, and in many Respects beneficial, was never designed to destroy the Energy, deaden the Vivacity, or even in any wise restrain the Force and Effects of a Discourse upon the Audience.

How greatly then is this Advantage abused, when it tempts us to read *with Apathy*, what ought to be spoken with as much Life and Spirit as if it flowed unpremeditated !

Hence comes the unlucky Distinction between *Preachers* and *Readers of their own Sermons*. The one speak or deliver themselves like *Advocates* at the Bar : But the other more like *the Clerk of the Court* reading the Indictment behind the *Table*.

Towards the Remedy of which Misuse of Notes let it be observed, secondly,

II. That *we should endeavour to preach in the Manner we talk*, provided we do it loud enough

enough to be heard, and leisurely enough to be heard distinctly.

This is in some Measure intimated in the very Terms we use for this Part of our Ministration. *Homilies* from the *Greek* Word: *Sermons* from the *Latin*: *Discourses* *English*. All of them importing an easy familiar kind of Address to the People.

And whereas there is something in every Man's Talk which is peculiar to himself, it is further adviseable for every one in preaching to keep to his peculiar or usual Manner of Elocution. For what is most natural is generally most becoming; and the taking Pains to alter our Customary Mode of *Pronunciation* seldom turns to good Account: Besides that what is got by Art, or by imitating others is ever apt to be attended more or less with a Spice of Affectation.

And this Rule being mentioned leads us directly to another, which is

III. *To avoid in preaching as we do in common Life, sameness of Tone, and sameness of Cadence.*

A Musician that plays only on *one String*, or always in the *same Key*, will never make good Musick.

The Voice is capable of infinite Modulations, and ought to be exercised in all that Variety that is requisite for expressing both the Force and Beauty of every Sentiment that is conveyed by it to the Audience.

But where this study is quite over-looked, and this Care totally neglected, ill Customs take Place, and being continued become at length inveterate. There are some who yet retain *the Cant* they got at School : And what is more strange they retain it only in the Reading Desk and in the Pulpit : And being *Men in Sense*, Learning, and Argument, are still *Boys in Delivery* ; repeating their Sermons, with their Books in their Hands, *at Seventy*, as they did their Lessons at *Seven*.

But how well soever the *Tone* and *Cadencies* may be adjusted for making the Discourse pass off agreeably, yet there is something further necessary to a good *Delivery*, namely

IV. *That we should observe Time and Measure in what we say*, so as not to be always in
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the *same Strain*, either uniformly *rapid* or uniformly *slow*.

For as Compositions are not all of a Piece, that is, of one and the same Kind of Stuff and Texture throughout, but consist of Parts which have a different Structure and Cast, so neither should one and the *same Measure* of Recital be used with them from the Beginning to the End.

Some Passages require a swifter Execution : Others a more deliberate. Our Fluency should be like that of the Streams, which hasten over the Shallows, but move slowly in deep Places.

Indeed a continued Rapidity, besides its being wastful and unthrifty by expending much Matter in a little Time, hath other unfriendly Consequences. For it doth in Appearance put all Topics upon the Level ; And makes a Man seem to treat even Mysteries in Religion with the same Haste and Unconcern, as if he was talking about indifferent Things.

You may have known perhaps some formal Persons who would in their common Conversation speak as gravely and solemnly

upon a *Straw* or a *Feather*, as if they were treating a *Point of Divinity*. This seems absurd enough. But it is much more so when the Case is reversed, and the most interesting Subjects are spoken of with as much Negligence and Precipitancy, as if *the Theme* were of no greater Consequence than a *Feather* or a *Straw*.

Yet what has been observed about *Tones*, and *Cadencies*, *Time* and *Measure* must not interfere with the fifth Rule, which is

V. *To preserve a sufficient Exertion of the Voice through every Part of the Discourse.*

They indeed who have weak Constitutions and low Voices must do as well as they can : And what cannot be helped will never be excepted against.

But I point this Advice to others, who neither want Lungs, nor have any Design of sparing them, but yet through an ill-judged Mode of speaking accustom themselves to drop or sink their Voices towards the Close of their Sentences, or suffer it to die away in their Cadencies. Whereby they really, tho' undesignedly, deprive several of their Hearers of Part of their Discourse, and leave them to
supply

supply by Conjecture those Remnants of the Sentences which they cannot recover by their Ears. This is preaching by Halves to Auditors so circumstanced: 'Tis a Kind of Stifling in the Birth what should be delivered and brought forth compleat and intire.

Let me add that all these Rules above-mentioned hold equally good, be our natural Command of Voice more or less, being equally practicable by all of us within that Sphere or Compass, be it greater or smaller, which we can audibly fill.

And now we are prepared for the sixth and last Rule, which indeed comprizes all the former, and is properly the Aggregate of them all, and this I shall give you in *Tully's* Definition of *Pronunciation* so far as we are concerned in it.

VI. *Pronunciatio est ex Rerum et Verborum Dignitate Vocis Moderatio.* To rule and guide the Voice by the Import of the Sense, and the Turn of the Diction: To frame and adapt it to the Subject Matters we treat of, and to the Words by which we describe them: To mould our Delivery into their Shapes, so far

as it is capable of taking New Forms, and to alter it as the Topics themselves change.

Were a Man, for Instance, to give his Advice to some Dear Friend about Points of the utmost Moment to his Family or Affairs, surely he would model his Voice after another Manner than if he was reading a Paragraph of foreign News in the *Gazette*.

Matters of Weight must be delivered, *ex Rerum Dignitate*, distinctly and slowly to those whom they concern; and with such an Air of Seriousness, as may best express the Speaker's internal Sense of their Importance to be attended to; and which, in Discourses concerning Religion, makes a principal Part of that *Uction* which the Foreign Writers on this Subject hold essential to the Perfection of a *Christian Orator*.

Thus for Instance, as often as mention is made in our Discourses from the Pulpit of God's Attributes and Perfections, or of any Thing that borders upon the Majesty of the Divine Being, it must be done with suitable *Reverence and Humility*; *Speaking of Him, ex Cathedra Christi*, as we would *Speak to Him,*

Him, Stantes ad Altare: Which gives the full Image of what I mean.

But other Things are to be handled less awfully, and with more Spirit.

The Devil and Sin with an Accent of Indignation and Aversion.

The Pretences and Scoffs of Unbelievers with an Air of Resentment and Disdain.

But Sinners themselves, They are our Brethren, are always to be spoken of with Pity, Shame, and Concern.

God's Favours and Promises are to be exhibited with Confidence, or a lively Assurance.

His Threatnings and Terrors with a foreboding Dread and Solitude.

Instructions are to be given with Uniform, Clearness, and Distinction.

But the Persuasives are to be urged with all the Variety of *Pathos* that we can give them.

And then as for Transitions and all other Sentences that serve only to connect the Parts of the Discourse together, let them be recited, as Things of no Consequence, with the utmost Indifference.

I am

I am just coming, I see, to the End of my Paper, and so must comprize as much as I can in a few Words.

Such is the Benefit and Power of Art in Delivery, that even a *Stop* or a *Pause* properly made, and on some Occasions, shall be equivalent to a *Sentence*.

And a short Sentence, that is big with Matter, and well prepared, being also emphatically spoken, shall be sometimes as significant in its Effects as a whole *Period*, or any labour'd Tour of Words.

And a *Period*, delivered by One who is Master of *Pronunciation*, shall be better remember'd, and do more good, than a whole Sermon from the Mouth of another who is regardless of his *Delivery*.

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